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DISSERTATION ABSTRACT 
Jessica Elizabeth Neafie 
Doctor of Philosophy 
Department of Political Science 
March 2020 
Title: Investigating the Effects of the Global Economy on Policy and Practice in 
Developing Countries: Foreign Direct Investment and the Environment 
Is foreign direct investment (FDI) good for the environment in developing 
countries? Every year the number of foreign investors in developing countries grows, and 
its importance leads developing nations to make the political environment more 
hospitable for foreign investors that seek access to natural resources and new markets. I 
contribute to the debate over the influence of globalization on the environment by asking: 
Do the effects of multinational corporations (MNCs) on a developing country’s 
environment reflect the commitment of the source country to environmental protection? 
Existing literature suggests that international economic flows are channels by 
which countries providing investment financing can influence the regulatory standards in 
recipient country. This dissertation explores the possibility of a source effect, where 
countries receiving FDI begin to reflect the environmental practices of those MNCs 
providing FDI. In a mixed methods research study, I use content analysis and large-n 
quantitative analysis to evaluate (i) what distinguishes the effects on environmental 
protection of FDI from multi-national corporations (MNCs) from different source 
countries; and, (i) how does FDI from MNCs from different source countries lead to 
different outcomes in recipient countries. I find preliminary evidence that suggests that 
v 
levels of development of the source countries of FDI significantly influence whether FDI 
improves or degrades environmental quality in recipient countries.  
I demonstrate that the increasing flow of FDI from developing countries is leading 
to pressures for and evidence of declining environmental standards and outcomes in 
recipient countries. This dissertation provides preliminary evidence supporting a new 
perspective on international economic flows, showing a ‘source effect’ in which the 
strength of concern regarding and interest in protecting the environment in the source 
country for FDI has an impact on the degree to which environmental outcomes are 
promoted in recipient countries. 
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CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION
Globalization is increasingly harming environmental justice. Inadequate 
compromise between domestic governments and multinational corporations (MNCs) has 
led to failures in protecting environmental resources that the poorest individuals and 
communities need. It is largely believed that foreign investment from MNCs is critical to 
development, and it is largely assumed that this investment will diffuse best practices and 
initiate improvements in technology that will alleviate environmental problems 
(Schmidheiny 1992). However, the ability to move production anywhere on the globe 
also gives corporations increasing freedom to locate businesses where they are the most 
profitable at the expense of local communities and the environment (Madeley 1999). Of 
particular concern is whether MNCs are bringing policies and practices that are more 
beneficial or harmful to environmental outcomes in the countries where they invest.  
Evidence regarding the relationship between foreign direct investment (FDI) and 
the environment is mixed and is used to sustain competing claims of “race to the bottom” 
and “race to the top” effects, depending on the environmental problem, industrial sector, 
or region under investigation (Vogel 1997). On one hand, it is possible to find evidence 
that foreign investors are not only having a negative impact on environmental resources 
(Neafie 2018) but also stalling the introduction of new environmental regulations that 
would improve the environment (Jorgenson 2007). On the other hand, evidence shows 
that foreign investors are bringing with them green regulations and technology and 
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encouraging their use in developing countries (Garcia-Johnson 2000). However, neither 
side of this debate has investigated the impact that different sources of FDI, and the 
subsequent diffusion of a variety of environmental policies and practices, will have in 
developing countries. 
To advance this debate, I examine how MNCs vary. I examine the possibility that 
“source effects”—the degree of potential environmental harm on host country regulations 
and practices deriving from the environmental atmosphere of a MNC’s home country—
will cause MNCs to have a more positive or negative impact on environmental practices 
in developing countries.1 This theory of source effects is predicated on the idea that 
exogenous factors at home—social, political, and economic—influence a corporation’s 
internal norms and discount rates, thereby changing their cost benefit analysis of different 
environmental strategies. As a result, companies from different socio-political and 
financial environments would have different environmental policies and practices.  
Second, I examine how these corporations are diffusing these behaviors into 
developing countries that have weaker environmental infrastructure. Investment into 
developing countries is further complicated because it is heavily concentrated in 
manufacturing and extractive industries, which are highly pollutant. This means that the 
environmental policies and practices a company carries with them become even more 
important for the environmental impacts of FDI. 
1 This is derived from the work of Adolph et al. (2017), which shows evidence to suggest a “Shanghai Effect” for trade 
in developing countries.  
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This project will examine the role of manufacturing and extractive MNCs by 
addressing the questions of how, when, and why FDI can affect green policy and practice 
in developing countries. This study contributes to the growing body of research on 
policy/environment relationships in comparative perspectives. Drawing from political 
economic theories—including liberal economic theories, foreign investment dependence, 
and source effects—and sociological approaches to society and the environment, I 
employ a three-part study that uses quantitative content analysis, rigorous panel 
regression techniques, and a case study of South-South investment.  
Figure 1.1: Research Design 
Figure 1.1 lays out the three-part research design, with the motivating questions. 
The second chapter is a content analysis of corporate reporting, which looks at 
commercial environmental policies and traces the institutional variation that may have 
prompted those policies. The findings of the content analysis indicate significant impacts 
by political and economic institutions, which are analyzed in the consequent chapters. 
Variation in corporate 
environmentalism
• How does corporate 
environmentalism vary 
due to social, political, and 
economic institutions in 
source countries? 
• Do companies from 
developed countries have
greener environmental 
polices?
• Do companies from 
democracies have greener
environmental policies?
• Do companies from 
countries with more 
environmental 
vulnerability have greener 
environmental policies?
Diffusion of environmental 
practices into developing 
countries though FDI
• Describe and explain the 
variation in the diffusion 
of environmentalism into 
developing countries. 
• How do the effects of 
developed and developing
source FDI on the 
environment differ in the 
host country?
• How do non-green 
sources of FDI more 
negatively affect the most
vulnerable groups? 
Exploring the local and 
national impacts of South-
South investment
• Describe and explain 
diffusion of corporate 
environmentalism through
a case study. 
• Why does corporate 
environmentalism in China 
look less green? 
• How does the level of 
Chinese corporate 
environmentalism affect 
the practices they diffuse
in developing hosts? 
• How does Chinese FDI 
negatively affect the most
vulnerable groups? 
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The third chapter examines how the environmental consequences vary by economic 
institutions—developed versus developing. This large-N panel data analysis finds 
evidence to suggest that companies from developing countries have adverse 
environmental outcomes in the other developing countries they invest in. Finally, to look 
more closely at this theory, I use a case study of Chinese corporations. China is a 
developing country with high levels of outward investment in other developing countries 
and a historically poor environmental track record. This exploration finds evidence to 
suggest that China is having a more harmful effect on the environment than other foreign 
or domestic investors in Africa. Combined together, this three-part research design tests 
how, when, and why globalization may or may not lead to desired green outcomes. 
Understanding Why Corporate Environmentalism Varies—Source Effects 
We should expect the effect of FDI to reflect the ideas, values, norms, and 
concerns that are embedded in the strategies and practices of those making the 
investments (i.e., MNCs). Corporations are made up of individuals who are largely 
influenced by the ideas, values, and norms of their society. Political, economic, and social 
institutions are the sources of information that encourage corporate behavior, and 
variation in these institutions cause strategies to change.  
The logic of this framework is that corporations are organizations managed by 
rational actors who find themselves in complex and uncertain situations. The main goal 
of business is to maximize profit, but the strategies to achieve this may shift based on 
external forces; these may alter not only expected benefits and costs, but also internal 
norms and discount rates, which may be applied to the cost-benefit analysis (Aligica, 
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Boettke, and Tarko 2019). A corporation will voluntarily undertake social responsibility 
practices, like those that benefit the environment, because profits “are the result of a win-
win synergistic relationship with its broader social environment” (Aligica, Boettke, and 
Tarko 2019, 191). The process depicting strategic choice is laid out in Figure 1.2, where 
we can see that managing actors would weigh the benefits and costs of certain strategies 
dependent on the internal norms, discount rates, and the perceived linkages to outcomes 
(adapted from Ostrom’s (1990) internal world of individual choice). This means that the 
valuation of expected costs and benefits relies heavily on exogenous factors, particularly 
the influence of stakeholder groups linked to the corporation, e.g., government, 
shareholders, consumers, and so on. As a result, shifts in the social environment, and 
variations in institutions that affect it will lead to different corporate practices. 
Figure 1.2: Corporate Strategic Choice (Source: Author, Adapted from Ostrom (1990)) 
Changes to the expected costs and benefit analysis of corporations are often 
motivated by the outcomes of previous strategies; however, shifts in internal norms or 
perceptions of stakeholders can alter the norms and discount rates of the MNC. Where 
Expected
Bene ts
Expected
Costs
Internal norms
Discount rate
Choice of
Strategies
Outcomes
Stakeholder groups: consumers,
polic  makers, shareholders,
NGOs, etc.
E e nal
Wo ld
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stakeholders share a strong internalized norm, one can expect the corporation to act in 
accordance with that shared norm. For example, a study on green corporate reporting 
found that companies in the United States that are influenced by more progressive norms 
were willing to spend more on sustainability, even when it cost the company more than it 
benefited it (Di Giuli and Kostovetsky 2014). In this study, the companies were 
influenced by stakeholders that shared a strong internalized norm: that corporate 
reporting and sustainability are important. The companies act as a result of social learning 
and engaging with the wider community and leverage these norms as a benefit to the 
corporation (Aligica, Boettke, and Tarko 2019). When a corporation ignores the needs 
and wants of the community, stakeholders shame it for that behavior, which costs money 
and reputation (Ambec and Lanoie 2008). However, when only a few stakeholders share 
a norm, corporations will act opportunistically—in their self-interest (Williamson 
1975)—and will pursue the path with the highest profit margins. 
This general model of corporate decision-making is open to specifications that are 
dependent on the source. The source of the MNC is where the most amount of 
stakeholder influence is felt, i.e., where the corporation gains the most amount of 
competitive advantage by engaging with the community (K. Zeng and Eastin 2007; 
Vogel 1995; Pauly and Reich 1997; Prakash and Potoski 2007; Adolph, Quince, and 
Prakash 2017; Aligica, Boettke, and Tarko 2019). The analysis in this dissertation 
examines where this variation exists over issues of the environment by looking at the 
social and political institutions that shift community perspectives in source countries, and 
it shows evidence to support the theory that variation in outcomes in the host country 
reflect differences at the source.  
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The Propositions 
The three propositions laid out here motivate the hypotheses I explore in my 
chapters linking the source to corporate environmentalism and the diffusion of 
environmental practices abroad. These propositions are purely conceptional, general 
statements prompted by the different literatures on corporate environmentalism, MNCs as 
sources for policy diffusion, and the relationship between MNCs and the developing 
countries in which they invest. Each of these propositions will inspire testable hypotheses 
in the chapters of my dissertation.  
Conditions for Green Corporate Environmentalism 
It is difficult to provide a specific definition of corporate environmentalism, but 
we can understand the type of expectations, ideas, and values it assumes. Corporate 
environmentalism often reflects more on civil society than the government in the source 
country, but both are motivating factors (Garcia-Johnson 2000). It is largely believed that 
foreign investment should lead to more sustainable practices through the diffusion of 
improved technology, innovation, and competition. However, it is often suggested that 
civil society and the government are only able to focus on environmental issues and 
sustainability when economic development is at a high level (Korten 2001; Zammit 
2003).  
Understanding this phenomenon requires a closer look at the Environmental 
Kuznets Curve (EKC) hypothesis. According to studies on this hypothesis, during lower 
levels of development, economic growth is prioritized over environmental protection, 
allowing for resource plunder and high pollution (Grossman and Krueger 1995; Yandle, 
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Bhattarai, and Vijayaraghavan 2004; Panayotou 1993). Only when development has 
reached a certain level, can society begin to focus on post-material values such as 
environmental concerns (Inglehart 1990). This means that when a nation is developing, 
economic growth is prioritized; if the economy and environmental protections come into 
conflict, the creation and enforcement of eco-friendly policies will be weakened or 
undermined in favor of the market (Gallego and Pitchik 2004). This theory is largely 
motivated by corporate material values, but it is also compelled by other entities such as 
the political elites and the citizens that select and support governments who provide high 
levels of economic growth (Mulligan, Gil, and Sala-i-Martin 2004; Hibbs 2000, 2001; 
Ferejohn 1986, 1999). Understanding that these groups motivate corporate strategic 
decision-making, I expect that there is a connection between the level of development 
and the level of green corporate environmentalism.  
Proposition 1. Corporate environmentalism reflects economic development and demands 
from stakeholders who are more likely to prioritize environmental policy when they reach 
a high level of economic growth, and development is stable. Green corporate 
environmentalism will increase in more developed countries when stakeholders share 
norms that prioritize environmental issues, thereby making corporate environmentalism 
greener when development levels are higher and less green when development levels are 
lower (Tested in Chapters 2 and 4). 
Diffusion of Environmentalism 
Multinational corporations (MNCs) operate in developing countries with weak 
environmental policies and poor infrastructure development. These economic and 
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political environments often prioritize foreign investment because it promotes economic 
growth and will make the atmosphere for investment as hospitable as possible, even 
weakening regulations in less important policy areas, such as the environment. This 
allows MNCs to operate in a strategic manner that is most beneficial to them, maintaining 
policies that provide the most competitive advantage. If an MNC has low levels of green 
corporate environmentalism, it will lack any motivation to improve its behavior. 
However, if it has high levels of corporate environmentalism, it might seek to improve its 
competitive advantage by encouraging local governments to increase the environmental 
regulations of the country. By studying source effects, new patterns develop for our 
understanding of outward investment and the competing claims over whether FDI creates 
a “race to the bottom” (RTB) or a “race to the top.” 
Theories that link development and increased FDI with environmental 
degradation are often associated with an RTB. Some RTB studies claim that foreign 
investors seek the promise of access to adequate infrastructure with opportunity for 
natural resource exploitation (Bellos 2010; Bellos and Subasat 2012; Hu, Deng, and 
Zhang 2013; Oneal 1994; Jessup 1999; Bues 2011). Other RTB studies claim that 
developing countries are just pollution havens in which MNCs shift their exploitative 
practices away from developed countries that have adopted more stringent policies and 
toward countries that have lax regulations (Levinson and Taylor 2008). These studies 
claim that investors have practices and policies aimed at exploiting host countries.  
If this were the case, then all FDI would be linked with poor environmental 
outcomes; however, evidence suggest that corporations export better technology and 
knowledge (Klein, Aaron, and Hadjimichael 2001; Modou and Liu 2017; Schmidheiny 
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1992) as well as promote norms of environmentalism that change the social and 
regulatory context between the industry and environmental sustainability (Garcia-
Johnson 2000). Research suggest that high income countries are not attracted by weak 
environmental standards because they are richer and already have higher environmental 
standards and better technology in place to meet any strict regulations; thus, they are not 
incentivized by pollution haven opportunities (Bhagwati 2004; Dean, Lovely, and Wang 
2009). 
The behavior of MNCs is motivated both by limiting costs and increasing 
benefits; they can be incentivized to change their behavior if the advantages of doing so 
outweigh the expense. For companies that already have strong environmental strategies, 
they are not going to change those policies (as it would be costly to do so) and will even 
promote environmentally beneficial policy changes if they may gain competitive 
advantage (Garcia-Johnson 2000). This indicates that corporations with greener 
environmentalism have a “race to the top,” or positive effect, on environmental outcomes 
where they invest. 
However, companies that have not adopted better environmental strategies may 
not change if the regulatory and social institutions where they invest do not provide 
incentives to do so. The MNCs are largely dependent on their source country’s markets 
and are not motivated by the local economy; thus, if the regulatory agencies are lenient, 
there are few host country incentives to change behavior. As a result, corporations with 
less green environmentalism should have a “race to the bottom,” or negative effect, on 
environmental outcomes where they invest. Proposition 2 proceeds from these 
observations and makes the connection between the source of corporate 
11 
environmentalism (Proposition 1) and eco-friendly outcomes in the host countries where 
MNCs invest.  
Proposition 2. The level of green corporate environmentalism an MNC carries may affect 
environmental outcomes in the developing host country. As MNCs diffuse their source 
country’s environmental policies and practices into the developing host country, MNCs 
from green sources should have a positive effect while MNCs from non-green sources 
will have a null or negative effect, depending on the current policies in the host 
developing country (Tested in Chapters 3). 
Environmental Justice in Developing Countries 
It is also important to understand that MNCs operating in developing states will 
have an effect not only on the economic system, but on the political and social system as 
well. On one hand, modernization theorists have been optimistic about the diffusion of 
environmentalism from MNCs to developing countries. MNCs help improve levels of 
environmental justice; when the MNC has stronger corporate environmentalism, its 
practices may influence local civil society, or it may transfer technology that could 
improve resource use and raise the societal norms on environmentalism to those of 
advanced industrialized countries.  
On the other hand, dependency literature has been highly critical of modernization 
theorists, claiming that more globalization could perpetuate dependency and under-
development (Valenzuela and Valenzuela 1978). MNCs harm developing countries when 
they promote resource exploitation and push governments to relax regulatory 
12 
requirements on the environment, not only harming the natural world but also the most 
vulnerable populations in developing countries (Rudra, Alkon, and Joshi 2018). The 
groups most vulnerable to pollution and resource scarcity are usually made up of 
marginalized citizens that have little political influence and suffer from high levels of 
poverty and inequality (Rigby and Wright 2013; Flavin 2012; Hickey and Bracking 2005; 
Gilens 2012). As these groups have no bargaining power, MNCs are able to capture 
governing agencies and either reduce environmental regulation or maintain the status quo 
when there are few regulations enforced. This results in worse environmental conditions 
in developing countries that receive investment from MNCs who are not influenced to 
use green practices and create green policies.  
The negative effects of non-green FDI from developing countries may only be 
negated by strong political institutions or a strong middle class, which are not mutually 
exclusive. Middle class groups tend to have more political clout, more resources for 
political action, and are more socially cohesive (Rigby and Wright 2013). As such, they 
can act as a check on the power of industry and communicate regulatory needs to 
policymakers. The middle class also helps bridge the gap between the rich and the poor, 
and it typically grows larger as a country develops. This group only forms as 
development grows, at lower levels of development there are less avenues for the citizens 
to make the government aware of environmental problems that need to be addressed. 
Proposition 3. FDI from non-green sources can adversely impact the poor’s access to 
natural resources and the levels of pollution they are exposed to; as a result, the poorer 
and less developed a country, the more negative the impacts of MNCs from non-green 
sources. At lower levels of development, the governments will be influenced by MNCs 
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over citizens, who may not be able to overcome collective action problems to lobby for 
stricter government regulations (Tested in Chapters 3 and 4). 
Research Design 
This dissertation is organized into three sections, exploring three propositions 
about corporate environmentalism and the role that the MNCs plays in diffusing 
environmental practices and policies in host countries. This study requires a mixed 
methods approach to explore how developed and developing source FDI varies in its 
effects on developing host country environmental policy and, to a lesser extent, why this 
variation happens. Through this process, I will show evidence to validate the source 
effects hypothesis. 
Figure 1.3 provides a visual representation of my project. My research design is 
largely based on testing the role of FDI in diffusing environmentalism from the source 
country to the host country. In the source country, stakeholder groups influence the 
strategies that become embedded in the corporation. The investment into corporations in 
the host country where the investor takes ownership and control of the corporation allows 
the investor to export their strategies with their investment. Consequently, the outcomes 
from the corporation in the host country then are largely dependent on the policies and 
practices that have been diffused through the foreign investor. 
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Figure 1.3: Flow of Corporate Environmentalism from Source Country to Host Country 
Case Selection 
For this study, I narrow my focus to manufacturing and extractive industries. The 
largest developing country investment comes from manufacturing and extractive 
industries, which have the greatest impact on the environment (Jorgenson 2007, 2006b; 
Rudra, Alkon, and Joshi 2018). The importance of these industries to economic growth in 
developing host countries makes it more probable that they will be able to export 
corporate environmentalism. These industries are the least likely groups to disseminate 
environmentalism and most likely to cause resource depletion and pollution. As a result, 
they are a hard test for positive effects from developed source countries, and if 
developing source countries do not show negative effects on environmental outcomes, it 
is unlikely they will in other less pollution-heavy sectors. There are some limitations to 
this case selection, however. It is important to note that extractive and manufacturing 
industries are more polluting than others, and so other industries must be considered. 
However, they may not have the same negative effects.  
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Research Methods 
I explore manufacturing and extractive industries in three different studies using a 
mixed methods approach. I first begin with a content analysis of corporate reports. In this 
analysis, I am making observations that capture the environmental reporting practices of 
corporations and then analyze them dependent on the political, economic, and social 
institutions of the state in which they originate. This analysis further develops the theory 
of source effects by showing that (i) there is variation between corporations from 
different sources and (ii) that this variation can be distinguished through institutional 
environments, particularly economic and political.  
Using the findings from Chapter 2, Chapter 3 tests the theory that MNCs from 
sources with different economic institutions will result in different outcomes in the 
developing host countries where they invest. Using a state-level panel study of greenfield 
investment2 in developing countries, I test the impacts of developing country inward FDI 
as a percentage of total FDI coming into a developing country on different environmental 
factors. This investigates the compositional effects of FDI—i.e., the impacts as 
developing country FDI composes an increasingly larger part of total investment. The 
major finding of this is that source effects are an alternative lens to understanding the 
variation in FDI impacts in developing countries,3 and that a greater number of greenfield 
FDI projects—in manufacturing and extractive sectors—from developing countries are 
 
2 Greenfield investments are the establishment of a subsidiary in a foreign country that has more investor control 
relative to investing in an existing local business. These types of investments are often used when expanding into 
emerging markets (Maverick 2019). 
3 For more information on source effects, see Adolph, Quince, and Prakash (2017). 
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associated with a worsening of the overall environmental situation in the host developing 
country. I find that developing countries that attract higher levels of FDI from other 
developing countries, thereby changing the composition of their investment flows, 
consequently, experience more harmful environmental impacts. 
Finally, Chapter 4 focuses on a case study of Chinese outward investment into 
Africa and explores the mechanisms from Chapters 2 and 3 more closely. I explore the 
social, political, and economic institutional environments that lead Chinese corporations 
to adopt specific environmental strategies. I then study the impact of this investment in 
African countries where China is becoming an increasingly larger proportion of foreign 
investment. The evidence suggests that Chinese corporations are largely influenced by 
local institutional environments, causing weaker environmental strategies. This means 
that when Chinese companies become a larger part of inward investment in Africa, there 
will likely be more negative environmental outcomes. 
Contributions to International Relations Literature 
This dissertation complements and challenges the current international relations 
literature by studying a set of non-governmental actors (multinational corporations) at 
different levels of analysis (transnational and domestic). This study looks at the everyday 
behavior of these corporations, which is important to the regulation of production 
practices, as well as the effects of corporate strategies on governments, communities, and 
environmental movements. Through the study of corporate environmentalism, I am able 
to further isolate the dependent variable ‘environmental impact’ to help further 
understand the intersection of the international and the domestic. 
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I also bring the theory of source effects into the study of FDI (Adolph, Quince, 
and Prakash 2015). This study provides a foundation for determining how the source of 
FDI matters through creating variation in the strategies corporations pursue. In looking at 
source effects, I focus on how corporations from a variety of places develop diverse ideas 
about corporate environmentalism, which may have a range of effects on the developing 
host country. This is important to the larger international relations literature because it 
explains the debate in the literature about whether FDI is a help or a hindrance to 
developing countries. 
I also draw on the common claim that FDI wields more influence over domestic 
politics and institutions in developing countries than in developed countries. Developing 
countries see foreign investment as an important and persistent driver of the global 
economy and of their own domestic economic growth (Pandya 2010; Fontagne 1999). I 
show support for the theory that developing countries are more dependent on FDI as well 
as more vulnerable to the conditions of the global economic system and the policies that 
investors bring with them (Chase-Dunn 1975; Bornschier and Chase-Dunn 1985). 
CHAPTER II: CORPORATE SUSTAINABILITY REPORTS AND 
GREEN ENVIRONMENTALISM: OPERATIONALIZING THE 
ENVIRONMENTAL IDEOLOGY OF CORPORATIONS
Introduction 
Why do corporate environmental practices vary by source? Corporate social 
responsibility (CSR) reports are becoming increasingly popular; however, the extent to 
which corporations participate in CSR varies. Today, more than 8000 companies that are 
signatories to the United Nations’ Global Compact come from more than 150 countries 
and have different options to engage with society. Wang et al. (2016) note that the scale 
and prominence of CSR acceptance reflects a shift from a conversation about what a 
multinational corporation’s (MNCs) mission is—“should we do it”—to one about the 
mechanisms and processes by which MNCs conceptualize and undertake social 
obligations—“how we do it.” As a result, as social, political and economic institutions 
vary, as do the corporate policies and practices reported by MNCs (Aguilera and Jackson 
2003). This is largely driven by the different stakeholder claims motivated by the 
different institutional environments in their own countries (H. Wang, Choi, and Li 2008). 
It is my belief that when it comes to environmental CSR, MNCs are largely influenced by 
this national context—at their source—and that the economic, social, and regulatory 
institutional environments motivate MNCs to be more or less involved in green CSR. 
One reason suggested by the literature is that the diverse environments in 
different countries shape CSR. For example, its evolution in emerging and developed 
economies may differ due to economic, political, or social institutional contexts. For 
example, in middle- and low-income countries, the economic and political institutions are 
dominated 
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by those that seek to promote economic growth over environmental protection, leading to 
unsustainable environmental practices (Korten 2001; Zammit 2003). However, as 
countries become more stable economically, stakeholder groups may expect business to 
be more environmentally responsible and to have better stewardship of natural resources 
(George, Schillebeeckx, and Liak 2015). Not only economic, but also social and 
regulatory institutional environments may also play a large role in compelling MNCs to 
act (Gardberg and Fombrun 2006). How MNCs conform to expectations in these 
different institutional environments varies and, according to Wang et al. (2016), has been 
largely understudied.  
To investigate the role that institutional environments play in shaping CSR, I 
collected CSR reports from more than 50 MNCs in extractive and manufacturing 
industries in both developed and developing countries across different political 
environments. I argue that the goals and processes of environmental CSR will vary due to 
the different social, economic, and political institutional environments at a MNC’s 
source. I coded and analyzed these reports using quantitative content analysis, multiple 
regression, and other parametric statistical techniques. The findings indicate that levels of 
professed greenness in CSRs vary in different institutional environments, largely driven 
by the MNC’s development context in its source country.  
This chapter contributes to the literature on international political economics in 
two ways. First, it explores the theoretical phenomenon of source effects and legitimizes 
the theory as a useful tool in globalization studies by investigating the variation of 
MNCs’ level of environmental concern by source (Lane and Milesi-Ferretti 2008; K. 
Zeng and Eastin 2007; Vogel 1995; Pauly and Reich 1997; Prakash and Potoski 2007). 
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Second, I operationalize and assess the roles of and relationships with stakeholders in 
corporate social responsibility (CSR) reporting more thoroughly and comprehensively 
than has been done previously. I use 53 specific environmental parameters of corporate 
greenness, which are derived from the literature on globalization and corporate 
environmental disclosures, to assess the role that different institutions play in shifting 
corporate reporting. I find evidence to suggest that political and economic institutional 
environments have more effect on MNC green policies than social institutional 
environments.  
In the next section, I introduce the concept of CSR greenness; I discuss what CSR 
reports are, the credibility of these reports, and the specific indicators one should look for 
in assessing the greenness of a corporation. I also show ‘how investment greenness can 
be shown to vary,’ before I discuss the institutional environments that can cause 
variation. In the third section, I discuss the mechanisms that may cause CSR to vary, and 
the effects that different institutional environments may have. After that, I introduce my 
quantitative content analysis research design, including the indicators that give CSR 
reports credibility, show stakeholder relationships, and that display their outward 
greenness. Finally, I will use my research to confirm that levels of development and 
political regime matter to CSR reporting and conclude by indicating future avenues for 
research. 
Background: Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) Reports 
CSR reports are important sources of knowledge of how corporations both present 
themselves and behave at home and abroad (Hah and Freeman 2014). The main goals of 
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these reports are to reveal corporate performance type and communicate corporate 
strategy to stakeholder groups. Over the years, international guidelines and national 
government policies have made these reports gradually more reliable and a source for 
recognized corporate policies (Clarkson, Overell, and Chapple 2011). Additionally, as 
CSR has become increasingly important to stakeholders, corporations have prioritized 
revealing good environmental strategy to distinguish themselves from companies who 
can only report “bad” news (Clarkson et al. 2008; Jose and Lee 2007; Lock and Seele 
2016). The importance of these reports is so evident that companies have even been 
willing to take a loss in terms of direct value (i.e., increase in profit) to provide these 
reports (Di Giuli and Kostovetsky 2014).  
In these reports, companies credibly communicate their environmental policies 
and practices to show how green they are, respective to the expectations of society, 
regulation, and economics. These reports also show the extent to which the company 
allows external stakeholders to influence corporate policy decisions (Herzig and 
Schaltegger 2006; Fifka 2013; Jose and Lee 2007; S. X. Zeng et al. 2012; Sotorrío and 
Sánchez 2010; Kolk 2010; Clarkson et al. 2008). Studies also state that these reports have 
become more credible4 as they standardize by international and domestic guidelines, 
providing a more accurate depiction of a MNC’s internal practices and policies (Lock and 
4 These reports are independent corporate editorials in which companies self-report their corporate greenness, raising 
concerns that these environmental reports are nothing but ‘greenwashing’—the act of reporting only positive 
environmental policies and practices (Lyon and Maxwell 2003). However, governments, stakeholders, and pressure on 
corporations from international organizations that regulate the CSR reports increase the legitimacy and credibility of 
the information included (Lock and Seele 2016; Di Giuli and Kostovetsky 2014). Legal violations can lead to fines that 
organizations must report in their financial obligations or adhere to these laws whereas stakeholders and international 
organizations put social pressure on organizations to be environmentally responsible and have been successful in their 
influence of corporate responsibility and reporting (Wolf 2014; Di Giuli and Kostovetsky 2014). The result is that the 
reports are now seen as a credible source of the upper limit of corporate policy.  
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Seele 2016). As a result, these reports can indicate the shape of a MNC’s CSR or, as I 
will refer to it, a corporation’s level of greenness.  
The Argument: Institutional Environment Effects on CSR Reports 
Companies create their environmental policies around the shifting institutional 
environments of economics, society, and politics (Albino et al. 2009). CSR development 
is prefaced on three factors: strategy—CSR is a means to increase profits; altruism—CSR 
is developed because corporations have normative behaviors that indicate they are 
concerned with social benefits; and coercion—the taxes, fines, and subsidies from 
regulatory agencies (Husted and Salazar 2006). This section examines the institutional 
environments that affect these three components and the development of green CSR. It 
also introduces three hypotheses that will be explored in this research. 
Economic Institutional Environment 
MNCs are largely considered to be driven by the goal of maximizing profits and 
shareholder value (Falkner 2005), and a corporation’s profits may be affected by 
environmental strategies that would eat into this profit. However, in different economic 
institutional settings, the economic situation may push corporate norms toward 
environmental strategies. For example, different levels of development cause changes to 
the market—the economic institution—that corporations are operating in. This happens 
because at different levels of development the material goods available and the material 
values of citizens both change and influence corporate decision-making.  
In countries at lower levels of development, MNCs are more focused on 
maximizing profits than on pursuing green strategies. The economic institution 
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encourages society to focus on material values, such as services and goods that will 
advance economic growth, and considers environmental stewardship to be a lower 
priority than economic development; this allows companies to access resources and 
pollute to meet the demands of economic growth (Najam, Runnalls, and Halle 2007). 
Even developing countries’ laws and institutions fail to take into account the need to 
make economic development compatible with environmental protection (Conca 2006; 
Abers and Keck 2013; Huitema and Meijerink 2009; Molle and Wester 2009). When 
environmental laws do exist in this environment, the policies are often contradictory, 
pursuing numerous objectives simultaneously, in an unsuccessful attempt to achieve both 
economic and environmental goals (Lim, Menaldo, and Prakash 2014). The developing 
country’s economic environment encourages organizations to focus more on economics 
than the environment, and I would expect that MNCs in these institutional environments 
to have fewer green policies.  
As the economy develops, there is a shift to implementing better environmental 
strategies (Grossman and Krueger 1995; Seldon and Song 1994). This happens when the 
economic institutional environment goes past the tipping point of the Environmental 
Kuznets curve (EKC)—the point on the inverse U-shaped curve at which resource 
plunder and pollution start to decrease as society advances (Andreoni and Levinson 
1998). This is credited to a shift toward post-material values, which are taken for granted 
during early stages of economic growth, such as the environment (Inglehart 1997) and 
access to more and better technology. 
In summary, development largely affects strategic corporate choices, and to a 
lesser extent the altruistic and coerced elements of their CSR. During development, 
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MNCs will consider environmental amelioration to be unsustainable because it extracts 
costs (Najam, Runnalls, and Halle 2007). However, in developed countries, MNCs will 
fund technology and research to encourage environmental betterment to distinguish 
themselves from their competitors and create a competitive advantage (Garcia-Johnson 
2000).  
Hypothesis 1 (H1): Companies from more economically developed source countries will 
have greener CSRs.  
Political Institutional Environment 
State actors also play an important role in influencing what standards and 
regulations a corporation adopts (Campbell and Ortíz 2012). Regulators can provide 
legitimacy to corporate actors by recognizing the organization’s existence (Deephouse 
1996). Paired with the increased economic gains of conforming to political institutional 
pressure and legal coercion, it is more likely a firm will conduct business in line with 
regulatory demands (Oliver 1991). Additionally, regulation will cause firms to make 
production and extraction more environmental, leading to more innovation than firms 
subject to weaker regulatory environments (Shrivastava 1995; Porter and van der Linde 
1995). 
States with more democratic institutions tend to encourage more environmentally 
friendly corporate practices. In democracies, there is a larger selectorate, in which 
citizens have more opportunities to voice their diverse interests and influence the 
government (Grossman and Krueger 1995; Panayotou 1993; Seldon and Song 1994; 
Yandle, Bhattarai, and Vijayaraghavan 2004). This gives more access points to 
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marginalized populations, who are frequently more affected by poor environmental 
resource management and pollution, to push for more effective environmental policies 
(Li and Reuveny 2006). As a result, democracies will have to respond to concerns that 
are raised by vulnerable populations, which may not have the opportunity in other types 
of regimes. This will force political institutions to create regulations faster than 
authoritarian regimes, which have a smaller selectorate (Li and Reuveny 2006; Bernauer 
and Koubi 2009b; Fiorino 2011; Farzin and Bond 2005).5  
Additionally, less democratic states may limit competition and direct access for 
society to influence corporations, which are more likely to develop environmental 
technologies or standards beyond the rest of the industry’s capabilities when facing 
regulatory competition. The struggle for market size leads corporations to seek 
technology strategies that make their product cheaper or more attractive; often, this will 
be in the form of more efficient resource use or environmental strategies that make a 
company stand out from its less green competitors (Bernauer and Caduff 2004).  
When governments limit the ability of society to influence corporations, they are 
also less motivated to appear green. Society can influence corporations by buying their 
goods, but also through protests and boycotts. Less democratic governments, particularly 
those that manage state-owned enterprises, are more likely to stifle social movements 
against corporations that may have a negative effect on their profit margins. This is 
considered an illiberal market practice and prevents the formation of green CSR policies 
5 However there is no clear empirical evidence to suggest there are differences between types of democratic 
systems, i.e., parliamentary versus presidential, or proportional representation versus multi-party (Fiorino 
2011).  
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because it prohibits the direct influence society has on MNCs to create better normative 
behaviors (Aligica, Boettke, and Tarko 2019). This indicates that the level of democracy 
present affects the role of a regulatory institution, playing an important role in the 
creation of CSR and changing the degree of greenness that a corporation undertakes. I 
would expect that practices and policies will be greener in companies from liberal 
democratic states. 
Hypothesis 2 (H2): Companies from more democratic source countries will have greener 
CSRs. 
Social Institutional Environment 
Stakeholder theory (Freeman 2010) of corporate management integrates the social 
contract into organizational decision-making. As a result, companies are influenced by 
social institutions to change their normative behavior and create policy that is beneficial 
to society6 and goes “beyond what the letter and spirit of the law require or the market 
demands” (Baron 2001). It is a broadly accepted supposition that CSR goes beyond just a 
legal and profit-seeking enterprise and reflects the society that it comes from (Husted and 
Salazar 2006; Davis 1973; Aligica, Boettke, and Tarko 2019; Baron 2001). Even 
shareholders are not purely driven by profits and have other values and interests that they 
influence companies to pursue (Aligica, Boettke, and Tarko 2019). Since corporations 
engage in CSR activities other than those related to economic and regulatory institutions, 
it means that different social institutions may also play a role in corporate greenness.  
6 See the work of Elinor Ostrom on institutional theories and the emphasis of investigating institutions “beyond markets 
and state”(Ostrom 1999, 1998, 1990). 
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Corporations are often influenced by their stakeholder groups to limit their 
resource use and pollute less (Matten and Moon 2008). Stakeholders hold MNCs 
accountable for that performance through protests or putting money into other products 
(Schaltegger and Burritt 2000). Stakeholder environmental opinions, like political 
opinions,7 are largely informed by the amount of awareness individuals have on the issue, 
and to a lesser extent by elites. Awareness can come from factors of salience, 
temporality, and spatiality. One way to look at how the social institutional environment 
may shift CSR reports is through vulnerability.  
Stakeholders are more apt to act when there is some perceived vulnerability to 
negative environmental impacts. This often takes the form of environmental justice—“the 
pursuit of equal justice and protection under the law for all environmental statutes and 
regulations without discrimination based on race, ethnicity, and/or social economic 
status” (Rajzer et al. 1997; Beckman, Khare, and Matear 2016). This is instigated when a 
company does something that has a negative effect on a local community (Kurtz 2005; 
Gosine and Teelucksingh 2008) or where there is more vulnerability to environmental 
problems. When vulnerability to environmental problems is higher, there would be more 
salience to environmental problems, which will cause stakeholders to pressure MNCs to 
change.  
Stakeholders have more impact on the environmental policy of a corporation 
when their claim is considered legitimate and urgent. Legitimacy is the necessary 
condition for MNC action; the corporation must find the issue to be salient to them 
7 See Zaller (1992). 
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because the stakeholders making the claim have the power to affect the organization 
(Beckman, Khare, and Matear 2016; Parent and Deephouse 2007). The urgency 
expressed by a legitimate stakeholder would also change the importance of the issue to 
the company and increase the expediency with which the MNC reacts to a claim 
(Mitchell, Agle, and Wood 1997). These are two features that are particularly relevant to 
environmental issues and which have the potential for both immediate impacts and far-
reaching effects 
Hypothesis 3 (H3): Companies from more environmentally vulnerable source countries 
will have greener CSRs. 
Of the three institutional environments discussed above, the economic institutions 
are the most necessary for corporations to pursue greener strategies. I believe that 
regulatory environments and societal influence are sufficient, but in institutional 
environments where development is low, the lack of middle class and importance of 
economics would limit the ability and willingness of the government and/or society to 
act. 
Research Design 
Corporate sustainability is a key concern for business and society, and it has 
special relevance for firms that are also investing abroad and producing a larger global 
impact on the environment. CSR does not exist independent of a MNC’s source state 
institutional context; it is a social, economic, and political phenomenon. Some research 
has started to explore the role of the stakeholders influence on CSR (H. Wang, Choi, and 
Li 2008; H. Wang et al. 2016). However, this research has not fully examined the way 
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that variation in the institutional setting affects the creation of CSR. Through this 
research design, I investigate the way different institutional environments (social, 
environmental, and political) shape the corporate sustainable responsibility report 
greenness. 
Data 
I collected data from a sample of 64 companies from the top 500 largest investors 
from 2003-2015, as listed in the Greenfield capital investment data set (“FDIMarkets” 
2016). My research study is limited by selecting too few firms. I am aware of this 
limitation, and sample firms were selected in a stratified sampling criterion based on 
three reasons. First, this sample includes only foreign investing companies from the 
manufacturing and extractive industries, as these high-polluting sectors already have a 
strong relationship with environmental disclosures and standardization of these reports 
(Nieminen and Niskanen 2001). Since these industries have similar impacts on the 
environment and share similar values, it homogenizes the CSR reports being studied and 
it is more likely that reports will look analogous. This means that any deviation would be 
from the institutional variation predicted and not from industrial differences. Using the 
Fortune 500 list 75 firms were drawn through randomization, with special attention to 
making sure that 1/3 of the firms represented developing countries.  64 were completed 
from the CSR reports found.  
I selected the largest global companies for two reasons. First, the content of 
corporate reports is more positively associated with the size of the companies (Bolívar 
Rodríguez 2009), meaning that larger companies have similar reports usually reflective of 
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national and international standards. This reduces reporting variation due to factors other 
than social, political, and economic institutional variation. Second, large firms are 
identified and lobbied by government and society. Multinational companies, because of 
their size and presence, have an impact on the ecologies of the economies in which they 
function, which should be reflected in the public’s increased awareness of their social and 
environmental impact (White 1999).  
Finally, random firms were selected with consideration paid to the independent 
variable: development level, vulnerability, and political system. This selection on the 
independent variable was to ensure I could assess the variation of the different 
institutional settings. 
Operationalizing: Corporate Greenness 
The key research design issue in this study is to develop a reliable proxy of CSR 
report greenness. Since I seek to assess the relative greenness of environmental policies 
from different MNCs in this study, I use content analysis to analyze corporate greenness, 
a method widely employed in the literature (Fifka 2013; Fetters, Curry, and Creswell 
2013; Lock and Seele 2016; Clarkson et al. 2008; Jose and Lee 2007; Ihlen and Roper 
2014). This technique facilitates inference “by objectively and systematically identifying 
specified characteristics of messages” (Holsti 1969). I break down the text into five 
indicators: environmental planning and policy (EPP), reporting (REP), external 
organization policy (EOP), community and social policy (CSP), and regulatory policy 
REG). I use a standardized coding of these indicators, see Figure 1. The coding of the 
CSR reports follows a priori coding method, where the codes were developed from the 
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literature and theories of corporate sustainability. This required a strong theoretical 
foundation, and then some additional coding was developed after initially being applied 
to a set of test cases. For more on my code book, see Appendix I.8  
The five indicators, shown in Table 2.1, represent the five areas for evaluating a 
corporations’ level of environmentalism: (1) EPP, (2) REP, (3) EOP, (4) CSP, and (5) 
REG. The first and second indicators, EPP and REP, evaluate the policies and practices a 
corporation has adopted in regard to their internal policies and reporting procedures. The 
third, fourth, and fifth indicators, EOP CSP, and REG, evaluate the external policies and 
practices a corporation has in regard to the community, their consumers and suppliers, 
regulations, and non-governmental organizations. These five sections build on the 
guidelines that prior literature has found important in determining if a corporation has 
green environmental policies and practices (Bolívar Rodríguez 2009; Jose and Lee 2007; 
Sotorrío and Sánchez 2010; Aguilera and Jackson 2003; Shin 2014; Clarkson, Overell, 
and Chapple 2011; Clarkson et al. 2008; Ihlen and Roper 2014; Fifka 2013), and provide 
a conceptual framework for the development of a well-rounded assessment of CSR 
reports.  
The coding rules (outlined in Appendix I) scored and tallied the elements in order 
to compare and evaluate levels of green environmentalism. Every element was scored 
using a binary coding measure (1,0), either the element was present or not in the CSR 
reports. The elements were tallied together for a total score, but also tallied into the 
different institutional areas as depict in the literature based on corporate planning, 
8 My code book was developed from the work of Clarkson et al. (2008), Fetters, Curry, and Creswell (2013), Fifka 
(2013), Ihlen and Roper (2014), Jose and Lee (2007), Lock and Seele (2016), Albino et al. (2009), and so on.  
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reporting, government interactions, stakeholder/community interactions, and industry and 
nongovernmental organization interactions.  
Environmental Planning and Policies (EPP) 
Environmental planning and policy is the presence and extent to which 
corporations create general guidelines that outline their environmental principles, 
rationale, and philosophical underpinnings (Jose and Lee 2007). Management theory tells 
us that planning is the first management function a MNC undertakes for a successful 
endeavor (Hall 1999; Daft 1995). Good environmental planning should have goals, a 
strategic rationale, a driving force (i.e., managers and a department), and a planning 
approach (i.e., including or not including stakeholders) (Jose and Lee 2007). Green 
environmental policy has two key ingredients: tangible commitments to environmental 
issues and the actions needed to translate those commitments into action (Jose and Lee 
2007). Clarkson et al. (2008) suggest that greener corporations will have proper planning, 
structure, and leadership, and they will inform stakeholders of their achievements through 
their CSR reports. The companies also receive pressure from international organizations 
that regulate these reports, making sure that the information they present is accurate and 
reliable; this increases the legitimacy and credibility of the information included (Lock 
and Seele 2016; Di Giuli and Kostovetsky 2014). 
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Environmental Planning and 
Policy (EPP) 
Presence of tangible goals 
Goals have a deadline 
Policy prioritizes sustainability over profitability 
Policy includes direct stakeholder input 
Life-cycle approach to sustainability 
Environmental committee or department 
Executive-level environmental manager (such as Chief Environmental Officer) 
Entities abroad are subject to the same environmental policies 
Employee training programs 
Internal audits are performed 
Invests in the development of environmentally friendly technology 
Presences of Environmental Management Systems (EMS) 
Reporting Policy (REP) 
Data on energy consumption, CO2, emissions, and water is present 
Data as a historical trend 
Data relative to corporate targets 
Data in absolute and normalized forms 
Data at disaggregate levels (i.e., factory, geographic segment) 
Data relative to industrial peers 
Environmental reports are certified by an external third party 
Uses global initiatives to report on environmental issues 
External Organization Policy 
(EOP) 
Invests in outside companies/organizations to develop environmental 
technology 
Partners with non-governmental organizations to promote and disseminate 
environmental information 
Membership in an international environmental organization 
Recognition of sustainability efforts by the international organization 
Promotes environmental stewardship in suppliers 
Shares company data with international organizations 
Participates in an industry-related environmental organization 
Chairs/co-chairs an industry environmental organization 
Founded an industry environmental organization 
Promotes solutions to environmental issues with industry peers 
Community and Social Policy 
(CSP) 
Environmental initiatives or goals at the community level 
Sets up a community environmental program (such as a tree planting program) 
Has local community program at multiple sites (at least two) 
Reports outcomes/successes of environmental community programs 
Promotes consumer environmental stewardship 
Sets up community engagement forums about environmental impacts 
Fulfills statutory information disclosures to shareholders 
Issues environmental reports and announcements on a biannual basis or more 
often 
Dedicated mailbox to receive stakeholder opinions 
Bidirectional communication with stakeholders (such as a phone number) 
Conducts public assessment of environmental impacts 
Stakeholders have an active role in the disclosure process 
Regulatory Policy (REG) 
Complies with external regulation for corporate reporting 
Attends political forums 
Offers company environmental expertise to government 
Strategic cooperation with government departments 
Promotes increased environmental regulation 
Improves goals to exceed current environmental regulation 
Current operations exceed regulatory requirements 
Table 2.1: Indicators and Measurements for the Assessment of the greenness Level of 
CSR Reports (Source: Author) 
34 
Reporting Policies (REP) 
The reporting policies variable examines the data that companies are providing 
that show their environmental impacts. Similarly to Jose and Lee (2007), I use reporting 
to represent two categories of information: disclosure and audits. Companies who want to 
appear green will offer complete (historical) data on their environmental emissions, show 
that they are meeting those goals, and illustrate that this data is verified by an outside 
source (Jose and Lee 2007; Clarkson et al. 2008; Takahashi and Meisner 2012). This 
indicator reflects measurements of data provided, auditing, and indicators used. 
External Organization Policies (EOP) 
External Organization Policy is also driven by voluntary involvement in 
environmentally beneficial activities at the local and international level. The latter can 
give more credibility to CSR reports, and approval from external organizations can open 
or close international markets to MNCs and even prompt local regulators to increase 
regulations (GRI 2011). MNCs will work with international organizations and other 
industry leaders to show their willingness to be green. To measure this, the indicator 
assesses the relationship between the MNC and both international organizations and 
industry peers. 
Community and Social Policies (CSP) 
Community and Social Projects are an indicator of a MNC’s engagement with its 
stakeholders. A sustainable business has been defined as “one that meets the needs of its 
stakeholders, all of these stakeholders, without compromising its ability also to meet their 
needs in the future” (Hockerts 1999, 32). Since the early 1990s, the standard theory for 
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organizational performance is that MNCs are largely responsible to a wider set of groups 
than simple shareholders (Hubbard 2009; Brown and Fraser 2006; Steurer 2006). This 
complex constituency of stakeholders drives MNC environmental policy and pushes them 
to increase environmental sustainability goals (Hoffman 2001; Matten and Moon 2008; 
Aguilera and Jackson 2003), like cutting carbon emissions, buying renewable energy 
credits, starting sustainability organizations, and even lobbying governments to increase 
regulations of greenhouse gas emissions (Di Giuli and Kostovetsky 2014). When 
stakeholders demand more environmental policy, the more deliberation—resembling the 
deliberative democratic theory—evident between MNCs and stakeholders, the higher the 
level of green policy expected (Scherer and Palazzo 2011; Fung and Olin Wright 2003; 
Fung 2004). Using Fishkin and Luskini’s (2005) outline of deliberation, this indicator has 
measurements for processes that are informative, balanced, conscientious, substantive, 
and comprehensive, i.e., reports on environmental programs, bi-directional 
communication, public assessment panels, and active stakeholder engagement in the CSR 
process. 
Regulatory Policies (REG) 
Regulatory Environment Involvement is an indicator of not only a corporation’s 
compliance with regulation but their participation in the regulatory process. Corporate 
sustainability reports include information about their political actions, including times 
that they lobby or promote environmentally friendly policies to governments (Jose and 
Lee 2007). Economic theory suggests that companies will build alliances with state actors 
who can “realign the ideological and material bases of the dominant hegemonic order” 
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(Falkner 2003). This means that MNCs are incentivized to influence government policies 
in a way that is favorable to the firm (Vernon 1971; Baysinger 1984). However, as a 
MNC becomes more involved in the government system, they are also being influenced, 
as the relationship is mutually reinforcing and will push businesses to take up specific 
policies or practices that make them greener (Campbell and Ortíz 2012). This indicator 
measures the relationship with government from simple compliance to active engagement 
in the political process.  
Descriptive Statistics 
This section provides a general analysis of my dependent variable and looks more 
closely at the descriptive statistics of my content analysis. Table 2.2 presents the state-
level profiles of the companies in the sample with related independent variables. I 
analyze 64 companies from 21 countries. In my study, the largest number of companies 
come from the United States (n=11, 17%) and China (n=11,17%); given my stratified 
random sampling methods, this is unsurprising since China is the largest of the 
developing country investors, and the US is the largest of the developed country 
investors. 64% of the companies come from countries that are considered developed 
(dev); the other 36% come from developing countries or transition economies. 
Development is indicated by their classification according to the United Nations (2017). 
Approximately 75% of the companies come from democratic countries, 5% from 
anocratic, and 20% from autocratic. Of these 64 companies, 55% are from countries that 
are considered highly vulnerable (vul-cat) to climate issues, 25% are from countries that 
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are sensitive to these issues, but it is not a timely or urgent matter, and 20% are from 
countries with a low sensitivity to climate issues.  
Source Score Dev HDI Democracy Dem-Cat Vul Vul-Cat Count 
UAE 12.0 1 0.83 -8 autocracy 0.38 High 1 
China 20.4 0 0.72 -7 autocracy 0.39 High 11 
India 21.0 0 0.60 9 democracy 0.50 High 3 
Brazil 21.0 0 0.75 8 democracy 0.38 Highest 1 
Russia 24.0 0 0.80 4 anocracy 0.33 Sensitive 1 
Indonesia 25.0 0 0.68 9 democracy 0.45 Highest 1 
Azerbaijan 26.0 0 0.75 -7 autocracy 0.41 High 1 
South 
Africa 27.0 0 0.66 9 democracy 0.40 High 1 
Czech 
Republic 28.0 1 0.87 9 democracy 0.31 Low 1 
Taiwan 28.5 0 0.90 10 democracy 0.39 High 2 
Ireland 29.0 1 0.91 10 democracy 0.34 High 1 
Italy 31.0 1 0.87 10 democracy 0.32 Sensitive 2 
Netherlands 31.5 1 0.92 10 democracy 0.35 Sensitive 2 
Malaysia 32.0 0 0.78 5 anocracy 0.38 High 1 
United 
States 34.3 1 0.91 8 democracy 0.34 Sensitive 11 
France 35.0 1 0.89 9 democracy 0.30 Low 3 
UK 36.0 1 0.90 8 democracy 0.30 Low 3 
Germany 37.6 1 0.92 10 democracy 0.29 Low 6 
South 
Korea 37.7 1 0.90 8 democracy 0.38 High 3 
Thailand 38.0 0 0.72 -3 anocracy 0.41 High 1 
Japan 40.2 1 0.89 10 democracy 0.37 High 8 
Table 2.2: Summary of CSR greenness Score with Independent Variables (Source: 
Author, Data: Author, QoG Dataset, Polity IV Dataset, and ND-GAIN Dataset (Dahlberg 
et al. 2015; Marshall, Gurr, and Jaggers 2019; Chen et al. 2015)) 
The main descriptive statistics for the corporate greenness scores of 
Environmental Policy and Planning (EPP), Corporate Reporting (REP), External 
Organization Policy (EOP), Community and Social Policy (CSP), and Regulatory Policy 
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(REG) indices are shown in Table 2.3, and they explore the findings of my content 
analysis for all companies in my study. The results indicate that all of the environmental 
characteristics of a CSR report are conveyed with similar consistency. There is not one 
area in corporate environmental reporting where corporations tend to report at higher 
levels than others, meaning that around 60% of corporations have environmental policy 
and practice standards, in addition to having practices regarding the community, 
consumers, suppliers, regulations, and non-governmental organizations they interact with. 
Environmental Policy and Practice had the highest average, which is foreseeable given 
that many of these indicators are part of the Global Reporting Initiative Guidelines 
(Global Reporting Initiative 2019). The lowest area is in the reporting of data about the 
environmental impacts of a corporation; this is expected as extractive and manufacturing 
industries tend to have poorer environmental performance. 
Variable Mean  % Average Std. Dev. Min Max Max Possible 
EPP 7.57 63.1 2.52 2 12 12 
REP 4.22 52.8 1.78 0 7 8 
EOP 6.27 57 3.08 0 11 11 
REG 4.94 61.7 1.66 2 8 8 
CSP 8.65 61.8 2.80 2 14 14 
Table 2.3: Descriptive Statistics for the CSR Scores ( Source: Author, Data: Author) 
Table 2.4 reports on the top and bottom codes from the sample. These are the 
elements of the coding scheme that came up the most and least often in CSR reports; the 
percent column on the right indicates which percentage of reports contain these codes. 
39 
The most reported on indicators come from the environmental policy and practice (EPP) 
indicator. Most companies seem to invest in research for environmentally friendly 
technology for their own use, include assessments of product lifecycle goals, and have 
environmental management systems. Additionally, the other three top ranked codes are 
all related to reporting standards. These codes indicate that almost all companies use 
global reporting initiatives, fulfill legal disclosure requirements, and provide feedback 
mechanisms for stakeholders.  
The lowest ranked codes show the areas that corporations are the least 
environmentally friendly. This analysis indicates that overall corporations do not indicate 
their performance compared to industrial peers nor chair industrial environmental groups. 
Given the poor performance of companies in the extractive and manufacturing sectors, 
this is unsurprising. Companies also seem to lack leadership on environmental issues and 
often house environmental management under other departments. All of these codes 
indicate areas where MNCs could go beyond standard practices, i.e., biannual reporting 
or promoting more environmental regulations and, predictably, are done by very few 
corporations. Is variation in institutional environments causing this deviation in the CSR 
environmental reporting?   
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Rank Indicator Code % 
1 EPP (9) Invests in the development of environmentally friendly technologies for their own use 96% 
1 REP (8) Uses global initiatives to report on environmental issues (GRI, ISO, etc.) 96% 
1 CSP (4) Fulfills statutory information disclosure to shareholders (legal requirements from state or international bodies) 96% 
4 EPP (4) Company policy includes assessment of product lifecycle goals 94% 
4 EPP (11) Employs environmental management systems (EMS) 94% 
4 CSP (3) Bidirectional communication with stakeholders (phone number/email) 94% 
48 EOP (9) Founded an industry environmental organization 24% 
48 EPP (8) Executive-level Environmental Manager (President/VP level/Chief Environmental Officer) 22% 
48 REG (7) Promotes increased environmental requirements 22% 
51 CSP (5) Issues reports and announces results on (at least) a semi-annual basis 18% 
54 EOP (11) Chairs/co-chairs an industrial group on the environment 8% 
53 REP (2) Data relative to industrial peers or rivals or industry is presented (must show it relative to industry average or major competitor average) 4% 
Table 2.4: Top and Bottom Indicators in Sample Scores (Source: Author, Data: Author) 
To determine if CSR greenness varies by institutional environments, I use 
standard operationalizing indicators for economic, political, and social institutions. For 
all institutional environment evaluations, I test on two different measurements: a 
categorical indicator and a continuous variable. These indicators come from two 
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independent sources to check the robustness of my findings across different measures of 
development, democracy, and vulnerability. 
Independent Variable: Institutional Environments 
Economic Institutional Environments 
To distinguish different economic institutions, I look at two indicators of 
development: the Human Development Index (HDI) (UNDP 2018) and the United 
Nations categorization of countries (2017). These two indices identify progress through 
different lenses to measure economic growth and human development. The HDI 
emphasizes human capabilities and provides a measurement that gives more information 
than economic growth alone. The HDI includes dimensions such as a long and healthy 
life, education, and standard of living. It measures these on a scale of 0 to 1, and it 
produces an HDI score closer to 1 if the state is more developed and closer to 0 if a state 
is still developing.  
The UN categorization is based more on economic growth. The United Nations 
report classifies countries into three categories: developed economies, economies in 
transition, and developing economies. For simplification in this study, I am only looking 
at developed and developing countries. These classifications are based on the basic 
economic conditions in the countries, and make each grouping mutually exclusive, even 
if the state has characteristics that would place it in more than one category (United 
Nations 2017). These make it a useful method of categorization for this study and, based 
on the information gathered and reviewed from it, I would expect that companies from 
developed countries would have greener reports than those still developing.  
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Political Institutional Environment 
To distinguish political institutions, I will look at two indicators of democracy: 
Polity IV index (Marshall, Gurr, and Jaggers 2019) and the V-dem Liberal Democracy 
Index (Global Change Data Lab 2018). The Freedom House (2019) dataset categorizes 
levels of polity on a 21 point scale from -10 to 10. The regimes can be categorized as 
“autocracies” (-10 to -6), “anocracies” (-5 to +5), and “democracies” (+6 to +10). 
Democracies should be associated with greater CSR greenness as there are less 
restrictions on the public to voice their dissatisfaction, and regulators will pass more laws 
that force corporations to be more environmentally friendly. I use this dataset as both a 
category variable and as a continuous variable to assess the effect of the political 
institutional environment on corporate reporting. 
The V-Dem Liberal Democracy Index (Global Change Data Lab 2018) scores the 
strength of the democratic institutions in a state from weak to strong on a scale of 0 to 1. 
This index aggregates across several different factors, including suffrage rights, clean 
elections, equality before the law, constraints on the executive branch, and the freedom of 
association and expression. A state that ranks closer to 1 should be more democratic and 
show evidence of greater CSR report greenness. Like with the HDI index, this tool 
focuses on other dimensions that offer a more holistic approach and provide a secondary 
test to check the categorical findings. 
Social Institutional Environment 
To distinguish social institutional environments, I look at two indicators that 
could cause companies to encounter civil unrest: the vulnerability index (Chen et al. 
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2015) and the environmental performance index (EPI) (2018). Often CSR reports are 
responding to susceptibility to climate impacts and pollution. For this study, I am looking 
at variation in vulnerability to climate change as leading shifts in the social institutional 
environment that would cajole stakeholders to pressure corporate action. The University 
of Notre Dame Global Adaptation Index (ND-GAIN) measures vulnerability as the 
“propensity or predisposition of human societies to be negatively impacted by climate 
hazards” (Chen et al. 2015). This includes assessments on food, water, health, ecosystem 
services, human habitat, and infrastructure vulnerability to changes in climate. These 
measurements are measured by exposure, sensitivity, and adaptive capacity. As this 
approximates vulnerability across different sectors, it is a good proxy for assessing the 
potential vulnerability citizens might face to environmental disturbances that would incite 
stakeholder demands for MNC action on climate issues.  
This data is presented in two ways: (1) the vulnerability score assessed by the 
ND-GAIN index and (2) the categorizations of these vulnerability scores into four 
categories: highest sensitivity (“highest”), high sensitivity (“high”), sensitive, and low 
sensitivity (“low”). 
Results 
Economic Institutional Environment 
The descriptive stats for the effect of economic institutions on the environmental 
reporting scores, and the indexes for Environmental Policy and Planning (EPP), 
Corporate Reporting (REP), External Organization Policy (EOP), Community and Social 
Policy (CSP), and Regulatory Policy (REG) are shown in Table 2.5. This provides 
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preliminary evidence in support of the first hypothesis (H1), that more developed 
countries will have MNCs with higher levels of corporate greenness.  
Table 2.5 reports the average scores for the total CSR report scores from the 
content analysis and broken down into each of the indicator variables. A paired-samples 
t-test was conducted to compare the scores for each of these groups to determine whether 
the mean difference between scores is zero (i.e., are these groups significantly different 
from each other?). Results indicate that developed countries have higher CSR report 
scores than developing countries and outperform developing countries in CSR reporting 
in all areas but regulatory. The results of the paired-samples t-test are as follows9: total 
score (t(62) = -4.4***, p= 0.0001), and all five variables: EPP (t(62) = -5.31***, p= 
0.000), REP (t(62) = -2.05**, p= 0.046), EOP(t(62) = -2.67***, p= 0.004), CSP(t(62) = -
3.9***, p= 0.0003), and REG (t(62) = -1.49, p= 0.144). Results indicate that developed 
countries have higher CSR report scores than developing countries and outperform 
developing countries in CSR reporting in all areas but regulatory. 
This agrees with my hypothesis that corporations in developed countries are in an 
economic institutional environment that allows corporations to develop greener CSRs. It 
appears to be a result of the characteristics of companies from a developed country, i.e., 
their ability to focus on post-material values. These companies express a stronger 
commitment to the environment through community activities, product lifecycle goals, 
and actively indicate to investors that the company’s management practices are making 
environmental sustainability one of their priorities. The practice of stating environmental 
9 Significance is indicated by the “*” that the findings are significant at *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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goals and practices increases the legitimacy of the corporation’s sustainability program, 
and makes the MNC’s reporting appear more authentic to stakeholder groups (Bolívar 
Rodríguez 2009).  
Developing country MNCs use their CSRs to send different messages. They 
express less commitment to convincing stakeholders of their environmental practices and 
are not trying to create perceptions of greenness. This is possibly because post-material 
values are seen as a secondary, or even tertiary goal, when the economy is still growing. 
An interview with Chinese managers expressed this sentiment when they claimed to hide 
environmentally friendly beneficial behavior if it did not also benefit the corporation’s 
profit margins and economic growth (S. X. Zeng et al. 2012). The findings of the variable 
on regulatory policies confirm that corporations are focused on financial gains, and that 
most companies will fall in line with regulatory policies as these can place financial 
burdens on the companies, i.e., fines. Finding that there is not significant difference 
between developed and developing countries on this indicator reinforces that developing 
country MNCs are focused on financial gains. The scores from the content analysis show 
that the managers are acting in such a way as to make the MNCs appear committed to 
financial gains, which can lead to lower levels of green environmental activity than those 
from developed countries. 
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Developed Developing 
n 43 21 
Score 
Mean 35.1 24.6 
% Average 66.2 46.4 
Std. Dev. 7.87 7.69 
Min 12 11 
Max 51 38 
EPP 
Mean 8.64 5.38 
% Average 72.0 42.0 
Std. Dev. 2.06 1.93 
Min 4 2 
Max 12 9 
REP 
Mean 4.58 3.50 
% Average 57.2 43.8 
Std. Dev. 1.66 1.86 
Min 1 0 
Max 7 6 
EOP 
Mean 7.06 4.63 
% Average 64.2 42.0 
Std. Dev. 2.68 3.28 
Min 0 0 
Max 11 9 
CSP 
Mean 9.61 6.69 
% Average 68.6 47.8 
Std. Dev. 2.46 2.44 
Min 3 2 
Max 14 11 
REG 
Mean 5.18 4.44 
% Average 64.8 55.5 
Std. Dev. 1.78 1.31 
Min 2 2 
Max 8 7 
Table 2.5: Comparison of Companies from Developed and Developing Countries: 
Descriptive Statistics of CSR Scores (Source: Author, Data: Author) 
Figure 2.1 further tests the first hypothesis using the Human Development Index. 
This figure shows the predicted values at a 95% confidence interval (CI) for CSR reports 
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at a given level of development in the range of my sample (HDI > 0.6). The predicted 
range of CSR report values increases when companies come from countries at higher 
levels of development. The interval is narrower at higher levels of development because I 
have more samples of companies from countries at higher levels of development. At an 
HDI of 0.7 (a medium level of development for emerging economies, like Thailand, 
China, and Indonesia), the predicted CSR scores are between 20 and 28. This is 
significantly different from the CSR scores predicted for an HDI of 0.9 (a high level of 
development for countries, like United States, Taiwan, South Korea, and the United 
Kingdom), which are between 32 and 37. These findings indicate that as a state develops, 
the more likely it is that corporations will be committed to environmental issues and 
address this in their CSR reports. 
Figure 2.1: Human Development Index Margins Plot with Predictions at 95% 
Confidence Intervals (Source: Author Data: UNDP (2018)) 
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The simple regression model10 for Figure 2.1 reports that for every 0.1 increase in 
HDI, CSR report scores go up about 5.4 points on average (robust standard error=1.1). 
This significant relationship (at a 95% CI) between HDI and CSR report scores reinforces 
the findings from Table 2.5 and shows a moderate relationship between HDI and CSR 
report greenness. This provides a robustness check for my findings and shows a strong 
relationship between development and corporate greenness.  
Political Institutional Environment 
The descriptive stats for the effect of political institutions on CSR report scores 
and the indexes for EPP, REP, EOP, CSP, and REG are shown in Table 2.6. On average, 
democracies score 13 points higher than non-democracies on the environmental content 
analysis. This provides preliminary evidence in support of the second hypothesis (H2), 
that more democratic countries will have MNCs with higher levels of corporate 
greenness.  
Table 2.6 shows the total content analysis scores for CSR reports between 
democratic and non-democratic nations. Using the V-dem Liberal Democracy Index 
(Global Change Data Lab 2018), anocracies and autocracies are labelled “0” for non-
democracy, and democracies are labeled “1” for democracy. Table 2.5 give the average 
for the total CSR report scores and for each of the indicator variables. Similarly, to the 
CSR content analysis outcome for developed versus developing countries, there are 
10 !"#! = % + '"()*! + +!, where % is the constant, '" is the change in the DV when there is a one-unit change in 
HDI, and +	indicates independent and identically distributed random errors using a robust clustered standard error of 
variance (VCE) because my sample is largely clustered by country.  
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significant differences for all paired t-test samples, except in regulatory policies. The 
results of the paired-samples t-test are as follows11: total CSR score (t(62) = -3.57***, p= 
0.0008), EPP (t(62) = -3.17*** p= 0.003), REP (t(62) = -2.82***, p= 0.007), EOP(t(62) 
= -3.38***, p= 0.001), and CSP(t(62) = -2.47**, p= 0.017), and REG (t(62) = -0.72 , p= 
0.476). 
In summary, democratic state MNCs’ results indicate high scores in reporting for 
all variables, but they may not be any different from non-democratic state MNCs in their 
relationships with regulators. It appears to be a result of the characteristics of companies 
from a democratic state; in democratic countries, the corporations may have a stronger 
relationship with local communities, unlike in non-democratic countries where only a 
smaller elite group can influence the market and consumer behavior. These companies 
express their commitment to the environment through reporting their environmental 
impact and their policy measures at a much higher rate. This is because in democratic 
countries the companies must show legitimacy to all stakeholder groups.  
Non-democracies are introducing new regulations to force companies to commit 
to CSR reports (Hofman, Moon, and Wu 2017; L. Lin 2010; L. Wang and Juslin 2009), 
but the nature and extent of their greenness compared to those in democratic countries 
varies greatly. MNCs from non-democratic countries do not appear to report strong 
environmental commitments. This finding may support the research that argues that in 
non-democracies communities, labor organizations, and NGOs have less influence on the 
development of CSR (Hofman, Moon, and Wu 2017). 
11 Significance is indicated by the “*” that the findings are significant at *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Democratic Non-Democratic 
N 48 16 
Score 
Mean 33.77 20.00 
% Average 63.7 37.7 
Std. Dev. 8.29 5.54 
Min 11 12 
Max 51 26 
EPP 
Mean 8.10 5.14 
% Average 67.5 42.9 
Std. Dev. 2.49 1.35 
Min 2 4 
Max 12 8 
REP 
Mean 4.56 2.00 
% Average 57.1 25.0 
Std. Dev. 1.62 1.29 
Min 1 0 
Max 7 4 
EOP 
Mean 6.95 2.86 
% Average 63.2 26.0 
Std. Dev. 2.63 3.34 
Min 0 0 
Max 11 7 
CSP 
Mean 9.13 5.71 
% Average 65.2 40.8 
Std. Dev. 2.66 2.14 
Min 3 2 
Max 14 8 
REG 
Mean 5.03 4.29 
% Average 62.8 53.6 
Std. Dev. 1.78 1.11 
Min 2 2 
Max 8 5 
Table 2.6: Comparison of Companies from Democratic and Non-democratic Countries: 
Descriptive Statistics of CSR Scores (Source: Author, Data: Author) 
In non-democracies, there is more suppression of civil society. For example, in 
China, the government regulates both the abilities of international organizations and 
societal expectations of businesses (Hofman, Moon, and Wu 2017). This cuts off two 
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important areas that would encourage corporations to be greener. My findings show that 
the average for both external organizations (EOP) and social organizations (CSP) exhibit 
that they are lower priorities in the CSR reports in non-democratic countries, even 
compared to the developing country reports, which describe higher average EOP scores 
and CSP scores. In the study, 14 of the 16 non-democratic companies are developing, 
which means the main institutional difference between 90% of these companies is 
whether they are democratic or not. On average, developing countries have a score of 6.7 
for community environmental engagement and 4.6 for engagement with international, 
regional, and industrial environmental organizations. When these states are also non-
democratic that average drops to 5.7 for community engagement and only 3.9 for 
engagement with environmental organizations. This shows that MNCs in non-democratic 
countries are not trying to send a message that they prioritize environmental issues or 
activities; instead, they show a commitment to environmental issues only as they pertain 
to regulatory agencies. 
To check the robustness of these findings, I performed two regression models, 12 
in which the margins plots can be seen in Figure 2.2 with 95% CIs. These models, which 
use different indices to measure democracy of countries, both find significant effects of 
democracy on the environmental program of corporate sustainability reports. The Liberal 
Democratic Index model has a 1.6-point rise in the CSR report score for every unit 
increase in liberal democracy (standard error = 0.5), and the Polity IV index has a 0.74-
12 !"#! = % + '")-./01203! + +!, where % is the constant, '" is the change in the DV when there is a one-unit 
change in Polity IV or in the Liberal Democratic Index, and +	indicates independent and identically distributed random 
errors using a robust clustered standard error of variance (VCE) because my sample is largely clustered by country.  
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point rise in CSR report score for every unit increase in democracy (standard error = 0.2). 
In looking at what this means for different countries in the model, for a non-democratic, 
autocracies, like China or Azerbaijan, with a polity score of -7, one would expect score to 
be between 16 and 26 at a 95% confidence interval. For non-democratic anocracies, like 
Russia or Malaysia, with a polity score of around 4, the expected score would be higher, 
between 27 and 32. The probable score for democracies is even higher, for countries like 
Taiwan, the Netherlands, and Germany the score should sit between 31 and 37. 
These findings are shown in the margin’s plots of Figure 2.2. In these figures, the 
scatterplots illustrate the scores of the sample population against the regression 
predictions at 95% confidence intervals. In both indices, there is significant evidence to 
support the second hypothesis: that companies from democratic countries are greener. 
This figure provides a robustness check to the findings from Table 2.5 and shows a 
moderate relationship between both the Liberal Democratic Index and the Polity IV Index 
and CSR report greenness. Findings indicate that companies from more democratic 
countries are more likely be committed to environmental issues and address this in their 
CSR. This provides a robustness check for my findings and strengthens the relationship 
between democracy and corporate greenness.  
After looking at the effects of democracy and regime type one thing seems to 
stand out: how the MNCs relationships with external organizations and the community 
change. When looking at the effects of regime type, it seems that corporations need to 
prove more legitimacy to stakeholders and external organizations. In non-democracies, 
where civil society and external organizations hold less importance, the MNCs are not 
making efforts to participate and engage with these environmental groups. However, 
53 
when looking at development as the variable of interest, the same behavior to take care of 
the needs of stakeholders and be a part of external organizations is not as strong because 
development alone does not drive corporations to seek out the needs of stakeholders and 
to join external organizations. This fits my hypotheses and lines up with the literature 
about corporate behavior.  
Figure 2.2: Democracy Margins plot with Predictions at 95% Confidence Intervals 
(Source: Author, Data: V-Dem Liberal democracy index (Global Change Data Lab 2018) 
and Polity IV (Marshall, Gurr, and Jaggers 2019)) 
Both political institutional and economic institutional environments show 
significant impacts on corporate sustainable responsibility. The only area that does not 
show significant differences in both is regulation (REG), which indicates that regardless 
of political or economic institutional environments, corporations are still building 
10
20
30
40
50
C
SR
 S
co
re
s
-10 -8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6 8 10
Polity IV: Democracy Measure
Adjusted Predictions with 95% CIs
10
20
30
40
50
0 .1 .2 .3 .4 .5 .6 .7 .8 .9 1
Liberal Democracy Index
Adjusted Predictions with 95% CIs
54 
relationships with regulatory agencies because they have the ability to level financial 
losses to the MNC.  
Social Institutional Environment 
The social institutional environment encompasses the non-financial and non-
political issues that would induce stakeholders to pressure MNC to act on environmental 
issues. I am testing the effect of different levels of vulnerability, which would motivate 
urgent and legitimate claims from stakeholder groups for corporate change. The 
descriptive stats for the effect of social vulnerability on CSR report scores and the 
indexes for EPP, REP, EOP, CSP, and REG are shown in Table 2.7. These findings do 
not support the third hypothesis (H3), that more vulnerable countries will have MNCs 
with higher levels of corporate greenness; rather, the findings indicate that there is no 
difference in reporting between countries at different vulnerability levels.  
The effects of the vulnerability variable are assessed in Table 2.7 using the 
categorization of the vulnerability scores, but with highest sensitivity and high sensitivity 
collapsed into the high sensitivity category (this was done because there were only two 
companies from highly sensitive countries). The three categories are displayed below and 
show very little difference; the average CSR environmentalism scores actually go down 
from low sensitive to highly sensitive countries, which contradicts Hypothesis 3. An 
ANOVA was conducted to compare the effect of vulnerability on CSR in conditions 
where there was low, moderate, and high climate vulnerability. According to this model, 
there is no significant effect of climate vulnerability on CSR for the three conditions (F 
(3,61) = 1.95, p=0.1532). This means that there is no difference in the environmental 
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behavior of companies that come from countries with different climate vulnerability 
levels. 
Low Sensitivity Sensitive High Sensitivity 
n 13 18 33 
Score 
Mean 35.9 32.6 29.4 
 % Average 67.7 61.5 55.5 
Std. Dev. 6.6 6.9 10.6 
Min 28 23 11 
Max 47 44 51 
EPP 
Mean 8.3 7.9 7.1 
 % Average 69.2 66.1 59.0 
Std. Dev. 2.4 1.8 2.9 
Min 4 5 2 
Max 12 11 12 
REP 
Mean 4.9 4.3 3.9 
 % Average 61.3 53.6 49.0 
Std. Dev. 1.5 1.6 1.9 
Min 2 1 0 
Max 7 7 7 
EOP 
Mean 7.3 7.0 5.4 
 % Average 66.4 63.6 49.5 
Std. Dev. 2.4 3.0 3.3 
Min 2 2 0 
Max 10 11 10 
CSP 
Mean 10.0 8.4 8.3 
 % Average 71.4 59.7 59.1 
Std. Dev. 2.1 2.2 3.2 
Min 7 3 2 
Max 13 12 14 
REG 
Mean 5.4 5.0 4.7 
 % Average 67.5 62.5 59.0 
Std. Dev. 1.6 1.9 1.6 
Min 2 2 2 
Max 8 8 8 
Table 2.7: Comparison of Companies from Countries at Different Levels of Vulnerability 
to Environmental Disturbances: Descriptive Statistics of CSR Scores (Source: Author, 
Data: Author) 
The characteristics of climate vulnerability may be a factor, since issues of 
climate change sometimes do not have the same urgency as other environmental issues, 
i.e., an oil spill or air pollution releases. If a recent environmental event impacted
stakeholders, they might react and demand change, but usually it is the economic and 
political institutional environment that can effect environmental change in corporations. 
More research could look into the effect that large environmental disasters have on 
communities that might spur significant change, but vulnerability alone does not show 
any significant change in behavior, according to this model.  
For this analysis, Figure 2.3 also shows the relationship between vulnerability and 
CSR environmental scores. This displays the weak negative relationship between 
vulnerability levels and corporate greenness. The regression model13 for this figure 
reports a significant decrease of 7.3 points for every 0.1 increase in vulnerability 
(standard error=1.5). In respect to the countries in this model, a highly sensitive country 
such as Indonesia, with a vulnerability score of 0.45, would likely have a score between 
19 and 30 at a 95% confidence interval; and a country with a low sensitivity score of 0.3, 
like France or the Czech Republic, would probably have a CSR score between 33 and 38. 
This model and figure further contradict Hypothesis 3 (H3). 
While these results dispute my hypothesis, the results are unsurprising, given that 
many of the countries in the highly sensitive category are both developing and non-
democracies, which have already been shown to have lower CSR scores due to other 
13 !"#! = % + '"4567-128969:3! + +!, where % is the constant, '" is the change in the DV when there is a one-unit 
change in Vulnerability, and +	indicates independent and identically distributed random errors using a robust 
clustered standard error of variance (VCE) because my sample is largely clustered by country.  
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institutional factors. This evidence suggests that there is no significant relationship 
between vulnerability and corporate sustainable responsibility because the economic and 
political institutions are more important. Stakeholder groups, while they might find social 
issues like vulnerability important, will not push for change on those issues if the 
economy is still growing and/or democratic institutions are not in place to allow civil 
society to push for change. 
Figure 2.3: Vulnerability Scatterplot with Predictions at 95% Confidence Intervals 
(Source: Author, Data: ND-GAIN (Chen et al. 2015)) 
Conclusions and Future Areas of Study 
The findings indicate that political and economic institutional environments have 
a more significant impact than social institutional environment. They also illustrate that 
development and democracy tend to have strong effects on the level of greenness 
apparent in CSR reports.  
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The evidence strongly supports the premise that businesses in developed countries 
face stronger expectations to be environmentally responsible and good stewards of 
natural resources (George, Schillebeeckx, and Liak 2015). This supports the literature 
that finds that as countries develop, they are more concerned with post-material values, 
and will push for more environmental changes that could improve environmental 
infrastructure and resource management. 
Additionally, democracy also matters for pushing forward green business 
practices. There is evidence that businesses from democracies tend to also encourage 
better environmental CSR. Future research should investigate variation in the strength of 
regulatory agencies across and within democracies and non-democracies. MNCs respond 
to pressures that create some sense of urgency; in weak regulatory environments, with no 
ability to enforce regulations, MNCs will not be as green as those from stronger 
regulatory agencies. This is more apparent at the global level, where international 
organizations with stronger enforcement mechanisms have been more successful than 
others in cajoling corporations to be green.  
One area of future study is to look more closely at the interaction between 
democracy and development in making companies more or less green. In my sample, 
95% of the democratic countries are also developed countries, so that could be swaying 
the results. This research program could be utilized to examine more developing nations 
that are democratic and non-democratic to see if democratic institutions are counteracting 
the impact of economic institutions.  
The social institutional environment shows a weaker relationship in encouraging 
stronger CSR. It is not surprising that social values play a less significant role than 
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democracy or development as society is reflective of both the economic and political 
institutional environments. Political institutions can prohibit social interactions with 
businesses, and development goals may alter the priorities of society. Table 2.8 shows the 
composition of democracy and development at different levels of vulnerability. The 
negative relationship between vulnerability and levels of greenness may be because all of 
the sensitive countries are developed and democratic. However, when I controlled for 
both characteristics, I still did not find a significant or positive relationship between 
vulnerability and CSR greenness. More research could be done to investigate how social 
institutional environments affect CSR on a local level since social inclusion in CSR 
reports is very high. 
Developing Developed Non-Democracy Democracy 
Low Sensitivity 0 13 0 13 
Sensitivity 1 17 1 17 
High Sensitivity 20 13 12 21 
Table 2.8: Composition of Vulnerability Categories by Development and Democracy 
(Source: Author, Data: Polity IV Dataset, and ND-GAIN Dataset (Chen et al. 2015; 
Marshall, Gurr, and Jaggers 2019))) 
This chapter has sought to explore how different institutional environments shape 
CSR. The findings indicate that political and economic variables in a corporation’s home 
state plays a stronger role in shaping CSR, with economic variables appearing to have the 
greatest function. This is an important field of study, as these corporate policies and 
practices may be exported abroad. Many of these companies are large investors in 
60 
countries abroad, and their investment is an important mechanism for the diffusion of 
these environmental regulatory standards, norms, and industrial practices (Prakash and 
Potoski 2007; M. Delmas and Montiel 2008). Every year the number of companies 
investing abroad increases, and these companies are increasingly coming from countries 
that are non-democratic and/or developing. The variation in the source state’s institutions 
may have an impact on the level of greenness in the corporation’s policies and practices 
as they go abroad.  
CHAPTER III: IS FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT IN DEVELOPING 
COUNTRIES HARMFUL OR  HELPFUL? AN ANALYSIS OF THE 
VARIATION OF ENVIRONMENTAL OUTCOMES DUE TO THE 
SOURCE OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT
Introduction 
Does foreign direct investment (FDI) lead to exploitative environmental practices 
in developing countries? Socio-economic theories argue that developing countries are 
most at risk of being exploited by foreign investors seeking manufacturing and extractive 
industries. Thus, policymakers in these countries must be concerned by where investment 
comes from, particularly if it is having adverse effects on local populations. Whether the 
effects of FDI are beneficial to or exploitative of environmental infrastructure in 
developing countries is an important ongoing debate in political economy. However, few 
studies have investigated the ways that investment from different sources may be one 
variable leading to diverse environmental outcomes in developing countries. Such 
analysis is critical to understanding the broader effects of globalization and to better 
evaluate the variation in FDI’s impacts in developing economies. With this in mind, two 
important questions are investigated in this analysis: Are the effects of FDI dependent on 
where it originates? If so, does the level of development of the host country matter in 
mitigating them? 
Developing country FDI is just one variation in investment that could be 
examined through source effects (Adolph, Quince, and Prakash 2017). There are two 
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reasons this focus is advantageous: First, developing country FDI has been increasing 
since 2000. As developing countries increase investment, they change the composition of 
FDI in the host country and, because it is new investment, the effects are easier to isolate. 
Second, political-sociological theories suggest that countries at a lower level of 
development have “less-green” environmental policies (Andreoni and Levinson 1998; 
Hilton and Levinson 1998; Levinson and Taylor 2008). For example, the Chinese, major 
international investors, have a poor environmental record when it comes to investment 
projects. Since 2013, despite worldwide decreases in coal investment overseas, Chinese 
corporations have invested more than $15 billion into developing countries, with another 
$13 billion in proposed funding (Tan 2018). Such behavior is similar in corporations 
from other developing countries that often have more projects with environmentally 
harmful effects.  
To evaluate the relationship between FDI and environmental outcomes in 
developing countries, I begin with a state-level panel study of greenfield investment in 
developing countries. Greenfield investment is investment into a country that involved 
building new facilities and is an active investment into the host country. I test the impacts 
of developing country incoming greenfield FDI as a percentage of total FDI coming into 
a developing country14 on to different environmental factors: water access, air quality, air 
pollution, and forest size. The advantage of this approach is that it allows me to look at 
the variation in FDI inflows from developing country to developing country and how the 
effects change based on the amount of FDI received. I first show that the rate of potable 
14 Flows are used instead of stocks as the stock amounts for developing countries were unattainable. 
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water provision has slowed in countries that host higher levels of greenfield FDI from 
developing countries while air pollution has increased. Evidence that FDI from 
developing countries is associated with slower rates of potable water access and 
increasing air pollution suggests the importance of FDI on the environment in countries 
where greenfield FDI from developing countries is a larger percent of all greenfield 
investment. Second, I use an interaction model of FDI and the Human Development 
Index (HDI) to test the relationship between these effects and development. Evidence that 
confirms this relationship between development and FDI suggests that the level of 
development of the host country matters for the impact of incoming FDI, and that 
countries at lower levels of development may be experiencing more regulatory capture as 
well as having compounded effects on more marginalized communities, which may be 
affected by environmental resource impacts. This evidence also confirms that source 
effects are an empirical regularity, which merits continued scholarly investigation. 
My major finding is that source effects are an alternative lens to understanding the 
variation in FDI impacts in developing countries,15 and that a greater number of 
greenfield FDI projects—in manufacturing and extractive sectors—from developing 
countries are associated with a worsening of the overall environmental situation in the 
host developing country. I find that developing countries which attract higher levels of 
FDI from other developing countries consequently experience slower increases in potable 
water access and higher levels of air pollution. This effect is even more pronounced in 
poorer countries with a lower GDP per capita and a larger population of the poor, where 
15 For more information on source effects, see Adolph, Quince, and Prakash (2017). 
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regulatory capture by multinational corporations (MNCs) is more likely and the 
marginalized groups are unable to make demands for reforms in response to these 
actions.  
This research makes two contributions. First, I introduce to the study of FDI the 
theory of source effects, which are variations in environmental outcomes which reflect 
and correlate with environmental norms and practices of the FDI’s source country 
(Adolph, Quince, and Prakash 2017). It starts with the notion that not all investment 
comes from sources that generate better environmental outcomes; rather, countries at 
different levels of development have disparate ideas of material or post-material values 
(Inglehart 1997), which may cause some investors to behave differently. This is 
important because it explains the variation in the literature about whether FDI is harmful 
or helpful to the environment in developing countries.  
Second, I build on the common claim in comparative politic economics that FDI 
wields more influence over domestic politics and institutions in developing countries than 
in developed countries. Developing countries see foreign investment as the important and 
persistent driver of the global economy it has been since the mid-1980s (Pandya 2010; 
Fontagne 1999). I will show evidence to further the theory that developing countries are 
more vulnerable than developed countries to the conditions of the global economic 
system and the practices that investors bring with them (Chase-Dunn 1975; Bornschier 
and Chase-Dunn 1985). 
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Literature Review: Development, FDI, and the Environment 
There are three main hypotheses that link globalization and the environment: the 
Environmental Kuznets curve (EKC) hypothesis, the pollution haven hypothesis (PHH), 
and the halo effect hypothesis. These three hypotheses associate FDI with both positive 
and negative effects on the environment.  
 Both the EKC and the PHH literature are often associated with a “race to the 
bottom” hypothesis in environmental studies. The “race to the bottom” (RTB) literature 
claims that foreign investors are only looking for the assurance of adequate infrastructure 
with natural resource exploitation promise (Bellos 2010; Bellos and Subasat 2012; Hu, 
Deng, and Zhang 2013; Oneal 1994; Jessup 1999; Bues 2011). The EKC hypothesis 
describes an inverse U-shaped relationship between pollution and economic 
development: as states grow, pollution also grows, until they eventually reach the tipping 
point, after which pollution decreases as the economy continues to grow (Andreoni and 
Levinson 1998)—i.e., early developers will have higher pollution than later developers. 
The PHH posits that FDI will have negative effects because as environmental regulations 
increase in developed countries, high-polluting firms will shift operations to countries 
with more lax regulations (Levinson and Taylor 2008). The RTB literature presents 
arguments that corporations are moving abroad to use practices that allow for depletion 
and degradation of environmental resources (Jorgenson 2007; Frey 2003; Gallagher 
2006; Leighton, Roht-Arriaza, and Zarsky 2002). These studies find evidence to suggest 
that the intensification of FDI increasingly puts pressure on natural resources, such as 
water, air, and forests (Jorgenson 2007; Perkins and Neumayer 2008; Grimes and Kentor 
2003; Neafie 2018). 
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The halo effect hypothesis is linked to “the race to the top” (RTT). This literature 
links the positive tradeoffs of MNCs, such as “best practice” transfers (i.e., technology 
and managerial capacity) that will lead to economic growth and ‘green’ development 
(Rudra and Jensen 2011; Modou and Liu 2017; Klein, Aaron, and Hadjimichael 2001; 
Garcia-Johnson 2000). The halo effect hypothesis suggests that globalization has positive 
effects because MNCs disseminate superior knowledge, technology, and environmentally 
friendly practices, in addition to improving the environmental performance of domestic 
businesses (Garcia-Johnson 2000).  
 This chapter posits that these hypotheses may all be true because it is where FDI 
comes from and where it is going to that matter for the impact that FDI has on 
environmental outcomes. By disaggregating FDI and looking at different sources of FDI, 
it is possible to determine what conditions cause a “race to the bottom” or a “race to the 
top”. I analyze FDI from diverse source countries at different levels of development in 
order to test the influence of source effects on environmental outcomes in developing 
countries. This is also crucial information for regulators who want to know which effect 
is being triggered by the MNCs in their country.  
The Argument 
Until the early 2000s, foreign direct investment (FDI) came almost exclusively 
from developed countries, but since then, there has been a steady rise in FDI flows from 
developing countries (see Figure 3.1). One question arising from this shift is whether FDI 
from developing source countries is different from FDI from developed source countries? 
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Figure 3.1: Investment flows into developing countries, % of total investment (Source: 
Author, Data QoG Standard Dataset (Teorell et al. 2013)) 
Foreign investors establish corporate policy through a cost benefit analysis that 
incorporates internal corporate norms and discount rates that are heavily influenced by 
the external world through stakeholders—policymakers, shareholders, consumers, and so 
on. At high levels of development, socio-economic literature suggests that citizens of a 
country begin to prioritize post-material values like the environment (Inglehart 1997). 
This change in the external world shifts the internal norms and discount rates of 
economic institutions through mechanisms such as laws, consumer buying patterns, and 
shareholder influence. As a result, corporations are persuaded by stakeholders to improve 
the well-being of the poor through the transfer of “best practices” (i.e., tech spillover, 
environmental management systems, etc.) (Garcia-Johnson 2000; Modou and Liu 2017; 
Klein, Aaron, and Hadjimichael 2001). 
However, during periods of development, stakeholder groups often prioritize 
material values, i.e., economic growth, over post-material values. The Environmental 
Kuznets Curve (EKC) literature suggests that during development, economic growth is 
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prioritized over environmental protection, allowing for excessive pollution and resource 
use (Grossman and Krueger 1995; Yandle, Bhattarai, and Vijayaraghavan 2004; 
Panayotou 1993). As a result, the stakeholder groups in developing countries will both 
directly and indirectly influence corporate environmental policies and practices. 
Studies find that when consumer and shareholder groups are dominated by those 
that seek to promote economic growth over environmental protection, corporate pollution 
levels and resource extraction increase to unsustainable levels (Korten 2001; Zammit 
2003; Mulligan, Gil, and Sala-i-Martin 2004). In this case, these stakeholders also tend to 
support less environmental regulation because economic growth and material prosperity 
have tangible benefits that they can quickly realize (Rogoff 1990). Policy reflects these 
views because the policymakers fear that the selectorate—the group of people who are 
responsible for giving the policymakers power—may remove them from power when 
macroeconomic performance wavers or if economic growth stagnates (Hibbs 2000, 2001; 
Ferejohn 1986, 1999). Consequently, lesser-developed countries have weaker, less 
comprehensive environmental practices and policies, and corporate strategic 
environmental choices will not favor environmental amelioration (Matten and Moon 
2008; Holtbrügge, Berg, and Puck 2007). The corporations from these countries are not 
being influenced by the consumers to protect the environment, and government 
regulations on the corporations also will be weaker. 
Environmental and economic policy come into conflict directly when the former 
diminishes profits, incurs a financial cost, or causes resources diverted for sustainability 
to adversely affect economic production (Najam, Runnalls, and Halle 2007; Gallego and 
Pitchik 2004). As a result, even in countries where there is environmental policy in place, 
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there is often weak enforcement as it can be costly and be in opposition to economic 
goals. For example, Chinese companies are not known for observing Chinese 
environmental law or good environmental practices because it is not expected of them 
(Watts 2010, 159; Hua 2009). Historically, local officials have often overlooked bad 
environmental practices that yield economic gains (Economy 2010), and without external 
motivation, Chinese managers are not influenced to voluntarily change behavior, even 
with knowledge of their environmental impacts (Fryxell and Lo 2003).  
Corporations in countries like China are not influenced by the key stakeholders to 
be greener and have developed weaker environmental policies and practices. As a result, 
the foreign investment flows from these developing countries will be a mechanism for 
cross-country diffusion of less environmentally beneficial regulatory policy, norms, and 
industrial practices as it is costly to change, and so corporations will seek countries with 
weak environmental policy or where regulatory capture is possible.  
Much of the globalization literature links the diffusion of regulation and practice 
to global economic partners (Garcia-Johnson 2000; Rudra and Jensen 2011). On one 
hand, there are positive impacts; Garcia-Johnson (2000) finds that US chemical 
companies carry with them positive practices in South America and influence regulatory 
agencies and corporate standards to adopt these new practices. On the other hand, this 
linkage was confirmed to be both positive and negative by Adolph et al. (2017), who find 
a “Shanghai Effect” on labor rights, in which the importing country, China, does not care 
about the labor standards in the foreign jurisdiction, so does not make any effort to 
improve the standards of the local labor practices. Furthermore, the International Institute 
for Sustainable Development finds in the literature that, like in many industrializing 
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countries past and present, Chinese companies ignore environmental impacts and 
participate in illegal environmental activities while operating abroad (Y. Wang et al. 
2016).  
FDI having negative impacts on environmental outcomes is not new, and there is 
a history of European and American corporations negatively impacting environmental 
outcomes in developing countries. However, regulators must be concerned about who 
may be having a larger impact on the environment today, and it may be that this “no-
strings-attached” developing country-to-developing country investment needs more 
standards of environmental protection. Local companies also may not be enticed to take 
up greener practices or to remove costly ones if they make them less competitive with 
foreign investors. This shows that there are distinct differences between developed and 
developing countries; it also suggests that the interactions between MNCs and local 
groups, such as corporations and institutions, create opportunities to diffuse their policies 
and practices.  
Hypothesis 1: MNCs from developing countries carry environmentally exploitative 
policies and practices that will negatively affect environmental policy and outcomes in 
developing countries.  
Due to variability in levels of development and political landscapes across 
countries, I further investigate my theory by looking at the variation in different host 
countries. The main concern is that developing countries are not all equal in their level of 
development and regulation of the environment. This is mainly due to the fact that 
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different levels of development attract a diverse range of foreign investors and also 
determine the ability a country has to regulate and influence those investors.  
First, more recent studies have found that there is a relationship between the 
amount of investment from high-polluting industries and laxity of environmental 
regulations, (Xing and Kolstad 2002) supporting the hypotheses put forth in the pollution 
haven literature. High-polluting FDI from developing countries seems to be attracted to 
countries where the environmental performance index is weakest, seemingly further 
supporting the “pollution haven” hypothesis, and where there are stronger democratic 
processes. The underlying hypothesis is that environmental policies and practices have a 
strong effect on industrial location, and that they can induce capital movement to the 
developing country with weaker regulations. 
Second, at various levels of development the negative effects of FDI may be 
mitigated because of changes in requirements and expectations of stakeholders. In the 
host country, weak environmental policies and performances attract FDI in high-polluting 
industries, and the need for economic growth means that lesser-developed countries will 
be laxer in the creation and enforcement of environmental policies. The Environmental 
Kuznets Curve (EKC) proposes that this is strongly driven by development goals, and 
that stronger environmental regulations and social expectations will only come as a 
country raises their level of development (Grossman and Krueger 1995; Yandle, 
Bhattarai, and Vijayaraghavan 2004; Panayotou 1993). Under this assumption: 
Hypothesis 2: The effects of high-polluting MNCs from developing countries will be 
mitigated as the developing host country progresses. 
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Research Methods 
Source effects theory suggests that different sources of economic flows carry with 
them varied ideas, corporate policies, and expectations for behavior based on where the 
flows come from (K. Zeng and Eastin 2007; Adolph, Quince, and Prakash 2017). This 
approach comes from the micro-economic theory of source effects—the technique of 
study in which research no longer only focuses on how much global economic flow a 
country receives, but rather from where the largest amount of global flows (foreign 
investment or trade) originates (Lane and Milesi-Ferretti 2008).  
The primary goal of this study is to evaluate empirically the extent to which FDI 
from developed and developing countries differently affects environmental outcomes in 
developing countries. Using a country-year fixed effects regression model, I conduct a 
series of quantitative cross-national analyses of environmental outcomes. I use a panel 
data set16 of developing countries from 2000 to 2015 in the middle- and low-income 
brackets, defined as developing countries by the United Nations (2017), see Appendix II 
for a list of source and host countries. The univariate statistics are laid out in Table 3.1 
and include measures of trade, domestic investment, inequality, political regime (polity), 
gross domestic product (GDP), measures of GDP growth, and urban population growth. 
The correlation matrix is laid out in Table 3.2 and shows that none of the variables in the 
model are strongly correlated.  
16 Panel data comes from the QoG Standard Dataset (Teorell et al., 2013), the World Bank (2018), and Greenfield 
Data Set (“FDIMarkets” 2016). 
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Source Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Dependent Variables 
Water Access (logged) EPI 595 4.1 0.6 0.94 4.6 
NOx (logged) UN Stats 188 8.1 1.8 1 11.4 
Deforestation (logged) FAO 217 -0.44 1.02 -2.9 2.8 
Air Quality Index EPI 619 71.6 18 29 98.3 
Independent Variables 
Developing Country FDI (% 
of total FDI)17 
FDI Markets 619 0.41 0.35 0 1 
Foreign Direct Investment 
(FDI) flows (percent of 
GDP, logged) 
World Development 
Indicators (WDI) 595 1.1 1.0 -4.8 4.4 
Domestic Investment 
(percent of GDP, logged) World Bank 499 1 0.33 1.2 4.0 
Inequality (GINI) coefficient WDI 253 40.8 8.8 24 64 
Trade (percent of GDP) WDI 605 4.2 0.7 -1.8 5.3 
Economic growth (logged) WDI 565 1.5 0.77 -5 4.8 
Population growth (logged) WDI 563 0.36 0.8 -4.1 1.7 
GDP per capita (logged) WDI 612 7.9 1.0 5.5 9.6 
Freedom House Polity IV Freedom House 619 71.6 18.0 29 98.3 
Table 3.1: Summary of Univariate Statistics (Source: Author, Data: QoG Standard 
Dataset and Greenfield FDI Data Set) 
17 Manufacturing and extractive industries. 
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Water 
Access 
Air 
Quality NOx 
Deforest
-ation 
Developing 
FDI 
Domestic 
Investment FDI GDP HDI Democracy
GDP 
Growth Trade 
Population
Growth 
Air Quality 0.14 1.00 
NOx 0.20 -0.35 1.00 
Deforestation 0.36 -0.32 0.08 1.00 
Developing 
Country FDI -0.45 -0.07
-
0.16 0.16 1.00 
Domestic 
Investment 
0.07 -0.53 0.32 0.43 -0.16 1.00 
Foreign 
Direct 
Investment 
(FDI) 
0.02 0.20 -0.28 0.07 -0.01 0.37 1.00 
GDP per 
Capita 0.67 0.51 0.24 0.00 -0.36 -0.04 0.05 1.00 
Human 
Development 
Index (HDI) 
0.77 0.37 0.20 0.20 -0.34 0.13 0.17 0.87 1.00 
Democracy 0.12 0.38 
-
0.02 -0.22 0.02 -0.46
-
0.25 0.30 0.15 1.00 
GDP Growth -0.16 -0.28 0.22 0.10 0.07 -0.05
-
0.34 -0.20 -0.13 -0.21 1.00 
Trade 0.01 -0.25
-
0.40 0.04 -0.15 0.16 0.39 -0.26 -0.13 -0.35 -0.15 1.00 
Population 
Growth -0.40 0.09
-
0.32 -0.01 0.23 -0.09 0.13 -0.21 -0.32 -0.21 0.12 0.01 1.00 
Inequality 0.01 0.42 -0.02 -0.12 0.01 -0.27
-
0.07 0.15 -0.07 0.59 -0.36 -0.32 -0.18
Table 3.2: Correlation Matrix (Source: Author, Data: QoG Standard Dataset and Greenfield FDI Data Set) 
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Dependent Variable 
For this study, I test the impact of FDI on environmental stewardship indicators: 
potable water access, air pollution (NOx), forest size, and air quality. These variables 
were chosen for four reasons: First, they are available in multiple years for a panel data 
analysis. Second, they represent the main three concepts of environmental stewardship: 
environmental quality, quantity, and access. Third, these variables reflect the impact of 
FDI on environmental issues throughout the developing country both directly, through 
their practices, and indirectly, through their lobbying efforts. Finally, these variables are 
also visible and salient to citizens, so there should be political awareness about their 
negative and positive consequences among the government, media, citizens, and other 
stakeholders, which means that action could be taken in these areas, depending on ability 
and need (Cao and Prakash 2010; Rudra 2011; Lim, Menaldo, and Prakash 2014).  
The first dependent variable, classified as water access, reflects all the 
environmental components of access, quality, and quantity. It denotes the percentage of 
the population with access to water of a “potable” quality and of a quantity that the 
household needs for survival, i.e., at least 20 liters of water per person per day from an 
improved source within one kilometer of the dwelling (World Bank, 2007). Potable water 
access is a very salient subject to citizens, and it is also an important variable for the 
study of environmental stewardship (Jorgenson 2007; Rudra 2011; Teclaff and Teclaff 
1985; Jorgenson 2006b; Cao and Prakash 2010; Bues and Theesfeld 2012; Bossio et al. 
2012; Sebastian and Warner 2013; Liu et al. 2013). Green sources may have a positive 
effect, despite increased quantity use for both manufacturing and extractive industries, 
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because these companies bring and use technologies that protect the environment and 
improve environmental infrastructure by reducing water and air pollution. Non-green 
sources may have a negative effect, not only because they will use a large quantity of 
water, but they will pollute waterways more heavily than green sources (see Table 3). 
This value is logged to control for outliers and variance in the water data as can be seen 
in the summary of the data. 
The second and third variables studied, air quality and pollution, measure 
emissions levels for different pollutants, the study of which is important to environmental 
stewardship, as well as pollution exposure, which directly affects citizens (Jorgenson 
2007; Lim, Menaldo, and Prakash 2014; Jorgenson 2006a; Cao and Prakash 2010; 
Bernauer and Koubi 2009b, 2009a). Air quality is a measure of both air pollution 
exposure and exceedance (percent of population exposed) as well as household air 
quality. It also can indicate access to better technology and policy, or lack thereof. Air 
pollution is a measure of Nitrous Oxide (NOx), a pollutant that can lead to acid rain and 
smog and is assessed throughout the developing world due to its direct impact on the 
lives and health of citizens. Similarly, to water access, green sources of FDI have a 
negative effect on air pollution and a positive influence on air quality because they bring 
in better technology for quality control and they typically advertise and encourage better 
environmental practices and policies in their industry and consumers.  
Finally, the study of forestry is important as many high-polluting MNCs have a 
negative effect on forests in developing countries. This variable quantifies the rate of 
deforestation, i.e., the rate of change in forest size in a country over time: 
!"#$%"&'(')$*!" = (#$%"&'	&)."!" − #$%"&'	&)."!"#$)/#$%"&'	&)."!"#$ 
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Forestry represents ecological withdrawals—the removal of natural resources—
that an MNC may be taking to aid in production. Often, as production increase, the 
extraction of nonrenewable resources, i.e., deforestation, increases at an unsustainable 
rate (Long, Stretesky, and Lynch 2017). Ecological withdrawal is an unequal exchange, 
and many other goods, similar to forests, are extracted in one location, only to be 
consumed elsewhere as a result of globalization (Jorgenson 2008). Increases in FDI from 
developing countries could increase the unsustainable use of forests further, contributing 
to the overall ecological withdrawal problem. Developing countries would then be 
expected to have a negative effect on the rate of change (see Table 3.3). 
WATER 
ACCESS 
AIR 
QUALITY 
AIR 
POLLUTION 
DEFORESTATION 
DEVELOPED + + - + 
DEVELOPING - - + - 
Table 3.3: Expected effect of Independent Variable on Dependent Variables 
Independent Variable 
The independent variable is a measure of net inflows of greenfield foreign direct 
investment (FDI) in the manufacturing and extractive industries from developing 
countries,18 as a percentage of total investment, lagged two years. Studies show evidence 
to suggest that FDI takes about two years to affect environmental outcomes as it can take 
time for predicted effects and project gestation (Neafie 2018; Rudra, Alkon, and Joshi 
18 FDI is an investment in the managing stock of a company, measured by the World Bank of any purchase over 10 
percent of controlling stock, outside of the investor’s home country (2016). 
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2018). The total effect on environmental outcomes of increased investment from a 
developing country depends on the degree to which the developing country replaces 
investment from developed countries. The general form of this model follows an 
autoregressive process that is influenced by the two-year-lagged variable of investment 
context, Ci,t-2, representing developing country investment (j) into the developing country 
(i) as a percent of total investment:
2!"#% =
345&→!,"#%
345!,"#%
Foreign investment is a variables that sums to a fixed constraint, using this model 
I am able to parse out the compositional data—the percentage of investment from each 
country that makes up the yearly FDI flows into a developing country (Aitchison 2003). 
This variable represents the percent of total investment coming from a developing 
country; as the percentage of investment from other developing countries increases, it 
must logically reduce the share of investment from other countries.19 Thus, the coefficient 
on this variable can be used to interpret the FDI-context effects of new increases in 
investment from a developing country, and it infers the aggregate estimates of investment 
context effects, ideally through changes in where investment comes from. The calculation 
is considered the more appropriate measure for this study for three reasons: First, bilateral 
Greenfield FDI data is available and has been recorded throughout a large number of 
developing countries since 2000, as compared to bilateral stock FDI numbers, which are 
harder to obtain. Second, Greenfield data reflects new projects that are built by the 
19 There are examples of compositional data analysis across different areas of study in political science (Adolph, 
Quince, and Prakash 2017; Katz and King 1999; Lantz et al. 2014). 
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investing company, as opposed to capital investments or use of preexisting facilities. This 
gives a more accurate assessment of how FDI flows directly impact changes in 
environmental stewardship. The aggregate measure of FDI context is subject to a similar 
logic, and the percentage composition of FDI can be used to weight changes in exposure 
to other countries’ standards. Third, Figure 3.2 shows that manufacturing and extractive 
sectors dominate FDI coming into developing countries.20 These sectors have a larger 
impact on environmental resources, resulting in problems such as pollution and resource 
overuse (Bues and Theesfeld 2012; Jorgenson 2007; Roberts, Grimes, and Manale 2006). 
Figure 3.2: Capital investment into developing countries, 2003-2015 
(Source: Author, Data: FDImarkets (2016)) 
20 This bar graph shows all Greenfield foreign investment from 2003 to 2015. Over 60 percent of investment that goes 
into developing countries is in the manufacturing and extractive sectors. The other section is made up of all other 
sectors, including shipping, hotels, and real estate groups. 
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Model 1: Source Effects and the EKC hypothesis 
The following model assesses the effects of manufacturing and extractive 
Greenfield FDI on indicators of environmental stewardship in developing countries. The 
model uses year dummy variables to account for annual trends: 
46!" 	= 7 + 9$2!"#% + 9&:"(%! + 9);$*'%$<&!" + =! + >!" 
In these equations, 46!"	denotes the effect on the environmental stewardship for 
every year data was collected. 9$is the change in the DV when there is a one-unit change 
in 2!"#%, which is the net inflows of FDI from developing countries into the developing 
country i at period t-2. ?"(%! 	denotes a time dummy, >	indicates independent and 
identically distributed random errors, and ;$*'%$<&!" are the various independent 
variables that account for any extraneous factors which affect the parameters of interest. 
=! is the unobserved time-invariant country effects, such as policy or other institutional 
factors. 
Model 2: Source Effects and the EKC hypothesis 
I also want to consider whether the effects of high-polluting FDI on 
environmental outcomes vary between levels of development in the host country. To do 
this, I use the same country-year fixed effects regression model with an interaction 
between FDI and my measurement of development, the Human Development Index 
(HDI): 
46!" 	= 7 + 9$2!"#% + @*A45 + @$2!"#% ∗ A45 + 9&:"(%! + 9);$*'%$<&!" + C! + >!" 
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All parameters and variables remain the same except the inclusion of HDI as an 
interaction term, which illustrates how a developing country’s high-pollutant FDI affects 
host countries at different levels of development. The HDI variable is a composite index 
of the basic dimensions of human development (UNDP 2018). Where 9$ is the change in 
environmental outcomes associated with a one-unit change in developing country high-
polluting foreign investment (as a percent of total investment) and 9$ + @$ is the change 
in environmental outcomes associated with a one-unit change in developing country FDI 
as HDI increases. All other variables remain the same. 
Control Variables 
To control for other factors that may affect environmental stewardship in this 
model, I will use control variables that help it to more accurately predict the effects of 
FDI. I use nine control variables to account for economic, social, and political factors that 
affect environmental stewardship, according to the literature linking it to political science 
and economics: net FDI inflows as a percent of GDP, domestic investment, gross 
domestic product (GDP), the Human Development Index (HDI), rapid economic growth, 
polity, trade, and inequality (GINI coefficient). GDP, GDP growth, and population 
variables are all logged, and they come from the World Bank’s (2012) world 
development indicators list. When using Greenfield FDI, I control for net inflows of FDI 
as a percent of GDP in order to take into account the economic size of a country as 
compared to its investment levels, as countries with larger economies attract more FDI; 
this allows me to compare between countries and regimes more succinctly (Choi and 
Samy 2008). Inequality is measured by the GINI co-efficient, in which higher scores 
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represent lower levels of inequality. These variables are important in the literature as they 
have impacts on environmental stewardship and infrastructure within the country and, by 
controlling for them, I can further isolate the effects of FDI. 
Results: OLS Model 
Overall, Table 3.4 shows empirical evidence in support of my hypothesis that 
countries with higher foreign investment inflows from developing countries lead to a 
‘worse off’ environmental stewardship situation, particularly in regard to water access 
and air pollution. These coefficients reflect whether developing country investors have a 
uniquely stronger effect than developed country investors. The strongest evidence for this 
is in the assessment of water access, where both the models with and without controls 
show strong evidence that developing country FDI is reducing water access more than 
developed country FDI.  
Developing Country High-Polluting FDI on Potable Water Access 
It would be expected that for every unit increase in developing country FDI, as a 
percentage of total FDI, potable water access would decrease by more than 0.03 percent 
on average, all other factors held constant (Table 3.4, column 2). The effect of high-
polluting industry FDI from developing countries on water access is significant. A one 
standard deviation increase of developing country FDI leads to a decrease of about 1.4 
percent of the population with access to potable water, all other factors held constant in 
this model. This indicates that FDI from developing countries slows the improvements to 
water access, even in the presence of political, environmental, and other economic 
controls in host countries. Developing country high-polluting investment may be using, 
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diverting, or polluting more water in comparison to developed country investment. This 
may be linked to technology that is not as sustainable and dumping of polluted water 
back into waterways. 
Developing Country High-Polluting FDI on Air Pollution (NOx) 
Increases of developing country FDI as a percent of total FDI raises the release of 
NOx on average by more than one percent compared to developed countries, all other 
factors held constant (Table 3.4, column 6). I find mixed results for the effect of 
developing country FDI on air pollution, with evidence suggesting there may be some 
greater negative effect of high-polluting industries on nitrous oxide (NOx) compared to 
developed country FDI in host countries. There is only a weak relationship between NOx 
and developing county FDI, which suggests that high-polluting FDI from developing 
countries may have an effect, but not a significantly large one, on increases in NOx 
releases in host developing countries.  
Developing Country High-Polluting FDI on Air Quality Measures 
According to this model (Table 4, columns 3 and 4), developing country high-
polluting FDI may have only a small ‘more negative’ effect or not significantly different 
effect on measured air quality, compared to a developed country’s FDI. Air quality is not 
found to be statistically significant, but the coefficients indicate that a developing 
country’s high-polluting FDI could be having a more negative effect than developed 
country FDI. This may be because net high-polluting FDI flows are causing decreases in 
air quality and developing country high-polluting industries do not have an effect that is 
distinct from developed countries. While developing countries may not be having any 
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significant effect on air quality outcomes compared to developed countries, as expected 
from my hypothesis, the sign is still negative.  
It is also important to note for air pollution measure that impacts are more 
localized. Air quality may have more significant differences if I could look at the more 
local level, at air quality levels affecting households near major polluters. It is possible 
that largely improvements in environmental infrastructure are washing out effects that 
certain localities are experiencing. Water access is able to capture this local effect 
problem with a national data set, air quality does not have the same possibilities with 
current available data.   
Developing Country High-Polluting FDI on Deforestation Measures 
The effects of developing country FDI on deforestation rates is not found to be 
statistically significant in the simplified model (see column 7 in Table 3.4), but there is a 
weak relationship in the second model that shows a positive relationship with 
deforestation. This indicates that FDI from developing countries is not hindering forest 
rates. However, overall FDI seems to have a negative effect on deforestation, which may 
be why I see this weak relationship between developing country FDI and deforestation. 
This means that as developing country high-polluting FDI increases, it may have a small 
positive or no effect on deforestation rates compared to all FDI.  
Other Variables of Note Compared to FDI 
Other variables exhibit outcomes that both agree and disagree with the literature 
when exploring the impacts of FDI but show the effect size of FDI in comparison. Net 
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FDI is an important variable to look at, especially as this model shows some evidence 
that disagrees with the overall literature.  
First, FDI has a positive effect on water access when the percent of investment 
coming from developing countries is controlled for, increasing the access of potable 
water by about two percent of the population. This shows strong evidence to support my 
overall hypothesis that developing country FDI will make a host country worse off, in 
this case by slowing the positive effect that FDI may be having. This is in opposition to 
the literature that suggests that FDI has an overall negative effect (Rudra, Alkon, and 
Joshi 2018), but it may be because the model also controls for developing country net 
FDI. Net FDI flows have a significantly negative effect on air quality and deforestation, 
which makes it harder to tell if developing country FDI is significantly different. I 
hypothesized that developing countries would have a negative effect in comparison to 
developed countries, and this evidence suggests that FDI has a negative impact. 
However, while the effects of developing country FDI may be more negative, it does not 
appear to be significantly different than the negative effects of developed country FDI. 
Looking specifically at water access and air pollution, there is evidence to suggest that 
developing country high-polluting FDI may have a bigger impact, which could be 
cancelling out the positive effects of FDI when it is a compositionally large portion of all 
high-polluting FDI.  
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Water Water Air Air Air Air Deforestation Deforestation 
VARIABLES Access 
(logged) 
Access (logged) Quality Quality Pollution 
(logged) 
Pollution 
(logged) 
(logged) (logged) 
Developing Country -0.029* -0.031** -1.24 -1.7 0.11*** 0.014 -0.7 0.29* 
FDI (lagged 2 yrs.) (0.015) (0.012) (2.35) (1.1) (0.032) (0.016) (0.45) (0.16) 
Net FDI (lagged 2 yrs.) 0.02** 0.013* -2.53** -0.67 0.027 -0.0053 -0.19 -0.07
(% of GDP, logged) (0.008) (0.007) (1.13) (0.66) (0.023) (0.0066) (0.14) (0.053)
GDP per capita 0.29*** 0.54*** -10.9 1.1 -0.49 0.43*** 0.62 -0.61
(lagged 2 yrs., logged) (0.067) (0.17) (12.9) (11.0) (0.33) (0.11) (0.86) (0.44)
Democracy 0.0061 0.0044 0.47 1.31*** -0.013 0.0023 -0.057 0.017
(0.0048) (0.005) (0.56) (0.33) (0.052) (0.0049) (0.054) (0.021)
Inequality -0.0035** -0.0095*** 1.24** 0.82** -0.0042 -0.0038 0.11 0.048
(0.0017) (0.0028) (0.56) (0.36) (0.0074) (0.0026) (0.07) (0.043)
Domestic investment -0.00055 0.0092 0.00015 0.099
(0.0013) (0.086) (0.001) (0.053)
Development Index 0.054 -118 0.17 -6.99*
(0.76) (72.4) (0.78) (75)
Rapid Growth -0.0094** 0.81 0.00061 0.13**
(logged) (0.0044) (0.6) (0.0083) (0.051)
Trade  0.042 1.34 -0.031 -2.1*
(% of GDP, logged) (0.1) (2.79) (0.068) (0.46)
Population Growth -0.008 -0.94 -0.098** -0.22
(logged) (0.013) (1.12) (0.042) (0.17)
Constant 2.0*** 0.045 105.0 95.6 15*** 6.23*** 0.09 15.1**
(0.56) (1.35) (101.0) (77.9) (2.6) (1.15) (9) (5.7)
Observations 162 96 163 96 80 51 89 38 
R-squared 0.66 0.75 0.41 0.44 0.69 0.97 0.44 0.87 
Number of Countries 58 42 58 42 41 32 24 13 
Table 3.4: Impact of Developing Country High Pollution FDI on Environmental Variables (with controls) (Source: Author, 
Data: FDI Markets (“FDIMarkets” 2016) QoG Standard Dataset (Teorell et al. 2018)). Robust standard errors in parentheses, 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Second, democratic investment does not show any significant impact on 
environmental variables. This shows that FDI has a more significant impact in 
developing countries than domestic investors, and that FDI may remove the effects of 
domestic investors and local communities that may seek “greener” methods of production 
(Jorgenson 2007; Young 1997). This indicates that FDI is a better indicator of access to 
environmental issue outcomes in developing countries and has a stronger effect than 
domestic investment.  
Third, the impact of trade is not as robust as previous studies have indicated, 
particularly in comparison to FDI, nor is it in the direction expected from previous 
studies (Rudra, 2011). The only significant consequence of trade is on forest land area 
and indicates that it has a positive influence on deforestation. Additionally, while its 
influence on water access, air quality, or pollution are all insignificant, the signs indicate 
the possibility that trade could have a marginally positive effect on the overall 
environment. 
Results: Interaction Model 
In Table 3.5, I evaluate the extent to which host countries are able to counter the 
effects of developing country high-polluting foreign investment through better 
institutional development and changes in priorities as the countries progress. The results 
from this model show support for the EKC hypothesis, that developing countries are able 
to counter effects from non-green FDI as infrastructure improves with development. 
There is strong evidence in my study that development mitigates the influence of FDI on 
some environmental resources. For potable water access and NOx emissions (air 
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pollution), developing countries are able to mitigate the negative effects. However, I do 
not see these same results in the relationship between development and deforestation 
rates.  
Development and Potable Water Access 
Potable water access in developing countries has a positive increase, 
approximately 0.002 percent, for each unit change in the Human Development Index 
(HDI). A positive value for the effect of the interaction term implies that the more 
developed a country is, the more positive the impact of developing country FDI on 
potable water access. These findings show that when there is more developing country 
FDI received at low levels of development, there is less access to potable water. As 
nations progress, however, these effects are mitigated. These results indicate that 
institutional change as a country develops could be moderating the negative results of 
foreign investment seen in previous models.  
Development and Air Pollution (NOx) 
Similar results are seen in air pollution, where increases in the percent of 
investment of high-polluting sectors is mitigated by development. At higher levels of 
development, the state is mitigating the negative effects on environmental resources. This 
supports the EKC literature that as a country develops it become easier to address 
environmental problems because the preferences of society shift to prioritize 
environmental issues, and it becomes more viable financially and technologically. 
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(9) (10) (11) (12)
Water Air Air 
VARIABLES Access (logged) Quality Pollution 
(logged) 
Deforestation 
(logged) 
Interaction term 0.0023* 0.013 -0.0054*** -0.038***
Developing FDI*HDI (0.0014) (0.15) (0.001) (0.0023)
Developing Country FDI -0.0019* -0.026 0.0042*** 0.03***
(lagged 2 years) (0.00097) (0.11) (0.00067) (0.018)
Development Index 0.028 -114.0 0.26 -14.2
(0.76) (70) (0.77) (10.3)
Domestic investment -0.00088 0.0074 -0.0018* -0.089*
(0.0015) (0.083) (0.00094) (0.046)
Net FDI (lagged) 0.013* -0.67 -0.017*** -0.23*
(% of GDP, logged) (0.0076) (0.67) (0.0029) (0.13)
GDP per capita 0.47** 0.69 0.47*** 4.16
(logged) (0.18) (12.5) (0.01) (4.26)
Democracy 0.0047 1.31*** 0.0033 -0.19**
(0.005) (0.33) (0.0033) (0.09)
Rapid Growth -0.0069 0.82 0.0071 -0.17
(logged) (0.0045) (0.66) (0.0052) (0.13)
Trade  0.025 1.25 0.025 2.1*
(% of GDP, logged) (0.1) (2.98) (0.058) (1.1)
Population Growth -0.0055 -0.92 -0.066** 0.22
(logged) (0.014) (1.09) (0.03) (0.22)
Inequality -0.0096*** 0.82** -0.0018 0.25***
(0.0029) (0.36) (0.0023) (0.085)
Constant 0.69 99.2 5.53*** -6.9
(1.45) (96.7) (1.1) (35.6)
Observations 96 96 51 95 
R-squared 0.75 0.44 0.98 0.63 
Number of Countries 42 42 32 41 
Table 3.5: Multiple regression interaction of the effect of FDI on environmental 
resources dependent on Development Index (Source: Author, Data: QoG Standard 
Dataset (Teorell et al. 2018)). Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** 
p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Development and Deforestation Rates 
The interaction term for deforestation indicates that there is a negative 
relationship between environmental improvement and FDI at higher levels of 
development. This suggests that the effects of high-polluting FDI on deforestation rates 
might not be mitigated by development. This may be because forests are used at the same 
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rate or higher regardless of the level of development, which may be linked to higher 
levels of consumption, no matter the rate of FDI. 
Conclusions 
Foreign direct investment from developing countries to other developing 
countries is on the rise around the world. Often the relationship between investment and 
resource use and pollution is overlooked by policymakers and local stakeholders because 
of economic growth. This chapter highlights the problems that developing country FDI 
may have on the environment in other developing countries, caused by the diffusion of 
poor corporate policy and practices. Increasing FDI in high-polluting manufacturing and 
extractive sectors places a strain on the least developed by limiting access to potable 
water, increasing air pollutants, such as NOx, and decreasing forest size. In contrast, 
increases in economic development can mitigate these negative effects. I find evidence 
from different environmental resources that supports my contention that anticipated 
negative impacts of developing country FDI hold, primarily at levels of low development, 
slowing positive changes to environmental resources.  
My findings are generalizable across the developing country-developing country 
foreign investment relationship. The finding that FDI from developing countries has 
negative effects on environmental stewardship has consequences for several different 
literatures, most particularly the “race to the bottom” and “race to the top” literature. I 
find that it is not necessarily a case that FDI inherently causes either, but a matter of 
where the investment comes from, and that some FDI may create a “race to the bottom” 
but other FDI may create a “race to the top.” For example, in the case of potable water, 
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on average, developing countries receive about 40% of their FDI from developing 
countries, which could have adverse effects for more than 1.5 percent of the population. 
This means that FDI from developing countries is slowing infrastructure improvements 
that host countries make in providing potable water access, thus creating a “race to the 
bottom” in countries that are not equipped to manage public goods. That strengthens the 
argument that the source of global flows matters for policy and practice in developing 
countries.  
These findings also indicate that developing countries can overcome the impact of 
negative global economic activities as they progress. Similar to developed countries, they 
can have a positive effect on environmental stewardship through the creation of strong 
institutions and changing materialistic values, both of which can lead to the expansion of 
potable water access and increased air quality. There is a need for further study 
comparing developed and developing countries’ ecological institutions over time as well 
as the impacts on environmental resources management; this would allow for an 
evaluation of the differences in how investment groups interact with countries at various 
stages of development. 
The logic of the source effect argument may also hold insights for other resources 
subject to overuse or pollution. Arable land, forests, and fisheries have attributes similar 
to water and air quality; they are consumable goods that impact the lives of the citizens in 
a state. It may be interesting to see if developing country FDI and developed country FDI 
have different impacts in these areas. Adolph et al. (2017) has suggested that Chinese 
trade has an effect on labor policy; this holds true regarding FDI and environmental 
impacts as well. However, there needs to be further study into whether it is China alone 
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or whether other developing countries are bringing policies and practices that have a 
negative effect in developing countries with them as well. It seems as though expanding 
multinational corporations are influencing policy and practice in developing countries, 
but it seems that developing country globalization may be motivating poorer 
environmental outcomes than globalization coming from other, more developed, sources. 
Further studies would also be able to identify if development is leading to more 
sustainable practices in the absence of effective management regimes.  
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CHAPTER IV: CHINESE FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT AND THE 
ENVIRONMENT IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: A CASE STUDY OF 
CHINESE MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS GOING TO AFRICA 
Introduction 
Does FDI from China influence environmental outcomes in African countries? 
The steady increase of Chinese foreign direct investment abroad since 1994, especially 
through its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), makes understanding its environmental 
impacts particularly important. Large investments by Chinese corporate investors give 
them the power to influence both environmental policies and outcomes in many 
developing host countries. FDI is recognized as an important mechanism for the 
diffusion of environmental regulatory standards, norms, and industrial practices (Prakash 
and Potoski 2007; M. Delmas and Montiel 2008). Until recently, most major investment 
sources have been located in the Global North, where there are higher regulatory 
standards, which are a reflection of the post-material values of those societies.21 
However, China, an emerging investor in a large share of African projects, has standards 
that are markedly lower than other major foreign investors, and even some African host 
countries. If companies are diffusing their environmental standards abroad, is China 
exporting poor environmentalism?  
21 See Boesso and Kumar (2009) as well as Frooman and Murrell (2005) on the role of stakeholders in influencing 
corporate practice and policy. 
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China receives a lot of attention as a foreign investor; it has been known as a 
destination for FDI for a long time, but now its investment abroad has grown 
substantially. Figure 4.1 shows how Chinese investment flows, which have steadily 
increased 20.5% per year since 2003, compare to United States investment in Africa 
between 2003 and 2017 (China-Africa Research Initiative 2019). China is now one of the 
largest outward investors, and the announcement of the BRI comes with over one trillion 
dollars in investment into infrastructure projects internationally (Batabyal 2019). This has 
generated conversation on what this means for regulations, norms, and industrial 
practices around the world. 
Figure 4.1: Chinese and US Investment in Africa, 2003-2017 (Source: Author, Data: 
(China-Africa Research Initiative 2019))  
I examine the theory of a Chinese source effect, the impact of investment from 
China on the domestic ecological resource practices and pollution levels of host 
countries. It is largely believed that foreign investment undermines environmental 
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infrastructure, which provides potable water and manages pollution in towns and cities, in 
African countries that cater to Chinese multinational corporations (MNCs). Scholars have 
noted the importance of China as a major investment partner (Shen 2013), but this 
discussion does not examine the mechanisms about why and how Chinese investment 
would lead to different outcomes nor does it isolate the effects of Chinese FDI in local 
markets. Building on previous chapters, this section looks for evidence of the 
mechanisms by which Chinese FDI contributes to declining resource access and pollution 
which undermines environmental infrastructure. Using quantitative study, I examine why 
Chinese MNCs might be bad for environmental infrastructure in developing countries 
and examine the consequences of Chinese investment on African countries’ 
environmental outcomes, which would directly impact the environmental infrastructure. 
This study offers insights in assessing how Chinese corporations’ role as a leading 
investor in manufacturing, extraction, and agriculture shapes environmental outcomes 
across Africa. 
This research builds on previous studies of FDI, which explored how it influences 
environmental regulation, practices, and norms in host countries. First-generation FDI 
studies focused on its role in creating a “race to the bottom” by the diffusion of policies 
and practices that were bad for local environments and through the treatment of 
developing countries as pollution havens—locations to export polluting industries 
(Levinson and Taylor 2008; Frey 2003; Gallagher 2006; Jorgenson 2007; Leighton, Roht-
Arriaza, and Zarsky 2002). Second-generation FDI literature developed arguments that 
contradicted the first generation. This literature claimed that the evidence that FDI 
relocates to pollution havens is inconclusive, and that MNCs have a “halo effect,” 
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improving technology, education, and regulation of supply chains (Garcia-Johnson 2000; 
Mercado 2000; Prakash and Potoski 2007; Eskeland and Harrison 2003). These 
conflicting literatures agree that MNCs are creating avenues for the exchange of 
regulations, practices, and norms, but they vary on whether these regulatory inclinations 
have a positive or negative impact.  
As a broader contribution to political-sociological studies, my research looks 
more closely at foreign influences on environmental policy and practice because of the 
impact that changes to environmental infrastructure have on low-income groups, 
particularly in developing countries. Inward FDI impacts key resources that are vital for 
the environmental infrastructure in the countries where they invest, i.e., water, air, and 
resource access; many of the large MNCs, like those from China, have operational 
demands that affect environmental infrastructure improvements because they demand 
more access to resources and increasing pollution levels (Moyo 2012). As a result, these 
changes in resource access and increases in pollution directly impact the poor more than 
the rich because they cannot afford to mitigate their exposure (Rudra, Alkon, and Joshi 
2018; Sun, Kahn, and Zheng 2017; Le Blanc 2008). By understanding better if one 
investor has a more significant effect on the government’s ability to provide sufficient 
environmental infrastructure improvements, regulators will be able to adjust and provide 
for societal needs. 
Is Chinese FDI slowing environmental infrastructure improvement? I test the 
impact of Chinese FDI on the main components of environmental infrastructure 
improvement: potable water access and pollution levels. My argument develops over 
three parts: First, I review the literature on the source effects mechanisms that cause 
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regulatory preferences to vary as well as the cross-country diffusion of regulatory policy, 
norms, and industrial practices. This section explores why and how the variation in these 
matter for environmental outcomes in the host country. Second, I look more closely at 
Chinese corporations and how their environmental policies and practices vary. Finally, I 
test my hypothesis that stronger ties with companies from countries with weaker 
environmental records, such as China, may be of concern to regulators and other 
stakeholder groups trying to protect in the environment. I use a large-N panel country-
year fixed effects regression model and find evidence to suggest that Chinese FDI is 
slowing infrastructure improvements in developing countries. 
Literature Review: FDI and the Environment in Developing Countries 
A theory of source effects has components in two actors: the source country and 
the host country (see Figure 4.2). The former has stakeholders and regulators that 
influence the corporation’s green policies, and the latter has laws and social actors that 
interact with the corporation, providing opportunities for influence of the corporation on 
the state, and the state on the corporation. Variation of institutions and society in either 
component may change the environmental outcomes in a country receiving FDI. Here, I 
will examine the key features that affect policies and practices in the source country, 
which filter down to the recipient country directly through MNCs that operate in the host 
country and change environmental outcomes. 
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Figure 4.2: Source Effects Flowchart (Source: Author) 
Source Effects: How does corporate environmental policy vary? 
Many different literatures discuss where corporate policy and practice come from 
and what external forces cause them to change. MNCs are largely considered to be driven 
by the goal of maximizing profits and shareholder value, but they are also influenced by 
stakeholders that seek to change corporate norms and discount rate—the current value of 
future monetary flows (Falkner 2005; Freeman 2010; Frooman 1999). External 
stakeholder groups—including shareholders, consumers, regulators, community 
members, and so on—build links to corporations over time; these connections may sway 
business decision-making, either through direct or indirect methods (Falkner 2005; 
Gunawan 2007; Sotorrío and Sánchez 2010; M. A. Delmas and Toffel 2004). Influence 
may take the form of requests to the corporation to change its strategies, consumer habits, 
or regulations that make a strategy more costly, all of which impact revenue and 
shareholder value. As a result of these actions, corporate costs and benefits may shift and 
the strategic choices of the company change.  
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 This paper outlines three important mechanisms at play in the relationships 
between external stakeholders and corporations that increase or decrease corporate 
greenness: (1) societal values, (2) regulation, and (3) competition. All three of these 
mechanisms are based on the premise that corporations will only protect the environment 
if the cost is less than the benefits they may receive. 
Societal values and corporate greenness 
Corporate policies reflect the external world because of stakeholder influence; 
business and sociological theory suggests that the stakeholder influence model reflects a 
society’s material values, which are largely focused on goods that advance economic 
growth. The theory also suggests that it is only when a society has achieved a certain 
level of development that it will begin to focus on post-material values (Inglehart 1997). 
These are things often taken for granted during the economic growth stage of 
development, e.g., the environment. The literature often describes this phenomena as the 
Environmental Kuznets curve (EKC), an inverse U-shaped relationship between pollution 
and economic development: as states grow economically, pollution will increase in low-
income economies until they reach a tipping point, after which pollution decreases 
(Andreoni and Levinson 1998). For the purposes of this study, this means that 
corporations pollute unless they are incentivized by society (which affects monetary 
motivations of corporations) to stop polluting, and society will only push environmentally 
beneficial practices when economic growth has reached such a point that citizens feel that 
they can focus on post-material values.  
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Essentially, this generates an expectation that foreign investment with relatively 
poorer environmental policies more often comes from less-developed countries in which 
the public is more concerned with economic growth. We can assume that the 
corporations, in this instance, are less focused on creating and promoting greener 
practices. Additionally, in countries where the market is controlled by the government 
and there is limited access for society to influence them, companies may exhibit weaker 
policies as well. These illiberal market practices mean that there may not be greener 
policies even at greater levels of development because societal pressures and other types 
of influence may be limited by government and market controls.  
Regulation and corporate greenness 
Corporate practices are also influenced by the regulations in their source country, 
which force them to change policies and practices at home and abroad or face fines that 
negatively affect their profit margins. Regulatory policy is largely influenced by society 
or the selectorate—the group of people who are responsible for giving the policymakers 
power—that keeps the government in power (Grossman and Krueger 1995; Panayotou 
1993; Seldon and Song 1994; Yandle, Bhattarai, and Vijayaraghavan 2004), which means 
that, for effective regulations of corporations to exist, the level of development and the 
ability of society to access regulators play a critical role.  
Social and political theory find that developing countries’ laws and institutions 
have historically failed to take into account the need to make economic development 
compatible with environmental protection (Abers and Keck 2013; Conca 2006; Huitema 
and Meijerink 2009; Molle and Wester 2009; Andreoni and Levinson 1998). 
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Policymakers perceive economic growth as the highest priority because the selectorate 
prioritizes it over environmental protection, and the regulators must convince them to 
support any regulation enacted if they want to maintain that power (Mulligan, Gil, and 
Sala-i-Martin 2004; Stigler 1971). This means that countries will have more green laws 
created and implemented in societies where the selectorate believes that the environment 
should be preserved.  
The selectorate varies with the type of government. It is often the case that 
democracies that have a larger selectorate and more access points for marginalized 
populations, who are more affected by poor environmental resource management and 
pollution, will have more successful environmental policies (Li and Reuveny 2006). In 
contrast, negative impacts on environmental resources are particularly acute in countries 
with large marginalized populations, who are unable to mobilize and lobby governing 
officials for environmental reforms, i.e., illiberal/authoritarian states. When there are 
weak legal frameworks for environmentalism in their source country, MNCs will 
establish weak environmental policies and practices. 
This means that (1) levels of development play a role in the regulation of the 
environment, and (2) levels of democracy and public participation in the regulatory 
process will change the environmental policies that exist. As a result, I would expect that 
corporate practices will be more regulated when they come from a developed, liberal 
democratic country.22 
22 Regulation may also come at the international level, but they are limited in both scope and enforcement mechanisms. 
Often, they only work if implemented by the source country or other countries that do business with the violating 
corporation. International regulation may play a role in making corporations greener, but it is inconclusive as an 
effective tool.  
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Competition and corporate greenness 
Studies also claim that competition can result in changes to corporate policy and 
practice. They posit (1) that competition can correct market failures around the 
environment and enhance social welfare; (2) that corporations will try to create a 
comparative advantage through better and more effective policies and practices, and other 
companies will try to catch up; and (3) that policies will converge and raise the level of 
environmental regulation (see Bernauer & Caduff, 2004; OECD, 2007). However, there 
is a lot of debate over whether competition and free trade leads to the creation of better or 
worse policies (Vogel and Kagan 2002).  
Corporations are more likely to develop environmental technologies or standards 
beyond the rest of the industry’s capabilities when it provides them some form of 
financial or reputational benefit. This leads to regulatory competition, where corporations 
compete based on their ability to influence regulation and society through technological 
developments. This works when there are multiple companies competing for market size. 
When competition creates better environmental regulation, technology, and corporate 
policies in the source country, there is more public concern over environmental issues, 
active rent-seeking for stricter regulations, and more sustainable and environmentally 
friendly performance strategies by corporations (Bernauer and Caduff 2004). This is only 
possible in an open market with competition, and markets without it would not have an 
opportunity to develop better environmental practices and policies.  
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Through these three mechanisms—society, regulation, and competition—
corporations are influenced to create environmentally friendly norms, values, and social 
behaviors. These then become nationalized and internalized in corporations through 
formal and informal processes (Powell and DiMaggio 1991). These then evolve into the 
level of environmental greenness a corporation will carry with them when they invest 
abroad.  
 Source Effects: Chinese Multinational Corporations 
To illustrate the general theoretical argument of source effect, I consider the case 
of China, a newly industrialized country that is still developing, but is the source of 
increasing amounts of FDI to developing countries. With the introduction of the Belt and 
Road Initiative (BRI), investment by China into developing countries is expected to grow 
even further. This increasing investment may be problematic as it is largely in the high-
polluting non-financial sector (Yu 2014) and comes from a country that has long been 
considered lax in its enforcement of environmental regulations due to economic growth 
and development goals (Economy 2010). My focus in this section is on exploring how 
FDI from China may be one underexamined variable contributing to environmental 
problems in developing countries, particularly its role in aggravating pre-existing 
challenges to environmental infrastructure improvements. This section will examine 
Chinese corporations and the three mechanisms from socio-economic theory that would 
most influence their environmental behavior—society, regulation, and competition.  
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Societal values and Chinese corporate greenness 
Chinese companies see pollution and resource use as unintended consequences of 
corporate strategy because companies do not incur high costs and sanctions for their 
chosen strategy. There are two reasons for this: First, there is no strong emphasis on post-
material values. China largely still sees itself as a developing nation that needs economic 
growth to raise the standard of living for Chinese citizens. During these periods, the 
citizens of developing nations will continue to focus on material values that increase 
economic growth and expansion, until such time as people start to feel they can focus on 
post-material values, i.e., environmental protection (Inglehart 1990). This is reflected in 
the policy choices of Chinese corporations that focus on economic growth, and which 
will even downplay any environmentally beneficial changes that may impact economic 
gains (Fryxell and Lo 2003).  
Second, China lacks a strong domestic environmental lobby or civil society to 
constrain corporations because the government suppresses civil society and community 
stakeholder groups that would be able to voice dissent over environmental policy (Shinn 
2016). The Chinese government has been criticized for not opening up dialogue with the 
public on environmental issues, as the United States and EU do in order to provide 
responsible environmental care (Chemical Week 1996). Even if the public were to seek 
action, the organizers of the environmental groups are arrested or suppressed by powerful 
interest groups representing large state-owned enterprises (Kahn and Yardley 2007; 
Zhang 2015).  
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The absence of social pressure and weak organization over environmental issues 
further dissuades Chinese corporations from creating strong environmental policies as the 
corporations lack the incentives to change their strategies.  
Regulations and Chinese corporate greenness 
Chinese corporations are also affected by the regulatory environment. However, 
despite the existence of such legislation, there has been a lack of strong implementation 
and enforcement mechanisms (Economy 2010). Starting in 1989 with the adoption of the 
Comprehensive Environmental Protection Law by the Standing Committee of the 
People’s Republic of China, the government has shown commitment to producing laws 
that protect and improve the environment. However, implementation and enforcement of 
these laws at the municipal and provincial level have been weak and lacked oversight 
(Compagnon and Alejandro 2013). Local policymakers are less concerned with 
environmental laws than with economic growth that can influence their political power 
and rank in the Chinese government. Consequently, when new regulations have been put 
into place, the local leadership has not shown a willingness to enforce national 
regulations in order to meet economic goals (Kahn and Yardley 2007; French 2007; 
Shinn 2016), and companies that are important for economic growth are not expected to 
observe environmental laws that interfere with their production.  
Considerable evidence shows Chinese corporations face few environmental 
constraints (A. L. Wang 2015). In 1995, China made an environmental protection law to 
clean up the Huai, but it was largely unsuccessful as businesses continued to dump 
pollutants into the river and were not punished for the violations (Watts 2010, 159; Hua 
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2009). The government has even created directives to stop environmentally poor behavior 
abroad by creating policies for Chinese outward foreign investments; however, these 
policies were also written with no enforcement apparatus (Jia and Bo 2013). 
Additionally, since its inception in 2008, the Ministry of Environmental Protection 
(MEP) has imposed rules on the steel industry and state-run oil companies that have been 
largely ignored, and the MEP has no power to make those companies comply (Wong 
2015). Even the courts have not been a constraint on corporate environmental practices 
and prioritize economic growth over environmental protection (Stern 2014). The courts 
are often only a tool for the officials to promote environmental protection needed by the 
government at strategic intervals (Qie 2013). This lack of institutional constraint can lead 
Chinese corporations to adopt more environmentally exploitative strategies. 
Competition and Chinese corporate greenness 
Chinese corporations also face problems in developing better environmental 
preferences due to a lack of competition that incentivizes environmentally beneficial 
practices. Before 2007, Chinese competition was limited, and regulation in China did not 
discourage monopolies of industry and manufacturing (Owen 2008). This lack of 
competition may have had a negative impact on corporate green policies and practices. 
Additionally, a study of Chinese corporations found that there has been no link between 
competition in China and the development of more environmentally beneficial policies 
and practices by corporations largely because the Chinese corporations are protected by 
the government from foreign enterprises (H. Lin et al. 2014). 
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As a result, Chinese companies lack motivation from external sources to promote 
environmentally beneficial policies. Company managers are constrained by the 
expectation to facilitate the growth of the Chinese economy over sustainable practices 
(Fryxell and Lo 2003), and the cost of implementing these environmentally beneficial 
policies overshadows the benefits the corporation could receive. The sustainability 
reports from Chinese MNCs show that these companies often lack environmental goals as 
well as a dedicated environmental department that could develop them, and they fail to 
have meetings about the environmental impacts of their projects (Kaplinsky, McCormick, 
and Morris 2007). Without stakeholder or institutional constraints to promote sustainable 
practices, decisions for the good of the company and the general economy may be 
environmentally exploitative. Regulators in developing countries where these MNCs 
invest must be concerned, then, that these practices are brought into their countries and 
have a negative effect on their environmental outcomes.  
Host Country: How does FDI affect the environment in host countries? 
When MNCs enter a host country, they carry these practices with them and will 
affect outcomes through their actions and influence over local stakeholder groups. 
Developing countries, compared to those that are already developed, tend to allow MNCs 
more latitude in terms of pollution and resource use, exchanging environmental 
conditions for economic benefits. Evidence suggests that developing country 
governments weakly govern foreign investors because they are under pressure to dilute 
regulatory standards and undermine enforcement in order to make the political and 
economic environment more open for foreign corporations who bring technology, jobs, 
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and other economic advancements (Bellos and Subasat 2012; Bellos 2010; Bues 2011; 
Hu, Deng, and Zhang 2013; Pandya 2010).  
Foreign MNCs affect the environment through two key mechanisms. First, MNCs 
directly impact the environment through manufacturing and production, which may 
produce pollution or use large amounts of resources (Doytch and Uctum 2016; Jorgenson 
2007). Many studies find evidence to suggest that the intensification of the global 
economy increasingly puts pressure on natural resources, such as water and air quality 
(Neafie 2018; Rudra, Alkon, and Joshi 2018; Cao and Prakash 2010; Grimes and Kentor 
2003; Jorgenson 2007; Perkins and Neumayer 2008; Rudra 2011). The second 
mechanism is through the influence that MNCs have on local domestic corporations, both 
directly and indirectly, through civil society and other stakeholder groups. Corporations 
actively and intentionally disseminate their business ideas because they consider 
themselves “agents of change” or “norm entrepreneurs” (Barnet and Muller 1974; 
Dashwood 2012; Garcia-Johnson 2000; Laidi 2008). Both of these mechanisms are 
pathways by which MNCs may influence environmental outcomes.  
China in Africa: Panel Analysis Model 
To test my hypothesis that Chinese MNCs are diffusing exploitative practices, I 
evaluate the impact of Chinese FDI on two important parts of environmental 
infrastructure: water access and pollution control. To do this, I use a panel data set of 
more than 45 African countries from 2003 to 2017. Since January 2006, when China 
announced its new China-Africa Policy, China has been building more trade and 
investment relationships on the continent. Just one year after this relationship was 
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announced, investment increased 35%, from $6,344.5 million USD in 2006 to $8,549.7 
million USD in 2007 (“FDIMarkets” 2016). These amounts have continued to grow and 
create opportunities for Chinese companies to disseminate their policies and practices 
into African countries. This section will review the case selection of Africa, and then 
discuss the variables that were chosen, before introducing my model. 
Case Selection 
I focus on African countries because they (1) are part of the Belt and Road 
Initiative and data is available to evaluate how changes in Chinese investment are 
affecting environmental outcomes, and (2) are locations that will prioritize economic 
growth over environmental protection, giving a more accurate idea of the impact that 
Chinese companies are having. This is particularly important because Africa has been 
receiving more and more Chinese investment, largely in the high-polluting, non-financial 
sectors. This is demonstrated in Figure 4.3: almost 70% of investment during this period 
is in manufacturing and extractive industries. Many African countries are also largely 
dependent on investment for economic growth and development (Adams 2009) and, in 
many cases, lack strong institutions that could counter environmentally exploitative 
behavior.  
African countries often have strong environmental policies but weak capacity for 
implementation of those policies. For example, Ethiopia, Mali, and Mozambique all have 
enacted a wide range of legal, political, and institutional frameworks in regard to the 
environment because they take environmental protection very seriously (Shinn 2015). 
Mali has even established the national Agency for Environmental and Sustainable 
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Development (Shinn 2015; Drakenberg and Cesar 2013). Mozambique also has several 
laws and policies that safeguard the environment and has signed many major multilateral 
environmental agreements (Wingqvist 2011). However, studies find that these countries 
still have weak capacity for implementation, monitoring, and enforcement due to poor 
legislation and low levels of budgetary allocation (Shinn 2015; Wingqvist 2011; Shinn 
2016). Implementation is often made harder because the laws and regulations are spread 
throughout various governmental departments and numerous pieces of legislation. For 
example, Zambia’s commitment to environmental protection is scattered across more 
than 33 different pieces of legislation and across multiple ministries (Shinn 2015). This 
lack of cohesion and enforcement may allow countries with less environmentally 
beneficial behavior to have a larger impact in Africa.  
Figure 4.3: Chinese investment into Africa, by sector (Source: Author, Data: 
(“FDIMarkets” 2016)) 
Dependent Variables 
For this study, I test the impact of Chinese FDI on the environment in developing 
countries as proxied by potable water access, air quality, and measures of air pollution 
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(PM 2.5, NOx, and CO2). These variables were chosen as they are likely areas to be 
impacted by foreign direct investment and, when they are overused or polluted, directly 
affect the lives of citizens; this section will review these variables more closely as well as 
why they were selected.  
Potable Water Access 
First, potable water access is the percent of the population with access to clean 
water from an improved source, such as a well. This has been used as a variable to 
represent access to natural resources of a certain quality and quantity in multiple studies 
(Rudra 2011; Neafie 2018; Rudra, Alkon, and Joshi 2018). Water is a resource that would 
elicit a response from the citizens who rely it to be at a minimum “potable” quality and of 
a quantity, i.e., at least 20 liters of water per person a day from an improved source 
within one kilometer of the dwelling (World Bank 2007). Chinese MNCs, largely in the 
extractive and manufacturing sectors, not only demand more water but are more likely to 
pollute water as well (Doytch and Uctum 2016; Jorgenson 2007). This value is logged to 
control for outliers and variance in the water data (this can be seen in the summary of the 
data). I estimate water models with and without a lagged dependent variable to ensure 
serial autocorrelation is not impacting my findings (Achen 2001). 
Indoor and Outdoor Air Pollution 
Second, I look at measures of emissions that affect air quality and pollution 
levels. The study of emissions is important to environmental stewardship as it measures 
air quality and pollution exposure, which directly affect citizens. More than five million 
premature deaths a year are linked to air pollution, mostly in developing countries (World 
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Health Organization 2005; World Bank & Institute for Health Metrics and Evaluation 
2016). The inclusion of these variables isolates a pollution problem that is linked to 
health issues in rural and socio-economically disadvantaged communities (Bernauer and 
Koubi 2009a; Jorgenson 2007; Bernauer and Koubi 2009b). 
The measurements used to look at indoor and outdoor air pollution are air quality, 
nitrous oxide (NOx), and carbon dioxide (CO2). The air quality measure represents 
changes in indoor and outdoor particulates. It is derived from the environmental 
protection index and includes measurements of particulate matter 2.5 and pollution that 
directly impact citizens in their living and working environment (Hammond et al. 1995). 
The other variable is the emission of outdoor air pollutants, specifically NOx and CO2 
and the measurements for this came from the United Nations Statistics Division. They are 
derived from data on energy, industrial and agricultural production, waste management, 
and land use (UN Stats 2019).  
These variables can impact the health of citizens (as well as the economic health 
of a country, which relies on healthy citizens to contribute to society), such as air 
pollution, which negatively affects agricultural production (Agrawal et al. 2003; Tai, 
Martin, and Heald 2014) and labor productivity (He, Liu, and Salvo 2019). Chinese 
MNCs in non-financial sectors tend to be in higher-polluting industries that affect indoor 
and outdoor pollution levels by increasing NOx and CO2 and decreasing the air quality 
index.  
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Independent Variable 
The independent variable of interest is a measure of net inflows of Chinese 
foreign direct investment (FDI), which marks the compositional change in FDI over time, 
versus FDI stock amounts which do not reflect new changes to the environment that may 
result from new facilities or an increase in production. I used a recently compiled data set 
from the John Hopkins Center China Research Center (China-Africa Research Initiative 
2019) on bilateral FDI flows from China to Africa. This measurement is appropriate for 
this study because Chinese flow data is available and has been recorded in Africa by the 
Chinese government since 2000. I will control for total FDI and domestic investment 
flows as well to further isolate the Chinese FDI flows as the source of changes to the 
environmental infrastructure. As these flows increase, Chinese investment plays a more 
influential role in the host state and society. This provides a more accurate assessment of 
how FDI flows directly impact changes in environmental stewardship. 
I use the net annual Chinese FDI flows to these African countries, lagged by two 
years. Generally, FDI ramifications are expected to be delayed as any changes to the 
status quo takes time. Other studies have found a two-year gap to be sufficient for 
measuring FDI flow impacts on natural resources because the effects of FDI are not 
immediately realized as the corporation needs to build factories and establish itself. 
(Rudra 2011; Rudra, Alkon, and Joshi 2018; Neafie 2018). This has the additional benefit 
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of controlling for reverse causality.23 I also adjust total FDI and domestic investment by 
two time periods to capture the consequences of Chinese FDI accurately. 
Model: Chinese FDI in African Countries 
I employ both country and year fixed effects in my regression model to conduct a 
series of quantitative cross-national analyses of Chinese FDI on environmental outcomes. 
The model uses year dummy variables to account for annual trends from 2005 to 2015 
and country fixed effects to account for any country-specific factors not accounted for in 
my model. The univariate statistics are laid out in Table 4.1; my matrix correlation is laid 
out in Table 4.2 and includes my measures of trade, domestic investment, inequality, 
political regime (polity), gross domestic product (GDP), measures of GDP growth, and 
urban population growth. Each model includes all African countries for which the 
environmental variables and FDI data were available, with control variables.  
The following model assesses the consequences of Chinese FDI on natural 
resources in African countries: 
!"!" 	= % + '#(ℎ*+,-,	.!/!"$% + '#.!/!"$% + '#!01,-2*3	/+4,-21,+2!"$%
+ '&5,67! + ''30+2708-!" + 9! + :!"
23 Even if poor environmental conditions are attracting FDI from emerging economies like China, by lagging my 
independent variable by two time periods, I am isolating the effect that it is having on environmental outcomes in the 
future.  
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Observations Mean Std. 
Dev. 
Min Max Source 
Water Access (logged) 502 4.26 0.25 3.38 4.60 World Development 
Indicators (WDI) 
Air Quality Index 463 74.21 11.29 47.09 98.34 Environmental 
Performance 
Indicators (EPI) 
NOx (logged) 188 8.07 1.81 3.08 11.42 UN Stats 
CO2 (logged) 282 8.25 1.70 4.88 13.13 UN Stats 
Particulate Matter (PM 2.5) 
(logged) 
329 3.59 0.56 2.20 5.32 UN Stats 
Chinese FDI Flows 624 0.05 0.22 -0.82 4.81 SAIS-CARI
FDI flows (% of GDP, 
logged) 
550 1.18 1.25 -6.30 4.44 WDI
Domestic Investment (% of 
investment, logged) 
522 23.53 9.01 2.23 74.61 World Bank 
GDP per capita (logged) 589 7.18 1.11 5.36 9.92 WDI 
Human Development Index 606 0.52 0.11 0.29 0.80 WDI 
Democracy (Polity IV) 618 5.34 2.47 0.42 10.00 Freedom House 
Rapid Economic growth 
(logged) 
545 1.48 0.72 -2.49 4.81 WDI
Trade (% of GDP) 568 4.28 0.42 2.95 5.74 WDI 
Population growth (logged) 610 0.79 0.56 -2.68 1.53 WDI
Number of Countries 47 47 47 47 47 
Table 4.1: Summary of Univariate Statistics (Source: Author, Data: QoG Standard 
Dataset (Teorell et al. 2018) and SAIS-CAIR China FDI data (China-Africa Research 
Initiative 2019)) 
116 
Water 
Access 
Air 
Quality 
Index 
NOx CO2 PM 2.5 
Chinese
FDI Flows 
FDI 
flows 
Domestic 
Investment 
GDP per 
capita 
Human 
Development 
Index 
Democracy 
Rapid 
Economic 
growth 
Trade 
Air Quality 
Index 
0.534 1 
NOx -0.2315 -0.3842 1 
CO2 0.1514 0.3712 0.4927 1 
Particulate 
Matter (PM 2.5) 
-0.2744 -0.4926 0.3376 -0.0598 1
Chinese FDI 
Flows 
0.1059 0.095 0.1522 0.3311 -0.0033 1
FDI flows -0.2162 0.063 -0.0955 -0.0106 -0.0983 0.021 1 
Domestic 
Investment 
-0.1087 0.3118 -0.1408 0.2119 0.0849 0.0161 0.2421 1 
GDP per capita 0.4611 0.8277 -0.2262 0.5177 -0.1845 0.1744 0.1768 0.4547 1 
Human 
Development 
Index 
0.5911 0.8281 -0.2125 0.5117 -0.3966 0.1403 0.0997 0.3462 0.8746 1 
Democracy 0.4048 0.1329 -0.1082 0.0381 -0.4455 0.1489 -0.0318 -0.1833 0.069 0.1507 1 
Rapid Economic 
growth 
0.0257 -0.0933 0.0072 0.0007 0.0364 -0.0793 0.0553 -0.2153 -0.0554 -0.112 0.0249 1 
Trade 0.1732 0.514 -0.4373 -0.0143 -0.3515 -0.1012 0.4116 0.2533 0.4504 0.3897 0.1168 0.0557 1 
Population 
growth 
-0.5351 -0.5591 0.2534 -0.2129 0.4403 -0.1283 0.0502 0.0213 -0.4361 -0.5801 -0.3613 0.0972 -0.2831
Table 4.2: Correlation Matrix (Source: Author, Data: QoG Standard Dataset (Teorell et al. 2018) and SAIS-CAIR China FDI 
data (China-Africa Research Initiative 2019)) 
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In this equation, !"!"	denotes the effect on the environmental dependent variables 
for every year data was collected. $#is the change in the DV when there is a one-unit 
change in %ℎ'()*)	+!,!"$% (the net inflows of Chinese FDI into the developing country i 
at period t-2). This measurement also privileges flows over measures of FDI stock; I use 
them because they capture more recent investments and will more accurately reflect 
changes in the environment outcomes introduced by new flow sources. -)./! 	denotes a 
time dummy, 0	denotes independent and identically distributed random errors, and 
12(3/24*!" are the various independent variables that account for any extraneous factor 
that affect the parameter of interest. 5! is the unobserved time-invariant country effects, 
such as policy or other institutional factors. A Woolridge test for autocorrelation between 
my dependent and independent variables found no autocorrelation in any of my models 
(Woolridge 2010).  
Controls 
I employ eight additional independent variables to control for other factors that 
impact environmental outcomes in African countries in all of my models: FDI flows, 
gross domestic product (GDP), economic growth, domestic investment as a percentage of 
GDP, population growth, democracy, development index, and trade.  
Both FDI flows and domestic investment as percentages of GDP are used as 
controls to isolate the effects of Chinese FDI. Domestic investment is measured as gross 
fixed capital formation (GFCF), formerly known as gross domestic direct investment. 
This variable controls for any changes in domestic level investment in fixed assets that 
might be captured by increased foreign-controlled manufacturing; meaning, that if 
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investors from the host country are also investing into these industries, they may seek 
their own environmentally exploitative or beneficial methods of production which must 
be controlled for, so that it is not captured in my other coefficients (Jorgenson 2007; 
Young 1997). FDI24 as a percentage of GDP is a World Bank measure that similarly 
captures the impacts of FDI that may be exploitative or beneficial; this is used to ensure 
that I am not conflating Chinese FDI with FDI from other sources.  
Trade is a standard variable to use as a control with FDI. Rudra (2011) finds that 
trade has a negative effect on access to potable water; thus, trade as a percentage of the 
GDP is included in this model as it may possibly have negative consequences on other 
environmental resources as well. The use of both trade and FDI is important in the 
ongoing debate over which is truly more robust in decreasing resource access. This 
control is not lagged as, in Rudra’s study, trade’s impacts are seen with more immediacy. 
I also included five variables that would be expected to affect potable water 
access: gross domestic product (GDP), economic growth, levels of democracy, Human 
Development Index (HDI) score, and population growth. GDP is linked to the 
Environmental Kuznets curve (EKC) literature and should be controlled for because the 
relationship between GDP and pollution is an inverted U, meaning that at certain levels 
of GDP, pollution is rising and, for certain levels of GDP, it is falling (Andreoni and 
Levinson 2001). I control for this variable using GDP per capita, logged because it is not 
a linear relationship. Economic growth is measured as logged GDP growth and accounts 
for pressures that rapid industrialization has on natural resources, particularly in low 
24 FDI is an investment in the managing stock of a company, measured by the World Bank of any purchase over 10% 
of controlling stock, outside of the investor’s home country (2016). 
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regulatory environments where it could severely reduce resources and increase pollution 
levels rapidly (Grossman and Krueger 1995). The Freedom House (2019) dataset is used 
to control for levels of democracy, determined by a 10-point scale that measures the level 
of democracy from less (0) to more (10) democratic. Democracy should be associated 
with greater access to resources and lower pollution levels, as members of society have 
more access points to communicate with the government when they are dissatisfied with 
the environmental situation and would be motivated by a reduction in potable water to 
use those access points (Winslow 2005). The Human Development Index (HDI) variable 
is a composite index of the basic dimensions of human development (UNDP 2018), and 
controls for levels of development in the country that may not be accounted for in other 
measures. Finally, population growth is used because fast-growing populations may put 
increased pressure on a state’s infrastructure, resulting in decreased access to potable 
water (Khan and Siddique 2000; Rudra 2011; Jorgenson 2007). These variables are 
important as they have impacts on pollution and resources access, as well as the 
institutions that provide infrastructure within a country; they are included to further 
isolate the effects of Chinese FDI.  
Lastly, in my water access model, I include a lagged water access variable in the 
time period, which controls for any previous infrastructure or water flows prior to the 
testing period. Rudra (2011) also employs this method in order to isolate t changes in 
access to potable water when trying to capture the impact of trade flows. Its addition does 
not change the sign or magnitude of the findings. 25  
25 I also tested my model without the lagged dependent variable and found the direction and magnitude not 
substantially changed, thus finding no evidence that this variable had any adverse effects on my model (see Achen, 
2001).  
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Results 
Overall, Table 4.3 supports the hypothesis that Chinese FDI slows environmental 
infrastructure improvements because they are diffusing environmentally exploitative 
practices. These coefficients also show that Chinese investors have a more robust effect 
across environmental indicators than FDI from other sources, domestic investors, trade, 
and the local economy. The strongest evidence is from water access, air quality, and 
CO2, where the models hold up with and without controls, showing strong evidence that 
Chinese FDI may contribute to reduced water access and indoor air quality as well as 
increased CO2 emissions. 
Chinese FDI and Potable Water Access 
My first model, Table 4.3 column 1, shows how Chinese FDI slows potable water 
access in African countries. The data includes the period from 2005 to 2015 for 43 
countries with an average of nine years per country because of lagged variables. The 
numbers indicate that the impact of Chinese FDI on water is not particularly large, only 
decreasing water access by 0.03 percent on average for every billion dollars invested. 
This finding does indicate, however, that FDI from China slows improvements to water 
access, even in the presence of political, environmental, and other economic controls in 
developing countries. This model was tested for robustness (see appendix), and the 
significance of Chinese FDI on water remains even when using the environmental 
protection indices for water access. The R-squared is particularly high for this model 
(R2=0.997) because I am controlling for lagged water access, which is a strong predictor 
of future water access. However, controlling for this further isolates the impacts of 
Chinese FDI in these countries.  
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES Water Access 
(logged) 
Air Quality 
Index 
NOx 
(logged) 
CO2 
(logged) 
Chinese FDI Flows -0.00034** -0.36*** 0.0085*** 0.034** 
(lagged 2 years) (0.00017) (0.11) (0.0026) (0.015) 
FDI (% of GDP) 0.000043 -0.23 0.0099 -0.024*
(lagged 2 years) (0.00025) (0.14) (0.0097) (0.013)
Domestic Investment -0.000109** 0.088 -0.0019* 0.002
(lagged 2 years) (0.000053) (0.059) (0.0011) (0.0038)
GDP per Capita 0.004 -5.09 0.026 1.2***
(logged) (0.0034) (5.14) (0.21) (0.341)
Human Development -0.02 -42.21 0.44 -4.17
Index (0.028) (47.32) (1.85) (3.12)
Democracy -0.00018 0.056 -0.003 -0.006
(0.00027) (0.30) (0.01) (0.024)
Rapid Economic -0.00012 -0.22 0.0066 0.015
Growth (logged) (0.00017) (0.17) (0.018) (0.016)
Trade (% of GDP) -0.00025 0.039 -0.23* 0.13
(0.0012) (1.33) (0.12) (0.096)
Population Growth 0.000096 -1.51 0.011 -0.12
(logged) (0.00078) (1.69) (0.043) (0.16)
Water Access (logged, 0.95***
lagged) (0.01)
Constant 0.20*** 128.8*** 8.573*** 1.21 
(0.04) (47.37) (0.78) (1.64) 
Observations 396 331 146 226 
R-squared 0.997 0.37 0.19 0.60 
Number of Countries 43 45 43 45 
Table 4.3: Country and Year Fixed Effects Regression Model of the effect of Chinese FDI 
on environmental resources in African Countries (Source: Author, Data: China-Africa 
Dataset (China-Africa Research Initiative 2019) and QoG Standard Dataset (Teorell et 
al. 2013)). Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Additionally, it has to be noted that while Chinese FDI has a negative effect on 
water access, domestic investment does as well. Some studies suggest that domestic 
investors and local communities may seek “greener” methods of production (Jorgenson 
2007; Young 1997); however, the evidence is more in line with the EKC literature that 
suggests that countries will pollute until they have reached a certain level of 
development. When domestic investment and Chinese investment are also controlled for 
in the model, FDI as a percent of GDP does not affect water access. This confirms my 
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hypothesis that Chinese FDI has a more robust impact on resource access than FDI from 
other sources and may be what was driving FDI outcomes in other studies, see Neafie 
(2018). 
Chinese FDI and Air Pollution 
 Table 4.2, columns 2-4 demonstrate how changes in FDI flows from Chinese 
companies change indoor and outdoor pollution. This set of models confirms that 
Chinese FDI decreases air quality for both indoor and outdoor pollution, which indicates 
that more people are being exposed to particulate matter and pollution in African 
countries when Chinese FDI increases. The effects on air quality are found to be 
negative, indicating that FDI from China could be having a negative influence on 
particulate matter and pollutants in the air, i.e., causing levels of particulate matter to rise 
through production processes. My model also finds that the levels of NOx and CO2 rise 
with increased Chinese investment. The results for CO2 hold up in my robustness checks 
and are particularly interesting given that FDI from other sources reduces CO2 levels in 
African countries. This shows that despite other investment having environmentally 
beneficial consequences, Chinese FDI has environmentally harmful impacts and may be 
prohibiting or reversing infrastructure improvements. 
In the models on air pollution emissions, there are a few control variables that 
behave consistently with the literature. Domestic investment seems to align with the 
writing on domestic investors and green methods, where it appears to have a negative 
effect on NOx. This is probably due to its links to acid rain, which may make it a more 
salient issue with stakeholders, who would want to see it reduced. In addition to domestic 
investment, trade also has a positive impact on air pollution. 
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 I find that increases in Chinese investment lead to increases in NOx, which 
suggests that the rise in releases may have a small increase in NOx in the host country 
affecting pollution and acid rain. However, my robustness checks, see Appendix III, 
show Chinese investment having an insignificant effect on NOx. This may be because 
there is only a weak relationship between Chinese investment and NOx or because there 
are only a few data points associated with NOx as many of the countries in this data set 
have only just begun to record NOx emissions.  
In terms of CO2, there is a strong negative effect of FDI on CO2 overall. This 
further strengthens my argument because, as Chinese FDI displaces other FDI, it may be 
contributing to more emissions by using dirtier practices. This model indicates that while 
FDI as a whole helps by decreasing CO2, possibly through the inclusion of better 
corporate policies and practices, investment from individual countries may not always 
share this trait. Additionally, in this model, GDP per capita has a negative effect on CO2. 
This is consistent with the EKC literature that finds that CO2 increases while countries 
are developing (Yandle, Bhattarai, and Vijayaraghavan 2004; Selden and Song 1994). As 
a result, investment from China may be intensifying CO2 emissions that were already 
rising in African countries.  
Discussion 
My findings show that, Chinese FDI may be negatively impacting some 
environmental resources. At the most basic level, the impacts of Chinese FDI may be 
mediated through the domestic political variables of a country. As discussed, these 
variables may be influenced by whether the country is more developed, and many of the 
environmental institutions in developing African countries are not yet highly 
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institutionalized and have little power to affect change. Investors entering these countries 
thus have more power to influence policies and practices that are not yet established, and 
institutions will struggle to keep up with the quick systemic changes caused by increasing 
investment (Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson 2001). These negative effects lead to 
substantial political and environmental costs for African countries if they do not have 
sufficient institutions to overcome the consequences of international economic flows. 
Investment from China is influencing water and air resources in African countries, 
which have a direct impact on the access of individuals to these resources for their own 
livelihood. Chinese FDI decreases potable water access in African countries, which is 
further compounded by domestic investment that is also slowing water access. This could 
be problematic in African countries that are trying to provide more and improved sources 
of water access. In the case of air pollution, domestic investment and FDI from other 
sources are having a positive effect on CO2 and NOx, reducing overall emissions, but 
Chinese FDI may be increasing them. This is important for regulators at the local and 
international level who want to set policies or encourage better practices.  
This evidence suggests that policymakers in African countries must be concerned 
with the effect that new investment projects from China may have on the environment. I 
find strong evidence to suggest that China is impacting the environment in Africa and 
that there is a distributional effect of emerging markets investing in other emerging 
markets. The changing make-up of investment to countries still in development comes 
with problems that may not be eternal but could create a momentary “race to the bottom” 
that will hinder development. 
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Conclusion 
This study provides evidence to suggest that the “race to the bottom” literature 
may still be relevant in the analysis of globalization and environmental outcomes. 
However, it highlights how the environmental culture at the source of investment is the 
most important indicator for policy and performance abroad. I identified where and how 
the economic relations with certain countries can lower standards of policy; in this case, 
the focus is on FDI flows from China. I also show that economic flows cannot be 
understood by aggregated data and more refined studies are needed; one way to do this is 
through the method I have used here: dyadic investment flows. This is important for 
policymakers who need to better understand the consequences of incoming investment in 
order to manage it. Overall, it appears that this disaggregated form of FDI is important, as 
I find evidence that suggests that measures of FDI flows from particular countries have 
different outcomes than aggregated FDI. This demonstrates that the original source of 
investment matters for a host country’s economic and sociological development.  
Further study should explore the Chinese relationship in these countries over time, 
as EKC research suggests that China may be reaching a ‘tipping point. Chinese 
corporations are being pressured to begin prioritizing green environmental behavior in 
the future, both domestically and internationally (Mang 2013). In 2008, the State 
Environmental Protection Administration was promoted to the Ministry of Environmental 
Protection and placed under control of the State Council (the chief administrator in 
China), giving it more regulatory power, and Chinese citizens have been allowed to bring 
more environmental cases against corporations to the Chinese court system. The Chinese 
government has also taken a more active role by encouraging companies to follow better 
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environmental practices when investing abroad through more stringent enforcement 
mechanisms (Mang 2013). Additionally, international organizations have been pushing 
the Chinese government to improve the oversight and regulation of companies’ 
environmental performances abroad (OECD 2007a). This indicates that behavior may 
change, as shifts in regulation and development of post-material values cause Chinese 
corporations to reevaluate the cost-benefits of environmental strategies.  
127 
CHAPTER V: CONCLUSION
I have traced the movement of corporate environmentalism from source countries 
to developing host countries. Over the last 15 years, FDI has come from more diverse 
sources, and as a result the levels of corporate environmentalism have changed based on 
the source of investment. This change in pattern has sparked a debate over whether these 
changes in who is investing are affecting the impact that foreign direct investment (FDI) 
has on environmental outcomes in developing countries. My dissertation finds evidence 
to suggest that developing country FDI is worse than developed country FDI. 
Evaluating the Propositions 
Proposition 1. Corporate environmentalism reflects economic development and 
demands from stakeholders who are more likely to prioritize environmental policy when 
they reach a high level of economic growth, and development is stable. Green corporate 
environmentalism will increase in more developed countries when stakeholders share 
norms that prioritize environmental issues thereby making corporate environmentalism 
greener when development levels are higher and less green when development levels are 
lower.  
In chapters 2 and 4, I evaluate the relationships between stakeholders and 
corporations, and how different political, economic, and social institutional environments 
can change the behavior of multinational corporations (MNCs). I find that (i) corporate 
environmentalism does look different between countries at higher and lower levels of 
development; and, (ii) manufacturing and extractive industries from different source 
countries, while sharing common indices prescribed by international and domestic 
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regulatory institutions, do have varied approaches to what information they provide in 
corporate social responsibility reports and their self-reporting policies and practices. 
Despite beliefs that all corporations would look the same because they share a common 
goal, to maximize profit, evidence in these reports shows that there are other factors 
influencing the internal norms of the corporation. 
Evidence in these reports shows that developed countries do have greener policies 
and that they take more action on the environment both at home and abroad. These 
sustainability reports are the dialogue between the company and the source stakeholders 
and reflect the relationship between these two groups. Companies from more developed 
source countries want to show stakeholder groups that they are in line with the social 
norms that will benefit them by reputation and, in turn, economically. In these reports, 
they communicate the ways they participate in dialogue with different stakeholder 
groups, cooperate with different groups, pursue their lobbying efforts, and use the tools 
for measuring and implementing environmental practices.  
On the other hand, the reports from developing source countries look distinctly 
different. Companies do not communicate as much information to their stakeholder 
groups, and often report weaker environmental goals, if any at all. The companies are 
influenced by economic growth and profit maximization with less influence on them to 
have greener corporate environmentalism. Corporations demonstrate a lack of progress in 
specifying their environmental policies and often must report many more environmental 
fines in their financial reports.  
In Chapter 2, I show that not only do my findings confirm that developing 
countries are less green, but that this phenomenon is being largely driven by political and 
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economic institutions. The economic institutional environment in a capitalistic, market-
based system that prioritizes economic growth over all non-material values, i.e., the 
environment, during development. Non-material values may be expendable while 
economic growth is taking place. As a result, natural resources are exploited for overuse 
and polluted. Evidence of this was found to be driving poor corporate environmental 
policies and practices.  
Additionally, political institutional environments are playing a role in corporate 
environmentalism. Chapter 2 also finds that corporations are affected by the political 
regimes in the countries they come from, and that corporations from democratic countries 
may be greener than those from non-democratic countries. This is because democratic 
countries are more strongly influenced by the citizens who may vote them out of office; 
as a result, they may make stronger environmental regulations and put more pressure on 
corporations to behave in more environmentally friendly ways. The companies 
themselves may not be more or less green if left to their own devices, but because they 
interact in these institutional environments, they are influenced to behave differently or 
lose profits.  
In Chapter 4, evidence from studying Chinese corporate environmentalism 
illustrates the links between institutional environments (political, economic, and social) 
and the environmental strategies that corporations choose. Even managers in Chinese 
corporations understand the importance of green corporate environmentalism but must 
prioritize economic growth over environmental practices (Fryxell and Lo 2003). The 
Chinese corporations put much less emphasis on the environment in their corporate 
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policies and practices, and profitability of the company is emphasized by society, the 
market, and the government.  
In sum, corporate environmentalism is higher in more developed countries, and it 
is largely being driven by economic and political institutional environments. This agrees 
with the existing literature that higher levels of economic growth shift social norms and 
lead to a prioritization of the environment. This reflects the higher level of economic 
growth at the source that is largely driving variations in corporate policy and practice at 
the source.  
Proposition 2. The level of green corporate environmentalism an MNC carries 
may affect environmental outcomes in the developing host country. MNCs diffuse their 
source country environmental policy and practice into the developing host country, 
MNCs from green sources should have a positive effect while MNCs from non-green 
sources will have a null or negative effect, depending on the current policies in the host 
developing country.  
The second proposition—that imported corporate environmentalism can adversely 
affect developing country environmental outcomes depending on the source—is 
supported. This means that environmental infrastructure improvements, increasing 
potable water access and air quality, may be slowed or stalled when investment is largely 
coming from a country with a poor environmental record. Chapters 3 and 4 explored 
different aspects of environmental infrastructure, i.e., water access, air pollution, and 
found evidence to suggest that these important areas of infrastructure are being negatively 
affected by FDI from a developing country source. They found that this negative impact 
may be counteracted by development in the host country, or investment from more 
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developed societies that have greener values. So, it may be possible that as host countries 
develop, they may attract greener FDI, that will allow them to develop stronger standards. 
Chapter 3 finds evidence to suggest that as developing source FDI increases, 
some environmental aspects decrease. Developing source FDI may be going to locations 
where environmental performance is lower because there is a lack of developed source 
FDI and less competition, but even in these cases, there is some evidence to suggest they 
are slowing or stalling infrastructure improvements around potable water access and 
pollution. This study finds that the environmental performance level lowers in relation to 
the increase in investment from countries that lack green environmentalism.  
Evidence from the Chinese case study in Chapter 4 does support Proposition 2. In 
the case of investment coming from China, increases in Chinese FDI as a percent of total 
investment leads to lower water access and poorer air quality. This can be linked to 
Chinese corporations carrying with them poorer environmental standards than companies 
from other places where the standards are higher. Research on Chinese corporations 
indicates that their policies and practices are less green, and the managers even admit to 
behavior that does not push green technology and innovation if it would hurt financial 
gains (Fryxell and Lo 2003; Economy 2010). If companies from developing countries, 
like China, with poor environmental track records are investing abroad, it is very likely 
that these investments are also diffusing poor environmental policies and practices.  
Proposition 3. FDI from non-green sources can adversely impact the poor’s access to 
natural resources and the levels of pollution they are exposed to; as a result, the poorer 
and less developed a country, the more negative the impacts of MNCs from non-green 
sources. At lower levels of development, the governments will be influenced by MNCs 
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over citizens, who may not be able to overcome collective action problems to lobby for 
stricter government regulations. 
FDI from developing source countries appears less “green” in developing host 
countries, and the environmental issues that are affected the most are those that impact 
the most vulnerable populations. My findings in Chapters 3 and 4 indicate that 
globalization is perpetuating dependency and under-development (Valenzuela and 
Valenzuela 1978). In Chapters 3 and 4, evidence of globalization influencing 
environmental infrastructure is apparent, particularly in the areas of potable water access 
and air quality. The wealthy in these countries are often not as affected, as they can afford 
to move or acquire the resources that they need; the most vulnerable are the marginalized 
communities who lack the political influence to prevent being affected and do not have 
enough money to gain better resources (Rigby and Wright 2013; Flavin 2012; Hickey and 
Bracking 2005; Gilens 2012). These groups then become more dependent on foreign 
investors and the government to provide the goods they need. 
Chapter 3 found evidence to suggest that countries that are poorer and less 
developed are more heavily impacted by FDI from sources with poor environmentalism. 
This study also found that higher levels of development do allow states to overcome this 
problem and improve their environmental situation. This means that as developing 
countries progress more, they have to be concerned with shifts in resource pattern usage 
that may have negative effects on air, water, and forests. For example, I find consensus 
that air quality and water access do improve as development increases and that the effect 
of having more FDI in the developing host country does less harm in host country’s with 
higher levels of development. However, not all environmental resources are positively 
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affected, and there is evidence to suggest that the depletion of forests increases even as 
development causes other environmental problems to decrease. The findings from this 
chapter further supports my third proposition in two ways: (i) that at different levels of 
development the effects of FDI on environmental resources are different; and, (ii) that 
countries at the lowest levels of development are the most affected by adverse 
environmental conditions brought by FDI with a poor environmental record.  
Developing country environmental challenges are reported every day in the media 
and are often associated with rapid urbanization, population growth, and changing 
lifestyles. This dissertation introduces a new perspective by examining how international 
economic variables affect environmental outcomes in developing countries, particularly 
those that are marked by socioeconomic cleavages like aspects of air quality and water 
access. This paper identified how countries may be more or less vulnerable to developing 
source FDI, but also how developed source FDI may have positive outcomes on 
environmental outcomes and improve the situations of vulnerable populations. It is also 
evident that increased economic growth, in the form of GDP and other aspects of 
development, have a positive effect on these vulnerable populations.  
Conclusion: Source Effects 
This dissertation added to the literature on the role of non-governmental actors in 
a transnational role as diffusers of policy and practice. This study looked at the everyday 
behavior of multinational corporations, which play a role as environmental regulators 
when their policies and practices dictate the behavior of an industry. Evidence of this was 
apparent in my study where the policies and practices an MNC carries with them are 
linked to the environmental outcomes in the states where they invest. This finding has 
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consequences for several different literatures, most particularly the “race to the bottom” 
or “race to the top” literature, suggesting that FDI may not cause either. Instead, it 
matters where FDI comes from in order to determine if the effects will be beneficial or 
not to the developing host country.  
Developed countries are often promoting a “race to the top.” The findings show 
some evidence to indicate that developing countries are being negatively influenced by 
the global economic activities of other developing countries; however, they are being 
positively influenced by developed countries that raise levels of environmental 
protection. This research confirms the findings that developed country FDI has a positive 
influence on developing countries. This is most likely because developed source FDI 
carries with it technologies and introduces stronger polices that could be used to expand 
potable water access and increase air quality. 
I find that developing countries are more in line with the “race to the bottom” 
hypothesis of globalization. On average, developing countries receive an equivalent of 
about 40% of their FDI from other developing countries, and it is increasing with each 
year. This means that for now FDI from developing countries is slowing infrastructure 
improvements that developing countries are otherwise making in providing potable water 
access, and it is creating a “race to the bottom” in countries that are not equipped to 
manage public goods. However, the evidence also suggests that over time the material 
values of source countries change, and that while they NOW have less green corporate 
environmentalism this may not be the case in the future. The question is: can host 
countries wait for the source country to become greener if they are currently ruining the 
environment?  
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I have shown data to suggest that the theory of source effects is important to our 
larger study on the impacts of FDI (Adolph, Quince, and Prakash 2015). The source 
effects literature, taken together with the evidence I have shown in this dissertation, 
provides preliminary evidence that FDI sources do cause environmental outcomes to vary 
and indicates that continued investigation of disaggregated FDI is needed. I believe the 
framework developed in this paper provides a useful foundation for such research. I focus 
on how corporations from a variety of places develop diverse ideas about 
environmentalism, and I show how those ideas are transferred to the developing host 
country. This study has shown evidence to suggest that it is not the FDI a state receives, 
but rather from where that FDI comes from that is important. 
Further Study 
In this study, I have isolated the dependent variable ‘environmental impact’ to 
help further understand the intersection of the international and the domestic. I anticipate 
that these findings are generalizable across developing source countries and in different 
policy arenas as well, such as labor. My case study on China only briefly touched on the 
institutional variation that can be seen at the source of investment. These same factors in 
environmental, political and social institutional environments could also be tied to 
different areas, i.e. labor, or other issue areas where ignoring issues of the environment 
often go hand in hand with poor working conditions.  
Further study into the comparison between developed country and developing 
country investment and their impacts on environmental resources management and 
globalization is needed to discuss the difference in the way that investment groups 
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interact with developing countries and how this may be regulated domestically or 
internationally.  
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APPENDICES 
APPENDIX A: CORPORATE ENVIRONMENTAL SUSTAINABILITY 
INDEX (CESI)  CODE BOOK 
The Corporate Environmental Sustainability Index (CESI) is a measure of overall 
progress towards environmentally sustainable practices by a corporation. The 
operationalization of corporate environmentalism, through sustainability reports, provides 
important insight into the rationale that drives internal MNC environmental policy and 
practice. This index provides a composite profile of corporate environmental stewardship 
based on a compilation of 9 variables made up of 40 indicators derived from corporate 
sustainability responsibility literature. Good environmental stewardship practices are 
pivotal to an international companies’ ability to positively influence environmental policy 
and practice abroad. 
This analysis uses the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) indicators, and the 
indicators and variables from the literature that reports on corporate environmental 
disclosures. The issues incorporated and variables used were chosen through extensive 
review of this literature, assessment of the available reports from global companies, and 
rigorous analysis. While these indicators do not provide a definitive vision of corporate 
sustainability, they do form a tool for the systematic evaluation and ranking, by score, of 
corporate environmental policies from different countries, both within and across 
different industries that will build on the existing literature. The higher a company’s 
CESI score, the better position it is in to utilize and promote favorable environmental 
conditions at home and abroad, now and into the future.  
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The Data 
This data set was created to define corporate greenness through the environmental 
sections of corporate sustainable responsibility (CSR) reports. CSR reports are 
independent corporate editorials in which companies “self-report their corporate 
greenness” (Lyon and Maxwell 2003). The aim of this data is to make a comparative data 
set specifically on corporate greenness using content analysis methods.  
Corporate greenness are the activities and policies undertaken by the company to 
improve the environment through research, technology, and practice. This includes 
creating goals, having socially responsible investing, and impact investing—investing in 
activities and events that educate and change the environmental landscape. This code 
book seeks to define greenness through the activities and goals a corporation assumes, as 
defined by the literature.  
CSR reports are used by companies to voluntarily publicize environmental actions 
that make them look comparably better to stakeholders (Clarkson, Overell, and Chapple 
2011). Influencing the CSR reports are international organizations who have created 
guidelines, making CSR reports one of the most effective tools for companies to 
communicate their environmental disclosures (GRI 2011). These reports include 
activities and policies that a corporation wishes to advertise to their shareholders and 
larger community; they also simultaneously publish financial reports which prevent 
companies from hiding environmental fines or lying about the money spent on 
environmental research and technology. Coding of CSR reports is made easier through 
the domestic and international regulatory agencies that create guidelines and policies that 
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pressure corporations to include certain information, and increase the legitimacy and 
credibility of what is included (Lock and Seele 2016; Di Giuli and Kostovetsky 2014). 
Country and Time Coverage 
In this data set, CSR reports from around 2016 are included. Reports from 2016 
are prioritized, however, if no report was issued in that year or the company only does bi-
annual reports 2017 is included. I relied on a stratified random sampling method to 
choose the companies examined in this data set. I wanted to make sure I included 
countries from both developed and developing nations, the full list of countries included 
in the data set is in Table i.  
Source Count 
UAE 1 
China 11 
India 3 
Brazil 1 
Russia 1 
Indonesia 1 
Azerbaijan 1 
South Africa 1 
Czech Republic 1 
Taiwan 2 
Ireland 1 
Italy 2 
Netherlands 2 
Malaysia 1 
United States 11 
France 3 
United Kingdom 3 
Germany 6 
South Korea 3 
Thailand 1 
Japan 8 
Table i: Country list 
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Thematic Categories and Coding Rules 
Table ii displays the full list of the five thematic categories and the indictors that 
are coded on (1,0) scale, either this item is present, or it is not. This section will go 
through each of those categories and explain the coding rules. Each indicator is a yes/no 
question (with further clarification provided below) and will be scored 1 for yes, 0 for no. 
As these coding rules were developed using a priori coding methods the source of the 
variable is exhibited in column three, with the citation of the literature that uses a similar 
variable or discusses the use of such a variable as a way to indicate greenness or 
sustainability. 
Environmental Planning and Policies (EPP) 
Green corporations have a substantial amount of green policies and practices. 
Environmental planning and policy (EPP) is a measure of the presence and extent to 
which corporations create general guidelines that outline their environmental principles, 
rationale, and philosophical underpinnings (Jose and Lee 2007). Clarkson et al. (2008) 
suggest that greener corporations will have proper planning, structure, and leadership, 
and they will inform stakeholders of their achievements through their CSR reports. Green 
environmental policy has two key ingredients: (1) goals to engage in environmental 
sustainability and (2) a plan of action to commit to those goals (Jose and Lee 2007). 
External actors monitor corporate claims to make sure that the information they present is 
accurate and reliable; this increases the legitimacy and credibility of the information 
included (Lock and Seele 2016; Di Giuli and Kostovetsky 2014). The following 
indicators were developed from the literature on environmental practice and policy. :  
• (EPP03) Does the company prioritize sustainability over profitability?
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o The corporation has a baseline where they’ve began to prioritize
sustainability over profitability. This is not motivated by government
policy or regulation, but could be motivated by stakeholders, e.g., the
company is choosing to be more sustainable even though there is no
regulation telling them to do so. This can include an emphasis on
expenditures to improve the environment that will not increase profits; or
changes to their corporate goals to be more sustainable.
• (EPP01) Does the company have clear tangible goals?
o Corporate environmental practice is considered green if the company
expresses clear tangible goals to be achieved. This includes an impact
reduction goal (emissions or pollutants) as a percent of current emissions
or pollutants, as an amount that they set to achieve.
• (EPP12) Do stakeholders participate in the CSR process?
o The corporation invites stakeholders to participate in the creation of these
goals. This allows stakeholders to actively engage or give feedback on the
corporations CSR reports. An example of this is the External Citizenship
Advisory Panel from Exxon.
• (EPP02) Do the goals have deadlines?
o There is a deadline for these goals to be achieved, this can be any type of
deadline (by a certain year, or within 10 years), but it must have an end
date by which the goals are supposed to be achieved.
• (EPP11) Has the corporation enacted environmental management systems
(EMS)?
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o EMS is a framework designed to help a corporation achieve its
environmental goals. It consists of reviewing, evaluating, and improving
the corporation’s environmental performance. It implies a continual
improvement of corporate policies and implementation.
• (EPP05) Does the company audit the environmental performance throughout the
company, including global facilities (verified to a reasonable level of assurance)?
o These could be audits run by outside companies or internal to the
company. This not only includes their manufacturing/extractive processes
but can also include auditing not just their pollutants but also sustainable
office practices, electricity, etc. Not only in the host country but also in
their global locales.
• (EPP07) Do all locations follow the same policies and practices?
o The global locations must be expected to meet the same goals and policies
as the corporate headquarters. The global locations do not have less
stringent goals or expectations for sustainable practices.
• (EPP04) Does the company audit the product lifecycle for sustainability?
o This means that the company is concerned about the source of the
materials all the way to consumption/use. The company actively assesses
these goals and looks at the sustainability both upstream and downstream.
This may include assessing customer use, the production of any materials
the corporations outsource, etc.
• (EPP06) Does the company have an environmental committee or department?
143 
o \It must be separate from health and safety or be a substantial presence in
the health and safety department. Executive level committees are
acceptable. This show there is prioritization of the environment and not
just secondary to the current duties of the health and safety departments.
• (EPP08) Does the company have an executive-level environmental manager?
o This could be a president/vice president/chief environmental officer. This
is again to show the prioritization of the environment as important to the
company.
• (EPP10) Does the company have a training programs to teach employees how to
be more sustainable?
o This can be any form of environmental training to encourage more
sustainable practices in employees.
• (EPP09) Does the company invests in research for their environmental
technologies internally?
o This includes money used in their own lab or given to any private research
center that is developing more sustainable technologies by only for their
own use.
External Organization Policies (EOP) 
Greener CSR should also include measurements of external organization 
involvement. This can include involvement with regional, industrial, or international 
organizations that are largely voluntary. Having more open involvement with external 
organizations can give more credibility to CSR reports as they are usually increasing their 
transparency by reporting their internal goals and policies to outside evaluations. 
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Additionally, the approval of CSR reports from international organizations can open or 
close international markets to MNCs and even prompt local regulators to increase 
regulations (GRI 2011). As a result, the external organization policies (EOP) section 
measures how MNCs work with environmental international organizations and other 
environmental industry groups. To measure this, the indicators show the relationship 
between the MNC and external green organization: 
• (EOP01) Does the company invest in research for environmental technologies
externally?
o Most companies that have started to prioritize environmental polices
might invest in their own technologies, but some might also invest in
universities or think tanks to also do this research. When they invest in
universities or think tanks to do this research it shows a willingness to
invest in environmental technology that might benefit those outside of the
corporation.
• (EOP08) Does the company participates in an industry environmental
organization?
o More often corporations will be in industry level organization before
international organization. The environmental goals and policies at this
level are specific to the needs of the industry.
• (EOP04) Are they a member of an international environmental organization?
• (EOP02) Does the corporation share their experiences with international
organizations/business group?
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o This must be the sharing of environmental data with some internationally
recognized organization or business group facilitating business
sustainability.
• (EOP06) Do they promote and recognize research from international
environmental stewardship bodies?
o i.e., the United Nations Sustainability Goals. Does not require partnership
with the organization.
• (EOP03) Do they partner with Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) to
promote and disseminate environmental information?
o This indicator shows that not only is the corporation interacting with the
organization, but it is promoting and disseminating the information that
they are given from the NGO. This can include putting this information in
their CSR reports or linking to further environmental information. Will
mention their partnership with the NGO in the report.
• (EOP05) Have they been recognized by an international or regional body?
o An international or regional organization has recognized the efforts of the
corporation to be sustainable or to reduce their pollution. This must be an
international or regional award and not within a country, i.e., SEAL
Award, World’s Most Ethical Companies, CIEEM Awards.
• (EOP07) Do they promote environmental stewardship in suppliers?
o Not only monitors upstream sustainability, but actively encourages
suppliers to use sustainable practices.
• (EOP10) Do they promote environmental stewardship in industrial peers?
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• (EOP11) Do they chair/co-chair an industrial group on the environment?
o Or any other leadership role in an industrial or international level
group/committee/organization.
• (EOP09) Did the company found an environmental organization?
o This could be at the national, regional, or international level.
Reporting Policies (REP) 
Reporting is a variable measuring part of the EMS system and gives feedback for 
how transparent the company is: the more transparent the greener. This is measured 
through the disclosure of the information, companies who want to appear green offer 
(historical) data on their environmental emissions and pollution (Jose and Lee 2007; 
Clarkson et al. 2008; Takahashi and Meisner 2012). The greener companies may verify 
their reporting practices and numbers, compare their practices to their environmental 
goals, and are as transparent as possible about their environmental behavior. This variable 
uses different reporting indicators to indicate the greenness of the CSR report:  
• (REP01) Does the company have environmental data in the CSR?
o Presents data on environmental practices from the current year and may
include energy consumption, water use, CO2 emissions, pollutant or
chemical releases etc. Data on at least two of these factors must be
present.
• (REP02) Do they present any of the environmental data relative to industrial peers
or industrial average?
o This is to comparatively show their environmental impact compared to
their larger industry.
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• (REP03) Is the data given as a historical trend?
o Data presented must be from at least the last 5 years.
• (REP04) Is the data reported relative to corporate targets?
o Could show their data in comparison the targets from the previous year.
Could be shown has a percent of goal achieved. Only possible if a tangible
goal had been stated.
• (REP05) Is the data presented in absolute and normalized forms?
o Data is not just given in absolute terms, the raw number or net impact, but
also in normalized form such as the relative impact given changes in
production. If pollution/emissions went down but was caused by overall
production decreases this is not a change in policy/practice.
• (REP06) Is the data presented at disaggregate levels?
o Not only is data at the entire company level but is also presented at
disaggregate levels including factor level, regional/geographic segment
level, etc.
• (REP07) Is the data certified by an external third party?
o Only possible if environmental data is given in numeric and/or financial
terms. Must specifically have the environmental data checked.
• (REP08) Does the company use global initiatives/standards as a baseline to report
environmental impacts (GRI, ISO, etc.)?
Community and Social Policies (CSP)
Community and social policies show a company’s external commitments to the
environment outside of their own corporation. The more green a company is the more 
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they meet the needs of all their stakeholder groups now and into the future(Hockerts 
1999, 32). These companies show more accountability and transparency by showing how 
they are institutionalizing stakeholder communication and programs that meet the needs 
and demands of stakeholders (Schaltegger and Burritt 2000; Bolívar Rodríguez 2009). 
These MNCs will be taking up community initiatives, advertisement, and environmental 
clean-up programs that would be extoled in their sustainability reports and would be 
reporting the success of these programs (Jose and Lee 2007). Using Fishkin and Luskini’s 
(2005) outline of deliberation as a baseline, this indicator has measurements for 
stakeholder policies and practices that are informative and comprehensive:  
• (CSP02) Does the company conduct public forum to assess company impacts?
o This is any open public forum to provide community response to corporate
activities. An example of this is the “Open to the Public Day” by Petro
China, in which people can assess the impacts of Petro China activities.
• (CSP14) Does the company set up public forums to assess future projects in an
area?
o The company sets up feedback opportunities for future projects that are
going into an area.
• (CSP04) Does the company fulfil their statutory requirement to report to their
stakeholders?
o Company must provide information to their stakeholders through their
disclosure statements. This is fulfilled when a company is meeting its
statutory requirements at the international or domestic level.
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• (CSP05) Does the company put out environmental reports or updates more than
once a year?
o Greener companies may put out reports multiple times a year, going
beyond regulatory standards.
• (CSP03) Is there a bi-directional communication mechanism for shareholders?
o The company must communicate with shareholders and allow them to
respond back. This could be email, telephone, etc. Any bi-directional
communication device.
• (CSP06) Is there a “mailbox” to receive public feedback?
o This is an email, phone number or physical address where all stakeholders
may address problems with the company. This “mailbox” can be used by
anyone to leave feedback related to the environment for companies.
• (CSP07) Does the company show evidence that they react to stakeholder
wants/needs?
o The company reports evidence to show that they are reacting to
stakeholder wants or needs. This could be direct responses to public
feedback or communication with different stakeholder groups.
• (CSP08) Does the company allow or plans to allow stakeholder groups to be
active in the environmental disclosure process?
o The company has a forum, group, or feedback mechanism for stakeholder
groups to provide direct response to the environmental sections of the
CSR report.
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• (CSP01) Does the company have an environmental stewardship campaign for
downstream sustainability?
o This type of campaign seeks to inform consumers of how to use the
product sustainably.
• (CSP12) Does the company have an environmental education advertisement
campaign?
o The company engages in advertisement to educate the community on
sustainability or environmental issues.
• (CSP09) Does the company have goals or initiatives at the community level?
o This could be any environmental activity at the community level that the
company plans to partake in, i.e. will plant a certain number of trees, will
have so many environmental forums, etc.
• (CSP13) Does the company report on the achievements of these goals or
initiatives?
o The company reports on their ability to meet these goals, across multiple
sites.
• (CSP10) Has the company set up environmental programs at the community
level?
o This must be an actual program that the company has set up (not just a
donor), this could be a program to plant trees, clean up trash, etc.
• (CSP11) Has community program across at least two different operating sites?
o These community programs are not only in their own country.
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Regulatory Policies (REG) 
Regulatory Environment Policies (REG) is an indicator of compliance with 
environmental regulation and participation in the regulatory process. Greener companies 
report their political actions, and the times that they lobby or promote environmentally 
friendly policies to governments (Jose and Lee 2007). The companies have to report any 
fines, so it is easy to asses if they have complied. This variable uses different regulatory 
engagement indicators to indicate the greenness of the CSR report: 
• (REG06) Does the company break any laws?
o The company is within legal requirements and has not faced any fines
from pollution or emissions violations.
• (REG01) Does the company’s policy exceed regulatory standards?
o The company goes beyond regulatory requirements at the
national/international level.
• (REG08) Does the company change policy to continually exceed regulatory
standards?
o The company actually strives to improve environmental practices and
policies above the regulatory requirements.
• (REG02) Is corporate reporting in compliance with external regulations?
o The company follows any national or international guidelines in its
reporting processes (i.e., ISO or domestic regulatory)
• (REG03) Does the company participation in any strategic relationships with
government departments?
152 
o The company may report that it works with domestic regulatory agencies
to provide data or work with them on environmental issues. This can be
any level of interaction with the government.
• (REG04) Does the company attend any political forums/seminars on
environmental issues?
o The company participates in government run forums or seminars at any
level of government.
• (REG05) Does the company offer environmental expertise to the government?
o The company specifically works with the government on environmental
issues and shares their expertise. This is a higher level of interaction and
involves sitting on or working directly with environmental committees.
• (REG07) Does the company promote increased environmental requirements?
o The company works with the government to create more comprehensive
regulations.
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TITLE CODE SOURCE 
External Organization Policy EOP 
Invests in outside companies/organizations to promote 
environmental technology. 
EOP01 
Clarkson et al. (2008); Hahn and 
Kühnen (2013) 
Share’s company environmental experience with international 
organizations/businesses 
EOP02 Hahn and Kühnen (2013) 
Partners with Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) to 
promote and disseminate environmental information 
EOP03 Hahn and Kühnen (2013) 
Is a member of an international environmental organization EOP04 Hahn and Kühnen (2013) 
Recognized for sustainability efforts by international 
organization 
EOP05 Hahn and Kühnen (2013) 
Promotes and recognizes research from international 
environmental stewardship bodies. 
EOP06 Hahn and Kühnen (2013) 
Promotes environmental stewardship in suppliers (upstream 
sustainability) 
EOP07 Jose and Lee (2007); Wolf (2014) 
Participates in an industry related environmental organization; EOP08 
Clarkson et al. (2008); Hahn and 
Kühnen (2013) 
Founded an industry environmental organization; EOP09 
Clarkson et al. (2008); Hahn and 
Kühnen (2013) 
Promotes solutions to environmental issues in industry peers; EOP10 Hahn and Kühnen (2013) 
Chairs/co-chairs an industrial group on the environment EOP11 Hahn and Kühnen (2013) 
Environmental Planning and Policy EPP 
The company expresses clear tangible goals to be achieved EPP01 
Jose and Lee (2007); Clarkson et al. 
(2008) 
There is a deadline for goals to be achieved; EPP02 
Jose and Lee (2007); Clarkson et al. 
(2008) 
Policy prioritization puts an emphasis on sustainability over 
profitability; 
EPP03 
Jose and Lee (2007); Clarkson et al. 
(2008) 
Company policy includes assessment of product lifecycle 
goals  
EPP04 
Clarkson et al. (2008); Hahn and 
Kühnen (2013) 
Internal audits of environmental performance throughout the 
company; Performs verification audits on all global facilities 
EPP05 
Clarkson et al. (2008); Hahn and 
Kühnen (2013) 
An environmental committee or department EPP06 
Jose and Lee (2007); Clarkson et al. 
(2008) 
Entities abroad are subject to the same environmental policy 
as the headquarters 
EPP07 
Clarkson et al. (2008); Hahn and 
Kühnen (2013) 
Executive level of Environmental Manager EPP08 
Jose and Lee (2007); Hahn and 
Kühnen (2013) 
Invests in the development of environmentally friendly 
technologies for their own use; 
EPP09 Clarkson et al. (2008) 
Employee environmental training programs EPP10 Clarkson et al. (2008) 
Employs Environmental Management Systems (EMS) EPP11 
Jose and Lee (2007); Clarkson et al. 
(2008) 
Policy includes direct input from stakeholder groups. EPP12 
Clarkson et al. (2008); Hahn and 
Kühnen (2013) 
Regulatory Policy REG 
Policy is based on exceeding regulatory standards, not just 
meeting minimum requirements; 
REG01 
Scherer and Palazzo (2011); Clarkson 
et al. (2008) 
Corporate reports are in compliance with external regulations 
(national, ISO, GRI) 
REG02 
Scherer and Palazzo (2011); Hahn and 
Kühnen (2013) 
Participates in strategic cooperation with government 
departments 
REG03 
Scherer and Palazzo (2011); Hahn and 
Kühnen (2013) 
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Attends political forums/seminars REG04 Hahn and Kühnen (2013) 
Offers company expertise to governments REG05 
Clarkson et al. (2008); Hahn and 
Kühnen (2013) 
Is in accordance with legal requirements REG06 
Scherer and Palazzo (2011); Hahn and 
Kühnen (2013) 
Promotes increased environmental requirements REG07 
Scherer and Palazzo (2011); Hahn and 
Kühnen (2013) 
Improves goals to EXCEED political requirements REG08 
Scherer and Palazzo (2011); Hahn and 
Kühnen (2013) 
Reporting REP 
Data on environmental practices is presented REP01 
Clarkson et al. (2008); Hahn and 
Kühnen (2013) 
Data relative to industrial peers or industrial average is 
presented  
REP02 
Clarkson et al. (2008); Hahn and 
Kühnen (2013) 
Data is given as a historical trend (shows comparisons with at 
least 5 years of past data) 
REP03 
Clarkson et al. (2008); Hahn and 
Kühnen (2013) 
Data is reported relative to corporate targets REP04 
Clarkson et al. (2008); Hahn and 
Kühnen (2013) 
Data is presented in absolute and normalized forms REP05 
Clarkson et al. (2008); Hahn and 
Kühnen (2013) 
Data is presented at disaggregate levels (i.e. factory, business 
unit, geographic segment) 
REP06 
Clarkson et al. (2008); Hahn and 
Kühnen (2013) 
Company environmental reports are certified by an external 
third party 
REP07 
Clarkson et al. (2008); Hahn and 
Kühnen (2013) 
Uses global initiatives to report on environmental issues 
(GRI, ISO, etc.) 
REP08 
Clarkson et al. (2008); Hahn and 
Kühnen (2013) 
Community and Social Policy CSP 
Promotes consumer environmental stewardship. CSP01 Hahn and Kühnen (2013) 
Corporation conducts public assessments of environmental 
impacts  
CSP02 Hahn and Kühnen (2013) 
Bidirectional communication with stakeholders CSP03 
Herzig and Schalteggar (2006); Hahn 
and Kühnen (2013) 
Fulfills statutory information disclosure to shareholders (legal 
requirements from state or international bodies) 
CSP04 
Clarkson et al. (2008); Herzig and 
Schalteggar (2006) 
Issues reports and announces results on (at least) an annual 
basis 
CSP05 
Wolf (2014); Herzig and Schalteggar 
(2006) 
Has a dedicated to “mailbox” to receive public opinion CSP06 Herzig and Schalteggar (2006) 
Reacts to stakeholder wants/needs (shows evidence that some 
change was made due to stakeholder feedback) 
CSP07 
Wolf (2014); Herzig and Schalteggar 
(2006) 
Stakeholders have an active role in the environmental 
disclosure practice (forum, stakeholder group, etc.) 
CSP08 
Wolf (2014); Clarkson et al. (2008); 
Herzig and Schalteggar (2006) 
Has a set of initiatives or goals at the community level CSP09 Hahn and Kühnen (2013) 
Set up community environmental programs (such as a 
community clean up, tree planting), company must be founder 
not participator/donor 
CSP10 Hahn and Kühnen (2013); 
Partners with local community programs (across at least two 
different operation sites) 
CSP11 Hahn and Kühnen (2013) 
Has an environmental advertisement program CSP12 Hahn and Kühnen (2013) 
Reports on outcomes/success of environmental community 
outreach  
CSP13 Hahn and Kühnen (2013) 
Sets up community engagement forums for future projects CSP14 Hahn and Kühnen (2013) 
Table ii: List of Variables for Calculating Corporate Greenness 
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APPENDIX B: CHAPTER 3 COUNTRY LISTS 
Source Developing Countries 
Afghanistan Jordan 
Algeria Kazakhstan 
Angola Kenya 
Argentina Lebanon 
Armenia Macau 
Azerbaijan Macedonia  
Bahamas Malaysia 
Bangladesh Mauritius 
Barbados Mexico 
Belarus Morocco 
Bermuda Myanmar (Burma) 
Bolivia Namibia 
Bosnia-Herzegovina Nigeria 
Botswana Pakistan 
Brazil Panama 
Bulgaria Peru 
Cayman Islands Philippines 
Chile Russia 
China Rwanda 
Colombia Samoa 
Costa Rica San Marino 
Cote d'Ivoire (Ivory Coast) Serbia 
Cuba Seychelles 
Dominican Republic South Africa 
Ecuador Sri Lanka 
Egypt Sudan 
El Salvador Syria 
Ethiopia Tanzania 
Georgia Thailand 
Ghana Tunisia 
Guatemala Turkey 
Haiti Uganda 
Honduras Ukraine 
India Uruguay 
Indonesia Venezuela 
Iran Vietnam 
Iraq Yemen 
Jamaica Zambia 
Zimbabwe 
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Host Developing Country List 
Cuba Burkina Faso Sudan  
Haiti Liberia Iran 
Dominican Republic Sierra Leone Turkey 
Jamaica Ghana Iraq 
Dominica Togo Egypt 
Grenada Cameroon Syria 
St Lucia Nigeria Lebanon 
Mexico Gabon Jordan 
Belize Chad Yemen 
Guatemala Congo Afghanistan 
Honduras Democratic Republic of Congo Turkmenistan 
El Salvador Uganda Tajikistan 
Nicaragua Kenya Kyrgyzstan 
Costa Rica Tanzania Uzbekistan 
Panama Burundi Kazakhstan 
Colombia Rwanda China 
Venezuela Djibouti Mongolia 
Guyana Ethiopia  India 
Ecuador Eritrea Bhutan 
Peru Angola Pakistan 
Brazil Mozambique Bangladesh 
Bolivia Zambia Myanmar 
Paraguay Zimbabwe Sri Lanka 
Argentina Malawi Nepal 
Albania South Africa Thailand 
Montenegro Namibia Cambodia 
Macedonia Lesotho Laos 
Bosnia and Herzegovina Botswana Vietnam 
Bulgaria Madagascar Malaysia  
Moldova Mauritius Philippines 
Russia Seychelles Indonesia 
Ukraine Morocco Papua New Guinea 
Belarus Algeria Micronesia 
Armenia Tunisia Niger 
Georgia Libya Cote d'Ivoire 
Azerbaijan Senegal Guinea 
Equatorial Guinea Benin 
Gambia Mauritania 
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APPENDIX C: CHAPTER 4 ADDITIONAL TABPLES 
Additional Tables 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES Water Access 
(logged) 
Air Quality
Index 
NOx 
(logged) 
CO2 
(logged) 
Chinese FDI Flows -0.000434** -0.190* -0.000732 0.0402*** 
(lagged 2 years) (0.000165) (0.0975) (0.00213) (0.0144) 
FDI (% of GDP) -5.08e-05 -0.275 0.0216 -0.00663
(lagged 2 years) (0.000218) (0.176) (0.0133) (0.0175)
GDP per Capita 0.00234 -5.012* 0.0262 0.605***
(logged) (0.00203) (2.779) (0.0275) (0.113)
Trade (% of GDP) -0.00125 0.573 -0.240** 0.162
(0.00119) (1.288) (0.101) (0.105)
Water Access 0.959***
(lagged) (0.00933)
Constant 0.174*** 105.8*** 8.814*** 3.116*** 
(0.0407) (23.39) (0.404) (0.851) 
Observations 482 405 166 248 
R-squared 0.997 0.302 0.123 0.566 
Number of Countries 47 49 44 45 
Table iii: (Robustness Check) Country and Year Fixed Effects Regression Model of the 
effect of Chinese FDI on environmental resources in African Countries (Source: Author, 
Data: China-Africa Dataset (China-Africa Research Initiative 2019) and QoG Standard 
Dataset (Teorell et al. 2013)). Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** 
p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES Water Access 
(logged) 
Air Quality 
Index 
NOx 
(logged) 
CO2 
(logged) 
Chinese FDI Flows -0.000322* -0.335*** 0.00855*** 0.0390*** 
(lagged 2 years) (0.000162) (0.0906) (0.00267) (0.0145) 
FDI (% of GDP) 5.09e-05 -0.227 0.00935 -0.0233*
(lagged 2 years) (0.000245) (0.137) (0.00854) (0.0131)
Domestic Investment -0.000110** 0.0840 -0.00188* 0.00177
(lagged 2 years) (5.24e-05) (0.0585) (0.000971) (0.00386)
GDP per Capita 0.00252 -8.166 0.0572 0.875***
(logged) (0.00300) (7.055) (0.136) (0.226)
Democracy -0.000144 0.0877 -0.00356 -0.00335
(0.000238) (0.259) (0.00959) (0.0217)
Rapid Economic -0.000114 -0.199 0.00616 0.0176
Growth (logged) (0.000170) (0.164) (0.0183) (0.0155)
Trade (% of GDP) -0.000351 -0.0620 -0.231* 0.150
(0.00128) (1.372) (0.123) (0.0995)
Population Growth 2.72e-05 -2.013 0.0126 -0.148
(logged) (0.000753) (1.652) (0.0447) (0.165)
Water (logged) 0.953***
(lagged) (0.0102)
Constant 0.196*** 130.8** 8.580*** 1.343 
(0.0438) (51.05) (0.813) (1.473) 
Observations 396 331 146 226 
R-squared 0.997 0.355 0.185 0.591 
Number of Countries 43 45 43 45 
Table iv: (Robustness Check) Country and Year Fixed Effects Regression Model of the 
effect of Chinese FDI on environmental resources in African Countries without HDI 
(Source: Author, Data: China-Africa Dataset (China-Africa Research Initiative 2019) 
and QoG Standard Dataset (Teorell et al. 2013)). Robust standard errors in parentheses, 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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